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INTRODUCTION:
The Pornographical.
Whilst this thesis began through curiosity with the peculiar nature of 
pornography, or rather pornographies, its main focus is not on the pornography 
industry and it's ideological battles. 1 Rather than providing a detailed analysis 
of specific genres of pornography and particular examples from within these 
genres, this thesis sketches out and introduces a concept of "the pornographicaF 
from the 'root form' of pornography.2 The pornographical is put forward as a 
name for the specific conjuncture between pleasure and the political, one that 
forms a cultural cartography of the sexual fantasises and fetishes central to a 
political and sexual account of the forces meshed in the social networks that 
serve to constitute an ethical reality.3 These paradoxical communities of the
1 Regarding the use of gender specifics, this thesis will be written using she/he; wo/man; her/his etc., 
unless a quote specifically uses he or she, or unless the above usage changes the meaning of the quote.
2 The concept of the pornographical arose from discussions with this thesis supervisor, Prof. Golding with 
regard to the relationship between the adjectival and noun forms of the verb, to pomograph. Prof 
Golding's own work puts forward the arts work of something as having a sexual component; one that 
forms an aesthetics libidinal economies, projected memories and acoustic ruptures, or as she names it a 
'blood poetics': towards a non-fascist life. S. Golding/johnny de philo (ed), Eight Technologies of 
Otherness. (London: Routledge, 1997). William Haver also ruminates on the subject of a 'pornographic 
life'; one that he defines as the task ofpoiesis, or as the presentation of the non-relation to singularity. He 
writes: "Pornography is a presentation of the essential stupidity of the sense and the affects. This is what 
is called obscenity, the supplement of the possibility of interpretation, where cocks are only cocks, cunts 
are only cunts, assholes only assholes, and a cigar is only ever a cigar. What is obscene about 
pornography, and what is essentially pornographic inpoiesis, is the fact that it presents the impossible non- 
relation to singularity, the very impossibility of interpretation. Again: through its manifold representation, 
pornography presents what needs no interpretation or representation; in pornography, the senses are 
invariably stupid, what you see is what you see." W. Haver, "Pornographically man dwells ...... towards
an irresponsible reading of Heidegger" in Issues in Contemporary Culture and Aesthetics, VoL 12, 
edited by S. Golding/johnny de philo. (Maastricht: Jan Van Eyck Akademie, August 2001), p. 3.
3 In this way pornography, as an industry, discourse and genre is manifested in the specifics of it's 
conjuncture of pleasure to the ethicio-political, but that the politics of these dynamics, that the mannerisms 
and dynamics of a pornographic code is not subsumed or contained to this one genre, subordinating all 
other genres. Pornography is not something that just people in the industry produce. Through the impact 
of technology many lovers and acquaintances make pornography in their memories, videos, photos and 
web pages. 'The pornographical' is a site of degrees of paradoxes; a site that locates, through pornography 
as an industry, genre, name and in the 'human' bodily communication of pornographic codes, degrees of 
social taboos; fetishes; fantasies; sexual, gender and racial identities; repressions; oppressions; prohibitions 
and proprieties that are central to a sexual and political account of the forces meshed in the social and 
cultural networks that serve to constitute reality.
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pornographical are both public and anonymous, yielding a peculiar cultural 
'memory space' or psyche of fantasy sexual identities.
One of the aspects that this thesis examines is the way in which 
pornography embodies a peculiar singularity, particularly around aesthetics and 
its ethical relationship to the universal and the personal. Pornography creates a 
strange community through its technological distance, manner and anonymity. 
These pornographical communities operate with and permeate a peculiar 
language structure that belongs paradoxically to the political presence of bodies, 
of skin. It is argued that the pornographical is a kind of dynamic, an unsayable 
something that has tonalities and techne to it, one that contours a bodily 
meaning; one that is bloody, stripped of moral consolation in presenting the 
unspeakable, in demonstrating the fluidities of sexual roles, the shifting of 
identities, the complicity of ideologies and the confusion between victims and 
oppressors. In addressing the body politic, the pornographical is a very 
different kind of dynamic than the bloodless absolute negativity of 
Enlightenment and the weight of its contingent necessity.
As a dynamic to thought, the pornographical, is raised as a way of thinking 
that allows thought to be muscular and sexual rather than driven by a need for 
administrative efficiency to classify, categorize, and cleanly represent. The 
pornographical is posited as an economy of identity that does not arise from a 
castration, a lack, a deep cut, an inbetween or an economy of signs or a politics 
of equivalences. It is a dynamic to the art and music, to name just a few, of 
Spencer Tunick; Marlene Dumas; Helen Chadwick; Cindy Sherman; Patricia 
Piccinini; Throbbing Gristle; Big Black; Benny Benassi; and Michael Collins.4
4 These artists and musicians comment in their works on the body, its grotesqueness and visceral nature of 
the skin; of the skins folds, of the physicality and politics of the bodies flesh. Patricia Piccinini's works
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This thesis derived the notion of the pornographical not as a general 
overarching term but from specific defining manners and traits of pornography 
and the pornographic genres. Pornography is not a timeless entity. Despite it's 
ancient etymology from the Greek word lpornographos' 5 , defined as the 
'writings of prostitutes', it is only during the 1800s that the genre, the series of 
written, engraved and printed products, was given the name: "pornography."6 
Previous to the seventeenth century it is problematic to chart a history of 
pornography that would be delimited by the concept 'pornography', given that 
the delimitation itself is a modern invention. 7 This is not to say that there were
express the nature of responsibility and vulnerbilites of our world and our changing relationship to the 
technological and the natural world. Her 'We Are Family' sculptures are detailed and emotive in their 
portrayal of the sexual nature of the body and its warmth, detailing the wrinkles and crevices of the skin 
and the accuracy of the body stances of the differing sculptures and their relationship to each other and 
even a 'gameboy'. Piccinini makes the bizarre and unbelievable come to life in a believable and non-sci- 
fi manner: http://patriciapiccinini.net/
Marlene Dumas' paintings again comment on the political and ever present nature of bodies 
violating taboos of motherhood; childhood; sexuality; gender; religion and racism. Her painting 
undermines the moral underpinnings of society and any sense of a universally held belief system. Spencer 
Tunick presents installations of skin and bodies and emphasises their political presence in these urban 
landscapes. Cindy Sherman's works again play with the body and the identifications, fears and fantasies 
that surround it. Helen Chadwick too challenges sexual and gendered assumptions of identity and the 
universal systems that uphold them. Her works attempt to approach the body in terms that Chadwick 
describes as an "exchange of matter and energy beyond power relations". Helen Chadwick quoted in Eva 
Martisching, "Getting into the Artist's Head" in Helen Chadwick, edited by Mark Sladen. (Ostfildern, 
Germany: Barbican Art Gallery/ Harje Cantz Publishers, 2004), p. 53.
The moans, groans and 'dirty talk' that accompany a Throbbing Gristle track are pornographic, if 
not pornography. Big Black electronic sexual crescendo's force one into thinking sex, as does Benny 
Benassi mixes, especially coupled with the visual displays that are like watching a Penthouse spread come 
to life.
5 According to Walter Kendrick, 'pornographos' seems to be a word rarely used in ancient Greece. He 
locates only one short passage in an ancient text where 'pornographer' is fleeting used, that of the 
Deinosophistae by Atheneaus, as pornographoi meaning 'whorepainters'. W. Kendrick, The Secret 
Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 11.
6 The term 'pornography first emerged in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1857, and most English 
variations on the word such as pornographer and pornographic date from the middle or the end of the 
nineteenth century. In France, according to the Tresor de la langue francaise, the word 'pornographe' 
appeared slightly earlier in Restif de la Bretonne's treatise of 1769. This titled Le Pornographe as 
referring to the writings about prostitution. The etymological offshoots of pornographique, pornographe 
and pornographie date from the 1830s and 1840s, and are referred to as obscene or immoral writings and 
images. L. Hunt, The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800. 
(New York: Zone Books, 1996), pp. 13 -15.
7 Kendrick locates the invention of the usage of the concept 'pornography' to the excavation of erotic 
Greek and Roman ceremonial artefacts during the 1800s. He argues that this lead to the invention of the 
cultural space of the museum, a 'secret museum' with restricted access to an elite category of people 'of 
mature age and of proven morality'. More than a hundred objects were placed within this 'Cabinet of 
Obscene Objects'. The name given to these objects was that of 'pornography'. The first systematic 
catalogue for the regulation of these objects was in 1866 with the 'Pornographic Collection' in Victorian 
England. W. Kendrick, The Secret Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture, p. 32.
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no sexually graphic images, paintings, sculptures, throughout a history of 
'human communication' but that these would perhaps be gathered under 
differing but related genres such as ceremonial objects, of differing religious 
practices and fetishes, renaissance art, political satire and criticism of
o
libertinism.
What makes pornography such a volatile and uncomfortable issue is that 
pornography is just not nice. It is in some cases monstrous. As a genre or set of 
genres, pornography often offends standards set, not only by family and 
religious values, but also by one's aesthetic taste. Pornography could be said to 
highlight, and often be proactive in a way that is 'in your face' to the sensitive 
and tender areas of any culture and its sexual practices and insecurities. As the 
'bad child' of culture, pornography possesses a kind of 'working-class hero' 
glamour, taking 'well-aimed shots' at all those in high positions within the 
institutional and notable establishments. No one is too lofty that they cannot be 
reminded that they too fall under the demands of ones bodily functions, 
pleasures and needs. It is with this mannerism that pornography's libertine 
roots are disclosed.9
This thesis suggested that it is a techne or technology of comic humour 
that forms the aesthetics of pornography and is fundamental to the shifting 
social ground that establishes its meaning. 10 The term aesthetics is itself
8 L Hunt, The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800, pp. 
339.
9 The sixteenth century French social satirist, Rabelais, whose emphasis on the body and the grotesque, 
provides the most infamous example of libertinism. Also see the examples of De Sade's Juliette and 
Cleland's Fanny Hill or even Reage's Story of O where the female protagonist takes sexual licence in part 
because she is disobeying societal etiquette. See also Lynn Hunt (ed.), The Invention of Pornography: 
Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800, and M. Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World. 
(Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1984).
10 This thesis draws upon the Heideggerian use of this word, techne. Heidegger traces back the origins of 
man's scientific modernity to the Greek age, and discovers the belonging of technology to techne. As he
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historical, complex and intricate. Aesthetics can be broadly defined as that 
branch of philosophy that deals with the arts on the one hand and with the 
nature of aesthetic responses and ethical judgements on the other hand. 
Pornography tends to be categorised as a lower part cultural expression and as 
such it fails to be credited with being able to engage an audience in an aesthetic 
relationship or interaction. Given that pornography is far from being a coherent 
or stable category to define, what then are the demarcations that distinguish 
pornography, pornographic culture and the rest of what is known to be culture? 
What is it that fails to allow pornography to be seen as an expressive cultural 
form?
What, for example, are the borders that define transvestite pornography 
as more pornographic than the everyday 'fuck and suck ' pornography? Should 
not transvestite pornography be viewed as an act of self- portraiture, as an 
aesthetic act of self-definition and creation? If both art and pornography are 
immersed in commerce, what then differentiates one act of self-portraiture as 
mass - produced smut from another as art? Could not pornography be said to 
perform the same service as a site and style of expression of a cultural 
unconscious? It is these class distinctions that are interwoven in the categorical 
distinctions between the genres of art and pornography that allow for art to be 
adorned with the status of being a mode of moral etiquette. These class 
distinctions are at the heart of pornography's composition and comic humour. 
A techne or technology of comic humour serves to allows a participant the
writes: ".... Techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts 
of the mind and the fine arts. Techne belongs to bringing-forth, topoiesis; it is something poetic." Techne 
is a mode of a kind of poetic truth, that ofaletheia. As such techne is not an instrumental kind of truth 
concerned with the ordering and causes of things; rather it is a bringing-forth of truth in the sense of 
revealing what 'does not yet lie here before us'. M. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" in 
The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated and introduced by William Lovitt. 
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977), p. 13.
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distance through which to engage with the pornographic material and at the 
same time exposes the class distinctions embedded in every cultural psyche and 
discord.
This thesis suggests that though the pornographical is more of an 'ana- 
aesthetic' than an aesthetic form, and this can be seen through its techne of 
comic humour; of its usage of data compression and its 'ana-linguistic' nature. 11 
Laura Kipnis calls pornography an anti-aesthetic, a space of political and social 
significance that highlights some of the cultural sore spots in, as she writes:
"... Elucidating not only the connection between sex and the social, but 
between our desires, our "selves", and the casual everyday brutality of 
cultural conformity."12
This usage of the term anti-aesthetic is similar to Hal Foster's concept of an 
"anti-aesthetic" with which he names the practices as:
".... Cross-disciplinary in nature, that is sensitive to cultural forms 
engaged in a politic (e.g., feminist art) or rooted in a vernacular - that is, 
to forms that deny the idea of a privileged aesthetic realm."13
Foster wished to question the validity of the aesthetic categories in the 
contemporary cultural practices of art. He sought not to reinvent a form of 
modernist nihilism or of affirmative negation that seeks a space beyond 
representation, not a time of pure presence, but rather a critique cultural of
11 This thesis utilises Lyotard's notion of an anesthesia that he outlines in Heidegger and "the jews". In 
looking at questions of racism, Lyotard sketches out an anesthesia, as a kind of 'non- forgetting' that is 
neither inscribed within a subjective memory, nor as such, is it able to be forgotten. Instead it forms a kind 
of mimetic, poetic and non-representative witnessing to fight against the reification, abjection and 
soulnessness that come with 'after Auschwitz'. Lyotard puts anesthesia forward as: "A more "archaic" 
anxiety, and one that is precisely resistant to the formation of representations. It is this, and only this, 
extreme resistance that can nourish the resistance of contemporary art and writing to the "everything is 
possible". Anesthesia to fight against amnesia." J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", translated by 
Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts. (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 48.
12 L. Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America. (North Carolina: 
Duke University Press, 1999), p. 121.
13 H. Foster (ed), The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. (Washington: Bay Press, 1985), p. 
xv.
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representations and social identities. For Foster art is never outside of its 
politics. 14 Whilst taking on board these two similar concepts of an anti-aesthetic, 
my thesis develops and fleshes out in greater detail the anaesthetic impulse of 
pornography and its dispositif.
Pornography is always linked to and determined by a question of ethics, 
whether over its sexually explicit nature and the limits to its public expression 
or over judging what is and what is not pornography. This thesis looks at 
another dimension to pornography, one revealed through the ethicality and often 
political realm that is played out through a techne of comic humour: an ethical 
realm of the pornographical, a peculiar ana-aesthetic event. This thesis posits 
the pornographical as an unnameable and ungraspable dynamic; as a discursive 
economy that forms an economic, cultural graph of sexual energies; and as a 
non-discursive event. In this sense the pornographical is a peculiar and 
monstrous singularity, an ethical paradox that underscores not only the 
superfluous role of the mediation of any universal, but also 'ex-scribes' a 
meaning 'stripped bare' of any moral consolation and representable referent.
One of the aspects of pornography is that it is difficult to fully categorize 
or classify. As part of a sexual culture pornography is messy and resists being 
neatly packaged, cleanly posited and conceptually placed within a social 
hierarchy. The paradoxical field of pornography has been approached by a 
diversity of theorists that each allow, in differing ways, for pornography to be 
misrecognized as being sexually representative. As Linda Williams writes:
".... The impression exists that the problem posed in our contemporary 
age of proliferating sexual representations is one of extreme explicitness 
of representation - the question of where acceptable speech, expression
14 H. Foster (ed), The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, pp. 
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and practice end and gratuitous filth, 'pure' smut, an irredeemable 
'hardcore', begins."15
Feminist theorists have engaged with the problematic terrain of 
pornography in a diversity of ways, those are who concerned with questions of 
gender identity; those with a position around anti-censorship; those who suggest 
a politics of sexual radicalism; and those that raise questions around a 'required' 
censorship amongst others. The three former strands encourage the importance 
of pornography to be accessible, accessed and produced by women, and in 
seeing the industry allows for the positing of differing stereotypes for and of 
women as sexual; the sexual exploration of women's bodies and that they 'cum' 
and have 'hard-ons'. Joan Nestle, Anne McClintock, Gayle Rubin, Pat Califia, 
Sue Golding, Lynne Segal, Mary Mclntosh, Carol Vance, Kate Millet, Erica 
long, Nadine Strossen, Betty Friedan, Kaja Silverman and Avedon Carol are all 
feminists who look at the multi-faceted and sexual nature of being 'female' in 
contemporary cultures.
These women argue for the freedom to express sexual difference and 
oppose any social hierarchization of those different sexual practices or 
sexualities. As Gayle Rubin writes:
"The realm of sexuality also has its own internal politics, inequities, and 
modes of oppression. As with other aspects of human behaviour, the 
concrete institutional forms of sexuality at any given time and place are 
products of human activity. They are imbued with conflicts of interest 
and political maneuvering, both deliberate and incidental. In that sense, 
sex is always political. But there are also historical periods in which 
sexuality is more sharply contested and more overtly politicised. In such 
periods, the domain of erotic life is, in effect, renegotiated."16
15 L. Williams, "Pornographies on/scene or Different strokes for different folks " in Sex Exposed: Sexuality 
and the Pornography Debate, edited by Lynne Segal and Mary Mclntosh. (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1993), p. 233.
16 G. Rubin, "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality" in Pleasure and 
Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, edited by Carol S. Vance. (London: Pandora Press, 1992), p. 267.
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This thesis presents a way of discussing 'the realm of sexuality' through the 
pornographical. This way there is no essence, biological or otherwise, posited 
to sexuality and sexual practices, and as we shall see, pornography is a 
historically specific invention, one that has emerged alongside modern 
technologies and an increase in moral legislation. It is against pornography and 
the freedom of sexual expression that contemporary cultures are negotiating 
their sexual, gendered and racial identities.
For the prominent 'women against pornography', Andrea Dworkin, 
Catherine MacKinnon, Robin Morgan, Susan Brownmiller, Diana Russell, 
Laura Lederer, Susan Griffin, Susanne Kappeler and Adrienne Rich amongst 
others, consider pornography to be explicit and representative of heterosexual 
sexual relations, and consequently material that incites and affirms the 
'masculine' tendency for violence and rape. 17 Dworkin goes as far as to define 
all penetrative sex as the root cause of sexual violence. Robin Morgan's famous 
anti-pornography of 'pornography is the theory, and rape the practice' still
17 Both MacKinnon and Dworkin define pornography as violent and that the violence of pornography is the 
sex of pornography. For them there is no sexual arousal that can be possible without inequality, force, 
dominance and violation. They both assert that the obscenity laws have done little to protect society and 
the female gender from interpreting this as their sexuality and predilection for sexual arousal too, rather 
they have often glamorised and clouded the main concerns of the pornographer's work. It is over the 
question of social harm and violation of civil rights that comes from allowing the representational practices 
of sexual coercion that the US anti-pornography feminists, MacKinnon and Dworkin present pornography 
as entailing, that they drafted the 1983 Minneapolis Ordinances. C. MacKinnon, Only Words. (Harvard 
University Press: Massachusetts, 1996,) and A. Dworkin, Men Possessing Women. (London: The 
Women's Press, 1992).
MacKinnon summarises the legal definition of pornography, that Dworkin and herself put forward 
in the 1983 Minneapolis Ordinances, as: ".... The graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, 
whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of the following: (i) women are presented 
dehumanized as sexual objects, things or commodities; or (ii) women are presented as sexual objects who 
enjoy pain and humiliation; or (iii) women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure 
in being raped; or (iv) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or bruised or 
physically hurt; (v) women are presented in postures of sexual submission, servility or display; or (vi) 
women's body parts - including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, and buttocks - are exhibited, such that 
women are reduced to those parts; or (vii) women are presented as whores by nature; or (viii) women are 
presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or (ix) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, 
injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these 
conditions sexual. Pornography also includes 'the use of men, children or transsexuals in the place of 
women.'" C. MacKinnon, "Not a Moral Issue " in Feminism and Pornography, edited by Drucilla 
Cornell. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 185 - 186.
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reverberates today. 18 One of the difficulties with these arguments is that if male 
sexually is essentially predetermined to be violent and perverse then what is 
female sexuality? Asexual and peaceful, uninterested and uninvolved with 
power relations? Are women to be defined as just the hapless victims of male 
domination and abuse?
The position of 'required' censorship, in confusing pornography as 
sexually representative, see the industry of producing and encouraging sexually 
violent 'hate crimes' against women, rather than analysing it as a fantasy genre, 
where the sexually violent scenes of fantasy, are consensual, and sometimes 
according to an s/m fantasy format and 'language-game'. It is difficult to fix a 
singular and universal meaning to any image, text, film, or piece of music, what 
may be offensive to one woman may be enjoyable for another, either as a 
viewer or as a producer of pornography. 19 This is not to dismiss this 'volatile' 
and important issue in the debates about the genre of pornography, but an 
attempt to shift the framework in order to perhaps analyse them in a different 
light.
18 R. Morgan, "Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape" in Take Back the Night: Women on 
Pornography, edited by Laura Lederer. (London: Bantham Books, 1982), p. 125. As she writes: "There is 
no subject relevant to women so deliberately distorted as that of rape. This is because rape is the perfected 
act of male sexuality in a patriarchal culture - it is the ultimate metaphor for domination, violence, 
subjugation and possession.".
Linda Williams, in her book Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the " Frenzy of the Visible ", in 
commenting on the popular impact of this slogan notes the Commissioner James Dobson's use of this 
phrase in his report to the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. The Commissioner 
writes: "Pornography is degrading to women ... It is provided primarily for the lustful pleasure of men and 
boys who use it to generate excitation. And it is my belief, though evidence is not easily obtained, that a 
small but dangerous minority will then choose to act aggressively against the nearest available females. 
Pornography is the theory, rape is the practice." Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final 
Report, 2 volumes. (Washington D.C., 1986), Vol. 1, p. 78, quoted in L. Williams, Hard Core: Power, 
Pleasure, and the "Frenzy of the Visible". (London: Pandora Press, 1991), p. 16. This same committee 
recommended that pornography be separated into two classifications, one for violent and two for 
degrading.
19 As Gayle Rubin remarks: "Feminist anti-pornography ideology has always contained an implied, and 
sometimes overt, indictment of sadomasochism. The pictures of sucking and fucking that compromise the 
bulk of pornography may be unnerving to those who are not familiar with them. But it is hard to make a 
convincing case that such images are violent." G. Rubin,", "Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of 
the Politics of Sexuality" in Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality, edited by Carol S. 
Vance, p. 298.
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Pornography, as a genre, has been created as a political site of 
negotiation, a cultural battle zone for its ever emergent and emerging
OAdiscourse. In dealing with questions around pornography, my thesis also had 
to take into consideration the difficulties posed with exploring sexual practices, 
expressions and identities with their interwoven discourses of misogyny and 
cultural forms of racism and racial practices. One of the problematics in 
making a practical assessment of pornography and the contents of the genres 
arose in forming a decision over what made something pornographic material. 
The question of this decision raised the complexities of the collectivised, 
societal, cultural and individual standards that make something be considered 
pornography.
Through its invention both as a discourse of sexual knowledge, arousal, 
political satire and subversion, and as one to be catalogued and regulated,
/^ -I
pornography has been and is juxtaposed to the term 'obscene'. The etymology 
of the word 'obscene' is two-fold: derived from both the Latin terms ob 
ceanum, meaning 'from filth' and ob scena, defined as 'off or to one side of the
20 The understanding of pornography as a discourse here is influenced by Michel Foucault's writings on 
the historical emergence of modern discourses such as medicine, the prison, madness and sexuality. It is in 
this way that pornography is to be understood as an invention, as a product of new inventions of forms of 
regulation, new desires for knowledge and of the inventions of new technologies, of new means of 
distribution, of massification of a product and communication of/with it. Pornography is deposited as an 
industry that is sexually representative. As will be argued throughout this chapter, it is an industry that 
produces only sexual fantasy. This misrecognition perhaps comes from the forms of invention of modern 
discourses as documentary, as a search for the 'truth', for the 'truth' of sex. My thesis has suggested that 
there is no core essence or 'truth' to pornography anymore than there is to sex. 'Truth' perhaps is more of 
an invention itself. M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology on the Human Sciences. 
(London: Routledge, 1994); M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by A. M. Sheridan 
Smith. (London: Routledge, 1995); M. Foucault, Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond 
Roussel, translated by Charles Ruas. (London: The Athlone Press, 1987), M. Foucault, This is not a Pipe, 
translated and edited by James Harkness. (London: University of California Press, 1983), M. Foucault, The 
History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol 1, translated Robert Hurley. (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 
M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, Vol 2, translated Robert Hurley. (London: 
Penguin Books, 1990), and M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self, Vol 3, translated 
Robert Hurley. (London: Penguin Books, 1990).
21 Kendrick argues that although obscenity was invented as a term of distinction between the realms of 
public and private behaviour something changed, during the nineteenth century, the balance between 
obscenity and decency, private and public, and pornography emerged as a governmental concern. W. 
Kendrick, The Secret Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture, 
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stage.' Placed within paradigms of morality and desire, to pornograph is to be 
obscene, to witness the pornographic is to witness the obscene. The invention 
of the word 'pornography' emerged with the related definition as sexually 
graphic writings, images and sounds both of and by prostitutes, varying on the 
wording of the definition. As such it is connected to the taboo topic and 
activities of prostitution; the sexual enactments of fantasies in exchange for 
money; sexual promiscuity; sexual perversion; violation of taboos; performed 
fetishes; and a variety of gendered positions of sexual power. Pornography is 
defined against the traditional family values of marriage, procreation and 
monogamy as an immoral taboo.
Pornography is always linked to a question of ethics and liberal 
approaches to this question attempt, and must according to the logic of a 
separation of power within the liberal paradigms, to pose pornography as being 
equivalent to prominent societal moral values. As such pornography is posed as 
an alternative or improper representation of sexual matters. Equivalence is 
posited around the terms of accessibility and protection to and from 
pornography for the viewers and actors, as individuals, according to different 
categories of regulation, for example, those of age, gender, race, sexuality and 
sexual practices.
With Hobbes equivalence is given through an ontology of bodies in
^ 3
differential motion. This freedom is limited by a coercion of wills of moral
22 1. Tang, Pornography: The Secret History of Civilization. (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1999), p. 
29.
23 Hobbes defines two kinds of motions specific to animals, by which he means animals and animal 
wo/man. The first of these he names vital! motion, a motion mat continues throughout the life span of any 
animal and any wo/man. Examples that Hobbes provides of such a motion are ones that need aid from the 
imagination, such as the coursing of one's blood, one's breathing, one's pulse, and the concoction of one's 
nutrition and excretion. The second, Hobbes names as animal or voluntary motion involves the 
imagination as the origin of the senses, and their role in moving one's limbs and speech facilities. As 
Hobbes writes: "These small beginnings of Motion, within the body of Man, before they appear in
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obligation. For Hobbes, in the counterfactual state of nature, humankind is 
"solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short", living according to the sole interests 
of self-preservation.24 Hobbes defines this self-interestedness as a natural right 
that lacks political authority. For him/her it is a fear of death and a longing for 
material security and peace that guides mankind to enter into a social contract, 
whereby each individual gives, of his/her own volition, as an act of will, his/her 
right to self-governance to the sovereign or Leviathan. The Leviathan has a 
moral obligation of natural law to represent this counterfactual social contract, 
for it is the unity of the individual wills that authorizes the Leviathan to 
represent the people as one body. Appetites of natural lust and sexual pleasures 
are to be regulated accordingly by the sovereign body.
Locke extends the classical liberal epistemology further through 
defining every wo/man's property as that of his/her own person, that of his/her
o ^body. He puts forwards a view of natural mankind as being one of a state of 
equality, whereby the ability to reason enables individuals not to harm the 
liberty and possessions of another, and able to judge a rightness of punishment 
for those who transgress against them. For Locke civil society is a natural 
evolvement that develops from conjugal and kinship origins. Such a society 
possesses established laws, judicature and adjudicating authorities and is 
incompatible with an absolute monarchy or authority of a Leviathan.26 Sexual
walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR." It is these 
endeavours that Hobbes names appetites and aversions. T. Hobbes, Part I, "Of Man", Ch. 6, Leviathan, 
edited by C.B. Macpherson. (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 119.
24 T. Hobbes, Part I, "Of Man", Ch. 13, Leviathan, 
25 Locke writes: "Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man has a 
Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the 
Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his." J. Locke, Book II, Ch. 5, "Of Property", § 27, Two 
Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 
287 - 288.
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pleasures are governed by the state but with the consensual agreement of civil 
society, for all men are free to establish new governments. Pornography is 
defined against the traditional family values of marriage, procreation and 
monogamy as immoral, lacking in the imagination that takes hold of the senses 
in love.
Rousseau challenges both of these versions of a natural human state.27 
Whilst still separating a natural state and law from that of the divine, Rousseau 
contends that natural man is timid, isolated, peaceful and 'self-hooded'. For 
him society is an invention rather than a natural state to humans, for pity as well 
as self- preservation and interest is a natural state to being human.28 Rousseau 
puts forward the idea that natural humans are 'soft-hearted', capable of reasoned 
sentiment, and as such able to invent a society in which they can build 
something better, a higher form of moral goodness.
In this sense political society is like a human body with a will that takes 
care of its general well being; this will Rousseau names, as the general will.29
26 J. Locke, Book II, Ch. 7, "Of Political or Civil Society", § 77 - 94, Two Treatises of Government, pp. 
318-330.
27 J-J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, translated by D. A. Cress, and introduced by 
James Miller. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992) and On the Social Contract, translated 
by Donald A. Cress, and introduced by Peter Gay. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987).
28 As Rousseau writes: "It is therefore quite certain that pity is a natural sentiment, which by moderating in 
each individual the activity of the love of oneself, contributes to the mutual preservation of the entire 
species. Pity is what carries us without reflection to the aid of those we see suffering. Pity is what, in the 
state of nature, takes the place of laws, mores, and virtue, with the advantage that no one is tempted to 
disobey its sweet voice. Pity is what will prevent every robust savage from robbing a weak child or an 
infirm old man of his hard-earned subsistence, if he himself expects to be able to find his own someplace 
else. Instead of the sublime maxim of reasoned justice, Do unto others as you would have them to do unto 
you, pity inspires all men with another maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect but perhaps more 
useful than the preceding one: Do what is good for you with as little harm as possible to others." J-J. 
Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 
29 Rousseau defines the social compact in the following terms: "Each of us places his person and all his 
power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each member as 
an indivisible part of the whole.
At once, in the place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association 
produces a moral and collective body composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, 
which receives from the same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will. This public person, formed 
thus by union of all the others formerly took the name city, and at present takes the name republic or body 
politic, which is called, state by its members when it is passive, sovereign when it is active, power when
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Rousseau locates a set of maxims for the general will stating that it must be 
followed in every action, that every particular will is in accordance with the 
general will and that the public needs are satisfied. In this way the general will 
is conceived as being morally legitimate in its sovereignty, for it is always 
directing itself for the public good and not for the interests of particular groups, 
for it is not representative of a majority or collective set of wills. For Rousseau 
the sovereignty of the general will allows people's freedom to be secure rather 
than limiting it, and the sexual pleasures of lust and pornography amongst 
others conform to the moral aims of public health.30
For Bentham there is no such thing as a social contract, something he 
dismisses as a useless piece of unhistorical fiction.31 He envisions a natural 
human state as anarchical, free from all legal restraint and the creation of 
governments arises from force or habit rather than natural evolution.32 Bentham
compared to others like itself. As to the associates, they collectively take the name people; individually 
they are called citizens, insofar as participants in the sovereign authority, and subjects, insofar as they are 
subjected to the laws of the state." J-J. Rousseau, Book I, Chapter VI, "On the Social Compact", On the 
Social Contract, pp. 24-25.
30 Rousseau writes on the subject of censorship that: "Just as the declaration of the general will takes place 
through law, the declaration of the public judgment takes place through the censorship. Public opinion is 
the sort of law whose censor is the minister, and which he only applies to particular cases, after the 
example of the prince.
Thus the censorial tribunal, far from being the arbiter of the people's opinion, is merely its 
spokesman; and as soon as it deviates from this opinion, its decisions are vain and futile." J-J. Rousseau, 
Book IV, Chapter VII, "On the Censorship", On the Social Contract, 
31 In Bentham's critique of the 1791 Declaration of Rights he declared both the idea of natural rights and 
the precept that all men are born free and remain equal in right as nonsense. He writes: "How stands the 
truth of things? That there are no such things as natural rights, no such things anterior to the establishment 
of government, no such things as natural rights opposed to, in contradistinction to, legal [rights]....
In proportion to the want of happiness resulting from the want of rights, a reason [exists] for wishing 
that there were such things as rights. But reasons for wishing there were such things as rights, are not 
rights; a reason for wishing that a certain right were established is not that right; want is not supply; hunger 
is not bread.
That which has no existence cannot be destroyed; that which cannot be destroyed cannot require 
anything to preserve it from being destroyed. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and 
imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.....". J. Bentham, Document 4.8, Article 
II, "Jeremy Bentham on Natural Right" in An Introduction to Political Ideas, edited by P. M. R. Stirk and 
D. Weigall. (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), p. 121.
32 Bentham defines the principle of utility as one that recognises the subjection of mankind to the two 
sovereign masters of pleasure and pain, and "... Assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of 
which it is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and law." J. Bentham, Chapter I, "Of the 
Principle of Utility", § 1, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, edited by J. H.
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asserts that the only rights that matter are civil rights, those protected by law, 
rather than natural rights and that community is the sum of the interests of those 
who compose it. He maintains that two masters, pleasure and pain govern 
human behaviour and that a calculus of moral value can be established from 
this. Under the guidance of these, individuals and groups strive towards the 
greatest happiness principle and it is a moral quest to maximise pleasure and to 
avoid pain. Bentham puts forward a positive and capable role for the self, as an 
individual, within civil society, one that limits state control and maximises one's 
ability to self-govern.
It is through the liberal utilitarianism of Bentham and John-Stuart Mill 
that advocates for freedom of expression and consensual sexual practices have 
fought legal battles for freedom from government and social restraints.34 Mill 
takes Bentham's philosophies further and defines two classes of sanctions for
Burns and H. L. A. Hart, and introduced by F. Rosen. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 11.
33 As Bentham writes: "4. The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can 
occur in the phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning is often lost. When it has a meaning, it is 
this. The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as 
constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, what? - The sum of the 
interests of the several members who compose it.
5. It is vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of 
the individual. A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be^br the interest, of an individual, when it 
tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of 
his pains." J. Bentham, Chapter I, "Of the Principle of Utility", § 4 - 5, An Introduction to the Principles 
of Morals and Legislation, 
34 The feminist groups against censorship, such as the British FAC, the American FFE and the Feminist 
Against Censorship Taskforce argue that in order to justify the censorship of pornography and other 
sexually explicit media, then there must be proof that there is a casual connection between exposure to 
such material and occurrences of sexual violence and sexism. These groups suggest that pornography does 
not have the corner markets on sexism and violence, that pornography is not entirely suppressible and that 
if pornography was removed then it is unlikely that sexism and sexual violence would disappear too. 
These feminist groups rally for the right for women not to be censored in their sexual choices and 
practices, and for pornography to be a matter for the freedom of expression of personal taste and 
consensuality.
Larry Flynt, the publisher of the American pornography magazine, Hustler, has fought numerous 
attempts at both public and private suppression and regulation. Laura Kipnis summarises the style that 
Flynt pursues, through his Hustler magazine, as one that: "... Systematically and extravagantly violate, in 
the most profoundly offensive way possible, each and every deeply held social taboo, norm, and propriety 
he could identify. The nation responded with its kneejerk response to any perceived insult or injury: the 
lawsuit." L. Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America, p. 123. 
Whatever can be said about Larry Flynt he has managed to expand and maintain the parameters of free and 
political speech within America, In 1988 Jerry Falwell, an esteemed religious figure in the US, filled a $45 
million lawsuit against Flynt and Hustler for an anti - religious pornographic parody of himself. The 
Rehnquist Supreme Court decided in favour of Flynt, and confirmed pornography's role as political.
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promoting the general happiness.35 Mill names the external motivations as 
those of one's peers, of one's family and of God. It is these figures that 
according to Mill one hopes most to please and fear to displease. He puts 
forward the subjective and internal instinct of duty as the second class of 
impetus. This driving force of duty is something that Mill delimits as 
instinctive, developing through one's lifetime in a mix of emotions of childhood 
recollections, sympathy, religious or spiritual feelings and the one's level of 
self-worth.
As with Bentham, Mill advocates a minimum level of governmental 
involvement in one's ethical and moral affairs. He classifies one's sense of duty 
as arising from emotive pain and remorse that pushes one away from actions 
and behaviour that is contrary to the promotion of the general happiness. With 
moral freedom and rationality, Mill proffers, comes creativity and evolvement 
of social and intellectual progress. As Mill states:
"If the claims of individuality are ever to be asserted, the time is now, 
while much is still wanting to complete the enforced assimilation. It is 
only in the early stages that any stand can be successfully made against 
the encroachment. The demand that all other people shall resemble 
ourselves, grows by what it feeds on. If resistance waits till life is reduced 
nearly to one uniform type, all deviations from that type will come to be 
considered impious, immoral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. 
Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have 
been for some time unaccustomed to see it."3
Mill defines liberty as the right to do as one wants, free from the interference of
"^7
others, as long as one does not harm others.
35 John Stuart Mill, Chapter III, Utilitarianism in On Liberty and Other Essays, edited and introduced by 
John Gray. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 160 - 162.
36 John Stuart Mill, Chapter III, On Liberty in On Liberty and Other Essays, 
37 John Stuart Mill puts forward the region of liberty as one that: ".... Compromises, first, the inward 
domain of consciousness; demanding liberty of conscience, in the most comprehensive sense; liberty of 
thought and feeling; absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects, practical or speculative,
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Juridical regulations of pornography as an obscene genre and the 
analysis of pornography by the methodological approaches of feminism and 
liberalism seemed to have allowed for both a "depositing" of the biological 
essentialism of sex; an 'abject' sense of the body; and that pornography as a 
genre seeks to represent a universal sexual representation of cultural societies.38 
The pornography industry in all its massifications and complexities does not 
represent everyday sexual activities. To pose the discourse that pornography 
offers as one that is sexually representative, that works with or differs from a 
sexual 'accepted norm' would reduce and overlook its salient tectonics.39 
Pornography is an invention about fantasies, sexually graphic fantasies.40
scientific, moral or theological. The liberty of expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under 
a different principle, since it belongs to that part of the conduct of an individual which concerns other 
people, but, being almost of as much importance as the liberty or thought itself, and resting in great part on 
the same reasons, is practically inseparable from it. Secondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes and 
pursuits; of framing the plan of our life to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such 
consequences as may follow; without impediment from our fellow creatures, so long as what we do does 
not harm them, even though they should think our conduct foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this 
liberty of each individual follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals, 
freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others; the persons combining being supposed to 
be of full age, and not forced or deceived.
No society in which these liberties'are not, not on the whole, respected is free, whatever may be its 
form of government; and none is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified." 
John Stuart Mill, Chapter I, On Liberty in On Liberty and Other Essays, pp. 16-17.
38 Within Western liberal democracies the pornography industry subject to regulation through applied laws 
as obscene. It is judged to have no artistic merit or truth value as such it is deemed filth, trash, and to 
excluded to adult-restricted zones, or banned according censorship laws. Pornography that features gay 
or/and lesbian fantasy sex is often subject to harsher regulation and censorship as it tends to be 
complicated by the notion of pornography as being 'sexually representative' and fall under both obscene 
regulation as pornography and as a sexual practice/ a 'sexuality'. For fantasy 'gay male sex' complications 
occur if there are more than two porn-stars or actors present on set and with varying hard-core regulations 
over the dilemmas of an erect penis, or 'fisting' scenes. For fantasy 'lesbian sex' complications occur not 
under erect clitoris or vulva [only the fantasy genre recognises this, and not always] but under hard-core or 
penetrative regulations of'fisting', dildos if inserted, and other combinations of fantasy sexual penetration. 
This in effect censors and denies gay and lesbian pornography from producing other various repetitions of 
this genre and also viewer's access to other possible repetitions of this genre. Female viewers are also 
excluded from their possible input in the pornography industry as viewers or producers, in accessing its 
repetitions and possible masturbatory exploration of their bodies. A sense of shame is posited with the 
body and filthy, fantasy as sexually representative complicates the regulation of pornography, and 
'sexualities' are named as an essence.
39 The differing analysis of the discourse of pornography by Tang; Hunt; and O' Toole, despite 
recognising the political nature inherent in the pluralism of pornography as genres of fantasy sex, still posit 
it as an alternative sexuality or a non-standard sexual representation or the representation of multiple 
sexualities and sexual activities. I. Tang, Pornography: The Secret History of Civilization; L. Hunt, The 
Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800; and L. O' Toole, 
Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire.
40 Pornography is an industry that produces/stages fantasy sex without the problematic and stressful 
boundaries or limitations that can accompany the everyday, 'real' sexual activities. In the
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This is not to say that the genres of the pornography industry are not 
related to the sexual fantasises and fetishes central to a sexual and political 
account of the forces meshed in the social networks that serve to constitute an 
ethical reality. Pornography is related to and can serve as documentary material 
to the societies from which it emerges. Rather, it is to argue that the 
pornography multiplex industry mutates itself through these relations according 
to its promise: what will be offered is a variety of fantasies; a variety of fantasy 
sexual scenes; fantasy sex fetishes; fantasy sex styles; fantasy sex humour; 
fantasy sex violence; fantasy body parts; fantasy striptease and other soft-core, 
hard-core fantasy sex repetitions.
For Golding this is the "joke" that pornography offers in its discourse.41 
In promising to reveal its secret, the products of the pornography industry reveal 
that what is offered can only ever be fantasy, never reality, never 'real' sex or
A O
sexual representations. As a sexual entertainment industry pornography gives 
these "jokes" as gestures of itself and the indeterminate "secret" that is 
promised to come with these offered pornographic slices is that fantasy can be
windows/economies that pornography offers there are no complications of dating, of relationships, of 
contraception, of headaches, of monogamy. The possibilities that fantasy sex offers as entertainment is 
sexual pleasure without the consequences, the politics and taboos that are involved in 'real' sex. For the 
director Steve Perry: "Sex in porn isn't like real sex. It's like a fight in a Stallone movie, which isn't a real 
fight... In porn you to stop and do it again for different angles. You can't have real sex in a porno movie 
because it has to be a certain length and take a predicted form." Quoted in L. O' Toole, Pornocopia: Porn, 
Sex, Technology and Desire, 
41 Sue Golding, "Sexual Manners" in Ethics of Enactment, Public, Vol. 8,1993, pp. 161-68, and S. 
Golding, "Solar Clitoris" in Bataille, Parallax, Mar - Apr 1997, pp. 137-47.
42 Pornography can never offer the whole reality of pleasure, or even capture its own whole physical or 
pleasurable reality. Produced as a technological event of sexual pleasure it can only be fantasy. It can 
never be more than that for any pornographer, be it as a viewer, a producer, a star or an actress/actor or all 
of these. This technological distance does not deny, but rather requires participation from the viewers, and 
offers them different vantage points and strategies of viewing - fast-forward, pause, rewind or converse, 
edit, copy, paste, cut, sample and so on. This is perhaps part of pornography's dialogue or discursive 
economy. To participate in is always to create pornography, to dabble in 'porn speak', to insert, mutate 
and repeat in its discursive economy. Pornography can only ever offer a glimpse, a slice of its fantasy sex 
reality, never the wholeness of the industry. Pornography is an invention, an ongoing invention, rather 
than an essence or an eternal fixed truth.
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sexually arousing, sexually pleasurable, masturbatory and sexually social.43 
Pornography's discursive power is one of sexual fantasy. Sexual fantasy is, in 
this trajectory, a strategy of technique.
In discussing the pornographical in terms of its techne and tonalities, this 
thesis illustrates the ethical nature of sexual fantasy and its both private and 
public relationship in shaping, and being shaped by, a belonging within these 
perverse cultural communities. What this thesis looks at are the super-imposed 
layers to the data- compressed language of the pornographical. Rather than a 
sense of language that is established through the genital stage or through a 
traumatic castration complex, the pornographical is non-discursive, alongside 
being a discursive economy, and 'ana-linguistic'. As such what is formed is a 
community of mimetic bodies and a witnessing that takes place in the ana- 
aesthetic by a peculiar kind of subject, one Deleuze has named the 'fourth 
person singular', 'drawn into place' and maintained through one's sense of 
fascination.44
The primary mannerism of the noun 'pornography' is its relationality. 
The gestures, theatre and performances of the industry's products are secondary
43 This reference both uses and plays against Jacques Derrida's concept of a secret. What is maintained of 
this concept is the indeterminacy of each event of pornography, an indeterminacy that is only ever partially 
defined both in the specificity of each slice that is offered by the industry in its technological products and 
in the specificity of the interaction and response that viewers bring to these products. However 
pornography's promise is not that much of a secret. J. Derrida, The Gift of Death, translated by David 
Wills. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.)
44 Deleuze writes: "No, singularities are not imprisoned within individuals and persons; and one does not 
fall into an undifferentiated ground, into a groundless depth, when one undoes the individual and the 
person. The impersonal and pre-individual are the free nomadic singularities. Deeper than any other 
ground is the surface and the skin. A new type of esoteric language is formed here which is its own model 
and reality. Becoming-mad changes shape in its climb to the surface, along the straight line of the Aion, in 
I, the lost identity, when they cease being buried and begin, on the contrary, to liberate the singularities of 
the surface. Nonsense and sense enter into co-presence of a static genesis - as the nonsense of the surface 
and the sense which hovers over it. The tragic and the ironic give way to a new value, that of humor. For 
if irony is the co-extensiveness of being with the individual, or of the I with representation, humor is the art 
of surfaces and of doubles, of nomad singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point; it is the 
"fourth person singular" - with every signification, denotation, and manifestation suspended, all height and 
depth abolished." G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale and 
edited by Constantin V. Boundas. (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), pp. 140 - 141.
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to, or arise from, the specific configurations of this relationality. That 
pornography is a relational identity or discursivity gives it a kind of "a- 
radicality" or "a-rootedness" in that it creates the ground or possibilities of its 
discourse.45 Pornography is a kind of dynamics that contours and contexualises 
the "prehensions" of it's yet to be realised, shifting ground of its ontological 
surrealism. 6 The pleasures of fantasy sex offer the fabric to the discursivity of 
a multi-dimensional 'real'. Through its relationality, pornography is a multi- 
dimensional identity; name; and noun, connected to both a philosophy of desire 
and of pleasure. It names paradoxically both the impossibility and possibility of 
representation, of representing itself, of presenting re-presentings of itself.
Pornography occupies a strange cultural position not only in its 
occupation with offending aesthetic sensibilities and a class-ridden bed of 
identity woes and other fetishes, but also in its relationship to both the body and
45 This concept or phrasing is being used here as a kind of 'a priori', or rather a porous and shifting root of 
a multiplicity that is indeterminate in its 'has and not yet been rooted' as an indeterminate determinacy. 
The multiple root of an event not yet rooted. Jacques Derrida in "Desistance" has used a notion of "a- 
radicality" in the introduction to P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, 
translated by Christopher Fynsk. (California: Stanford University Press, 1998,) p. 1. In this piece Derrida 
attributes an a-radicality to an event as an ineluctable. That the inevitability of an impossible singularity is 
one of a double bind, a double obligation: "...One must avoid avoiding the event but one cannot avoid 
avoiding". The a-radicality of an event is in this way posited as a form or matter, a mattering of a 
hesitation, a pause, and a gap of an undecidability that is a redoubling of the movement of negation. This 
is the double movement of an event [a positivity of an absence] that arrives both and neither too early nor 
too late. An undecidability that is supplementary. In such a way any determinations of the undecidability 
of an event will always be dislodged from its undecidable as delayed root. Any supplement to the event 
could never allow for its closure or incorporation in the repetition of its, undecidability, a series of 
hesitations, of deferrals of a radical undecidability. Sue Golding also uses the phrasing of an "a-radicality" 
in The Eight Technologies of Otherness (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 11-27. Golding contours an a- 
radicality of an event as the a-rootedness of a multiple excess. This excess of a "mutant negation" is an 
"... 'Impossible' concept, existing and not existing at the same time (at a different time) all (or none) of the 
time in the a-radicality (a-rootedness) of its spatial configurations." Golding sutures the patchwork 
wanderings of this 'impossible negativity's as micro-strategies of fiction, of identities, of social ensembles, 
imaginary, political journeys of "supposing that", an event of curiosity rather than a void or a lack.
46 Gilles Deleuze uses the term "prehension" in analysing Whitehead's theory of events. Deleuze posits a 
prehension as a unity/connection/conjunction of elements, and as having parts and as being a part. He 
writes that: "...The prehended datum, is itself a prehension of a prehension, and the event thus a "nexus of 
prehensions". Each new prehension becomes a datum. It becomes public, but for other prehensions that 
objectify it; the event is inseparably the objectification of one prehension and the subjectification of 
another; it is at once public and private, potential and real, participating in the becoming of another event 
and the subject of it's own becoming." Virtualities are actualised in prehensions. G. Deleuze, The Fold: 
Leibniz and The Baroque, translated and introduced by Tom Conley. (London: The Athlone Press, 1993), 
p. 78.
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to technology. It is this relationship that gives pornography a kind of 
paradoxical 'ana-linguistic' structure. The emergence of libertinism coincided 
with the increase in printing houses and in commercial opportunities for selling 
printed material. It was the technology of the printing press that made it 
possible to copy in large quantities these texts and comic images of sexual 
satire. The danger and effectiveness of libertine literature arose because it was 
able to be distributed en mass throughout the social classes. The sexually 
graphic pamphlets were no longer a pleasure or tool of an elite section of 
society. The invention of the name and genres of the pornography industry 
has been closely related and tied to the emergence of new scientific discourses, 
to the invention of new technologies as well as political criticism.
Every new technology has mutated and allowed the expansion of the 
pornography industry. As Roland Barthes discovered with photography, 
technology ceases to be "a medium, to be no longer a sign, but the thing in 
itself'.48 Barthes puts forward through his notion of a "punctum" an 
understanding of photography as an aesthetic field, rather than just a service 
industry or a documentary medium.49 He develops the dynamics of a 'punctum'
47 Isabel Tang has estimated that by the end of the ancien regime, two-thirds of all printed pamphlets 
circulated in France were forbidden and large quantities of these were pornographic. Tang comments on 
the rise of the 'underground' and illegal distribution of these 'pornographic tracts' written by ldes 
rousseaux des ruisseaux' or 'gutter philosophers', produced by printers, smuggled and distributed by 
'street hawkers'. Tang discovered that unlike "the pornography of the ancien regime, which was often 
expensively bound and circulated among the well-to-do, these tracts were affordable to a significant 
proportion of the population. Publications became shorter and more accessible. This was not pornography 
to be enjoyed by the privileged in private but brash texts designed to be shared aloud in public." I. Tang, 
Pornography: The Secret History of Civilization, pp. 92-93.
48 R. Barthes, Camera Lucida. (London: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 45.
49 R. Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 26-27. Barthes names the co-presence of "studium" and "punctum" as 
the elements which arouse an interest in photographs or a visual field and in doing so establishes a body of 
information and extends a person's and socio-cultural discursive fields. Barthes defines the studium as an 
"application to a thing" and an "enthusiastic commitment but without special acuity". It is by the studium 
that the viewer receives the photographs as a political and historical testimony, by participating in the 
figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings and the actions of the images. However it is the co-presence of 
the punctum that breaks or punctuates the studium. For Barthes the punctum is the accidental punctuation 
that pricks, bruises and is poignant to the viewer. It is in this sense mat the punctum operates as a
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as one of a technology. To rephrase this move away from a traditional semiotic 
field, technologies, in ceasing to be a medium, have mannerisms and 
characteristics of their own, rather than only documenting the event captured, 
copied, for example on film, the camera, the photograph mutates the event 
according to its format or discursivity.
In the photograph the referent, that of the event captured, 'drops out' 
whilst at the same time in remaining related to the photograph, the copy 
becomes part of the photograph's self-referenciality, part of the event of the 
photograph.50 It is in this way that meaning is added to an event in its 
movement and mutation. Each new technology has changed the capacity and 
format, the discursivity of what pornography can deliver to the viewer and how 
the viewer can receive and participate with the differing products.51 
Technological inventions have not only mutated pornography as an industry and 
the accessibility of its market, but also its means of regulation, but they 
themselves have also been a function and given impetus by the pornography 
market.52
technology or techne in forming and adding to a moment of an identity, meaning and body.
50 This ability for any event to be self-referential is discussed in more detail throughout my thesis, 
including how this self-referenciality can become absorbed and lost, in a certain sense. The main point 
raised here is that technologies are not just documentary of the 'world' and its created political 
occurrences, but are events themselves, a series of events that effect and mutate other events. Pornography 
has always mutated its own eventness through technological events. In other words, pornography is 
always a technological invention. In being related to each other in this manner, both pornography and 
technology mutate each other, as events that form discursive economies, and accelerate each other's 
movement.
51 Technology is being used in the paradoxical sense of both the scientific advancements of mechanical 
reproduction to digital reproduction [the printing press; the camera; the moving image camera; the phone; 
the video; the camcorder; the cd-rom; the dvd; the internet; the virtual reality equipment; the digital 
cameras, camcorders and printers], and as a techne and technique of identity. As O' Toole has suggested 
pornography is a compressed delivery service that viewers have to decompress in downloading. This is 
discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, "Libidinal Technologies". L. O'Toole, Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, 
Technology and Desire, 
52 Catalogues of pornography were made in the nineteenth century as a way of following and regulating 
pornography. These not only were written accounts of the titles and offences of the pornographic material 
but also included the offensive photographs. [These catalogues could themselves be gathered into the 
pornographic genres.] I. Tang, Pornography: The Secret History of Civilization, pp. 
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Chapter one, "Evacuating the Body: The Abyssal Logic of a 
Philosophy of Desire ", looks at the basic premises of three major philosophers 
who conjugate identity, pleasure and aesthetics through the metaphysics of 
desire. This chapter lays the foundation for the 'anaesthetic', in order to provide 
a fuller sense of the nuances regarding the pornographical. This requires, in 
part, a discussion on certain aspects of the philosophical canon. This 
undertaking examines how the speculative rationale of Hegel and Kierkegaard 
fold into an abyssal logic - one which tends to sterilise the body and its needs, 
mapping those needs into unrequited forms of 'desire' or, worse, into dualist 
preconditions of sexual interest (male v. female, gay v. straight). 53
Similar problems are reviewed in the work of Heidegger, despite his 
attempts to challenge and depart from the logic of these former thinkers, he 
manages to resurrect the older theories of desire, whereby pornography is 
disregarded as something 'vacuous', 'unnecessary', 'superfluous' or 'secret'. 54 
Chapter one examines the problematics of these theories in their suggestion that
53 This chapter will draw upon these books of Hegel: G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated 
by A. V. Miller. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); G.W.F. Hegel, Introductory Lectures on 
Aesthetics, translated by Bernard Bosanquet. (London: Penguin Books, 1993"; G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy 
of the Right, translated by T. M. Knox (1821). (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952); at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/preface.htm.. and G. W. F. Hegel, 
Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), 
translated by A.V. Miller, with additions by Leopold Von Hemming and K.L. Michelet (1970), at 
http://www.hegel.org/liriks.html/fftexts. The main text that this chapter utilizes for this argument is S. 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, translated and introduced by Alastair Hannay. (London: Penguin 
Books, 1985). This book has been chosen as the main focus for this chapter as it deals specifically with a 
paradox of ethics revealed by the leap of passion, of faith and its reliance on absurdity. Fear and 
Trembling raises questions about what it means to witness a paradox and despite its ability to be translated 
into the universal. Other books of Kierkegaard that this thesis draws upon are: S. Kierkegaard, Either/ Or: 
A Fragment of Life, by A. Hannay. (London: Penguin Books, 1992); S. Kierkegaard, Repetition, 
translated by H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); S. Kierkegaard, 
The Sickness Unto Death, translated by A. Hannay. (London: Penguin Books, 1989); and S. Kierkegaard, 
The Essential Kierkegaard, edited by H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1997.)
54 The main books this thesis employs are: M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays; M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, translated by J. Stambaugh. (New York: Harper 
Torchbooks, 1969); M. Heidegger, Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell. (London: Routledge, 
1996); M. Heidegger, The Concept of Time, translated by William McNeill. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996); M. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, translated by J. Glenn Gray. (New York: 
Harper TorchBooks, 1968.) The main concepts that this thesis utilizes throughout are that of 'the event of 
appropriation' and 'techne'.
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pornography is located in the "borderlands" of desire, between a dialectic of 
aesthetics and one of ethics.
Chapter two, "Fascination: The Paradox of a Philosophy of Pleasure" 
continues in looking at an overview of the difficulties of Lacan and Zizek in 
positing language as an origin, or as originating through the genital stage or 
through the traumatic castration complex.55 It briefly raises Kristeva's concept 
of a pre-genital or 'semiotic' language and Marcuse's notion of the body as a 
site of a 'pregenital polymorphous sexuality', both of which seek to evade the 
supremacy of the Oedipal and the symbolic as the origin of language and the 
law, and in doing so raises the pornographical as 'ana-linguistic'. 56 My thesis 
introduces this concept in order to revisit the terrain of language and its 
relationship to the body and a contemporary world of new technologies. 
Adorno is drawn upon to posit a notion of pluralism, of disintegrating excess 
that installs/maintains a physical meaning of the body politic, whilst 
underwriting the political difficulties and fallacy of a notion of modern 
subjectivity.57
In shifting the paradigm from one of a philosophy of desire to that of a
55 With regard to Lacan and Zizek the main books used throughout this thesis are: J. Lacan, Ecrits: A 
Selection, translated by Bruce Fink. (New York: W. & W. Norton and Company, 2002); J. Lacan, The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, translated by Alan Sheridan and edited by Jacques - 
Alain Miller. (London: Vintage Books, 1998); J. Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
Book HI, translated by Russell Grigg and edited by Jacques - Alain Miller. (London: Routledge, 2000); J. 
Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, translated Dennis 
Porter and edited by Jacques - Alain Miller. (London: Routledge, 1999); and S. Zizek, The ZizekReader, 
edited by Elizabeth and Edmond Wright. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.)
56 Marcuse outlines his notion of a 'pregenital polymorphous sexuality' in H. Marcuse, Eros and 
Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1987). The two main texts 
employed for Kristeva with regard to this thesis are: J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on 
Abjection, translated by Leon S. Roudiez. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), and J. Kristeva, 
The Kristeva Reader, edited by Toril Moi. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992.)
57 The major works used of Adorno are: T. W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, translated, edited and introduced 
by Robert Hullot - Kentor. (London: The Athlone Press, 1999); T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 
translated by E. B Ashton. (London: Routledge, 1996); T. W. Adorno, Minima Mor alia: Reflections from 
a Damaged Life, translated by E.F.N. Jephcott. (London: Verso, 2002); T. W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by John Cumming. (London: Verso, 1995); and T. W. Adorno, 
Problems of a Moral Philosophy, translated by Rodney Livingstone. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.)
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philosophy of pleasure, this chapter seeks to demonstrate a reconfiguration of a 
different route than the pathway created by a philosophy of desire.58 In posing 
the pornographical in terms of a paradoxical site of a transitive present, a site 
that is both related to pleasure and desire, it can be understood as 
simultaneously constituting both the impossibilities and the very possibilities of 
representation. This chapter examines the nuance of fascination as that which 
gives the pornographical a kind of fluid cohesive, as a non-discursive 
singularity, that is only graspable at the moment of its multiple crossing of its 
other, of the immanence transgression. 59 In other words fascination is posed as 
a pivotal point and anchoring for identities of the pornographical.
Chapter three, Libidinal Technologies of Comic Pleasure, continues to lay 
the groundwork for the 'ana-aesthetic', this time by elaborating a concept of the 
comic and its role in the data compression of the pornographical package/ code. 
It does this through three strange routes of the Heideggerian Being (Dasein and 
techne), the Bataillian notion of witnessing, and Freud's use of Jokes and the 
Unconscious and Bergson's An Essay on Comic Laughter.60
Chapter four, Economies of Witnessing: An Ana-aesthetic Mimetics, 
persists in developing this peculiar landscape of the complexities and
The theorists mainly used to elaborate a philosophy of pleasure are Foucault, Deleuze and Lyotard.
59 For works used for a notion of fascination as a suturing point of identity see M. Blanchot, the one who 
was standing apart from me, translated by Lydia Davis. (New York: Station Hill, 1993); S. Shaviro, The 
Cinematic Body. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), and J-L. Nancy, Being Singular 
Plural, translated by Robert D. Richardson and Anne E. O'Byrne. (California: Stanford University Press, 
2000). The main theorists drawn upon with regard to simulacra is Baudrillard, see J. Baudrillard, 
Simulacra and Simulation, translated by Sheila Faria Glaser. (Michigan: The University of Michigan, 
1996), and Lacan's work on 'quilting points' is also employed here, see J. Lacan, The Psychoses: The 
Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III.
60 See S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, translated by James Strachey. (London: 
Penguin Books, 19991); H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of Comic, translated by 
Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell. (Los Angeles: Green Integer Books, 1999), and for the 
Heideggerian techne see M. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" in The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays. The Baitaillian notion of witnessing that is elaborated by 
Lyotard, see J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, translated by lain H. Grant. (London: The Athlone Press, 
1993), and J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", translated by Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts. 
(London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995.)
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conceptual nuances of the pornographical and the re-configuring of a 
subjectivity / social agency, that is present as a kind of 'fourth person singular' 
and fascinated, comic witness of the improper body. This chapter looks at the 
pornographical in terms of its aesthetic and ethical properties as an 'ana- 
aesthetic', as an event (gift/ libidinal band/ differend/ virtual fold), and as a 
poetics of a forgetting, of a mimetic repetition and virtual folding.61 
The conclusion, Privacies and Practices: Virtual Privacy, New 
Technologies and Democratic Practices, resumes examining the notion of a 
comic witness with regards to mimesis and the body. The role of fantasy and 
anonymity is looked at in establishing the public and brash pornographical 
communities 'of those that have nothing in common'/2 Can there be such a 
thing as an autonomous body within such a 'de-individualised' geography? 
Bursting forth from the Enlightenment, and entwined between technological 
developments, practices and the improper body, the pornographical offers a
For Bataille see G. Bataille, "The Notion Of Expenditure" in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 
1927-1939, edited, introduced and translated by Allan Stoekl. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1985), pp. 116 - 129. It is the excesses of systems, the excreted waste products of laughter, tears, 
cries, poetry, and bodily excrements that create disequilibrium and expenditure without return of 
reciprocity or equivalence. For Bataille it is the heterogeneous elements of excess and loss, of chance and 
impossibility that form the base of a 'general economy.' It is these elements that are expressed through acts 
of sacrifice and bodily mutilation, which in turn rupture and mutilate the homogeneity of self. Bataille 
locates knowledge in the expenditures of energy and its bursts of self-blindness and heterogeneity. G. 
Bataille, The Accursed Share: Volume I, translated by Robert Hurley. (New York: Zone Books, 1991); 
G. Bataille, The Accursed Share: Volumes II and III, translated by Robert Hurley. (New York: Zone 
Books, 1993); G. Bataille, Eroticism, translated by Mary Dalwood. (London: Marion Boyers Publishers 
Ltd., 1994) and G. Bataille, The Tears of Eros, translated by Peter Connor. (San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 1989).
61 For the notion of an event as a gift see J. Derrida, Given Time: Counterfeit Money, translated by Peggy 
Kamuf. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), and J. Derrida, The Gift of Death, translated by 
David Wills. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.) For a virtual fold see G. Deleuze, The 
Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, translated by Tom Conley. (London: The Athlone Press, 1993), and G. 
Deleuze, Bergsonism, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. (New York: Zone Books, 
1997). For libidinal band and differend see J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, and J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger 
and "the jews". For a notion of a forgetting without forgetting see M. Blanchot, The Infinite 
Conversation, translated by Susan Hanson. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), and J-F. 
Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews".
62 The main theorists/texts of dis-community drawn upon are: G. Agamben, The Coming Community, 
translated by Michael Hardt. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); J-L. Nancy, Being 
Singular Plural; M. Blanchot, The Unavowable Community, translated by Pierre Joris. (New York: 
Station Hill Press, 1988); and A. Lingis, The Community of those that have Nothing in Common. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.)
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differing kind of an ethicio-political landscape, as an alternative to that of 
contemporary political forms, such as a liberal democracy.
28
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
Evacuating the Body: The Abyssal Logic of a Philosophy of Desire
"Open the so-called body and spread out all of its surfaces: not only the skin 
with each of its folds, wrinkles, scars, with its great velvety planes, and 
contiguous to that, the scalp and its mane of hair, the tender pubic fur, nipples, 
nails, hard transparent skin under the heel, the light frills of the eyelids, set with 
lashes - but open and spread, expose the labia majora, so also the labia minora 
with their blue network bathed mucus, dilate the diaphragm of the anal 
sphincter, longitudinally cut and flatten out the black conduit of the rectum, then 
the colon, then the caecum, now ribbon with its surface, all striated and polluted 
with shit; as though your dress-maker's scissors were opening the leg of an old 
pair of trousers, go on expose the small intestines' alleged interior, the jejunum, 
the ileum, the duodenum, or else, at the other end, undo the mouth at its corners, 
pull out the tongue at its most distant roots and split it, spread out the bats' 
wings of the palate and its damp basements, open the trachea and make it the 
skeleton of a boat under construction; armed with scalpels and tweezers, 
dismantle and lay out the bundles and bodies of the encephalon; and then the 
whole network of veins and arties, intact, on an immense mattress, and then the 
lymphatic network, and the fine bony pieces of wrist, the ankle, take them apart 
and put them end to end with all the layers of nerve tissue which surround the 
aqueous humours and the cavernous body of the penis, and extract the great 
muscles, the great dorsal nets, spread them out like smooth sleeping dolphins. 
Work as the sun does when you're sunbathing or taking grass.'
1. Conceptual enclosures: ideologies, ethical immoralities and suspensions.
One of the aspects that this thesis wishes to examine is the way in which 
pornography embodies a peculiar singularity, particularly around aesthetics and 
its ethical relationship to the universal and the personal. Pornography creates 
strange communities through its technological distance, manner and anonymity. 
These pornographical communities operate with and permeate a peculiar 
language structure that belongs paradoxically to the political presence of bodies, 
of skin. It will be argued that the pornographical is a kind of dynamic, an 
unsayable something that has tonalities and techne to it, one that contours a 
bodily meaning; one that is bloody, stripped of moral consolation in presenting 
the unspeakable, in demonstrating the fluidities of sexual roles, the shifting of
1 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, translated by lain H. Grant. (London: The Athlone Press, 1993), p. 1.
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identities, the complicity of ideologies and the confusion between victims and 
oppressors. In addressing the body politic, the pornographical is a very 
different kind of dynamic than the bloodless absolute negativity of 
Enlightenment and the weight of its contingent necessity.
This chapter will look at the basic premises of those philosophers who 
conjugate identity, pleasure, and aesthetics through the metaphysics of desire. 
This undertaking will look at how the speculative rationale of Hegel and 
Kierkegaard fold into an abyssal logic - one which tends to sterilise the body 
and its needs, mapping those needs into unrequited forms of 'desire' or, worse, 
into dualist preconditions of sexual interest (male v. female, gay v. straight). 
Similar problems will be reviewed in the work of Heidegger, and, despite his 
attempt to challenge and depart from the logic of these former thinkers, it will 
show how he manages to resurrect the older theories of desire, whereby 
pornography is disregarded as something 'vacuous', 'unnecessary', 
'superfluous' or 'secret'. It will examine the problematics of these theories in 
their suggestion that pornography is located in the "borderlands" of desire, 
between a dialectics of aesthetics and one of ethics.
In this context, the chapter will go on to suggest that pornography cannot 
be fully captured in either of the realms substantiated by a dialectical aesthetics 
or ethics; rather, it is in all its plurality of description and use, the more peculiar 
'singularity' of identity and pleasure. This a kind of complexity cohesion as a 
conceptual and discursive reality, fails to be captured either when one elevates 
the pornographical to an 'art', say, as erotica [sensual rather than sexually 
implicit] or deposes it as immoral/ hate crime towards women and any
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particular or relevant ethnic divides. 2 To unravel the nuanced complexity of 
what is at stake, we will first look at how pornography is slipped into the 
concept of 'identity' whereby identity is a construed as a pluralistic relation and 
ethical paradox based on dialectical synthesis (Hegel and latterly, Kierkegaard). 
Then we will move toward the way(s) in which latter day thinkers re-stage 
ethics in terms of a 'singularity' and its collapsing horizons - and why that 
move still marginalizes the body, and evacuates its presence (Heidegger).
1.1 Conceptual enclosures of Hegelian idealism.
In turning to Hegel this section will look primarily at the totalising 
conceptual movement of the Concept alongside the sublation ofMoralitat (the 
morality of one's autonomous, individual will) in Sittlichkeit (the ethical will of 
the community). 3 To draw upon Hegel in an effort to discuss pornography may 
seem a strange move since within the Hegelian epistemology, pornography is 
clearly immoral, being against family values with no redeeming qualities and no 
place within the fulfilment or the 'coming-to-be' of the ethical state. However 
Hegel forms the best starting place for looking at the political necessity of a leap 
from within his dialectical movement of the teleological development of the
2 What seems to be needed is a shifting of the epistemological framework in order to delve into how 
pornography operates at an ideological level - and this is precisely what the second part of this chapter, as 
well as chapter two will discuss. Supra pp. 28-81.
3 This chapter draws upon these books of Hegel: G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by 
A. V. Miller. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); G.W.F. Hegel, Introductory Lectures on 
Aesthetics, translated by Bernard Bosanquet. (London: Penguin Books, 1993"; G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy 
of the Right, translated by T. M. Knox (1821). (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952); at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/preface.htm.. and G. W. F. Hegel, 
Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), 
translated by A.V. Miller, with additions by Leopold Von Hemming and K.L. Michelet (1970), at 
http ://www.heeel. org/links.html/#texts For Concept see in particular his Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Introduction section, pp. 46 - 262; for Sittlichkeit and Moralitat, see in part his Philosophy of Right, 
Philosophy of Objective Spirit section,
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/preface.htm and Phenomenology of Spirit, Spirit 
section, especially pp. 263 - 410.
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sovereignty of a self-reflective subject and state. It is through delving into the 
logic of the Hegelian speculative structure of consciousness that contemporary 
thinkers, such as Deleuze and Derrida, named pornography an interval or 
hesitation, suspended in the cuts of immanent thought.4 In turning now to 
Hegel's speculative logic the political necessity of such a leap from his 
dialectical developments can be looked at in greater detail.
For Hegel, Kant's demarcation of legitimate theoretical and practical 
knowledge ends up being the demarcation of new areas of ignorance. 5 As 
Hegel remarks:
"The thing-in-itself(and here 'thing' embraces God, or the spirit, as well) 
expresses the ob-ject, inasmuch as abstraction is made of all that is for 
consciousness, of all determinations of feeling, as well as of all 
determinate thoughts about it. It is easy to see what is left, namely, what 
is completely abstract, or totally empty, and determined only as what is 
'beyond'; the negative of representation, of feeling, of determinate 
thinking etc. But it is just as simple to reflect this caput mortuum is itself 
only the product of thinking, and precisely of the thinking that has gone to 
the extreme of pure abstraction, the product of the empty T that makes its 
own empty self-identity into its ob-ject. The negative determination that 
contains this abstract identity as [its] ob-ject is likewise entered among the 
Kantian categories, and, like that empty identity, it is something quite 
familiar. - We must be quite surprised, therefore, to read so often that one 
does not know what the thing-in-itselfis; for nothing is easier to know 
than this." 6
4 G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale and edited by Constantin 
V. Boundas. (London: The Athlone Press, 1990), and J. Derrida, "The Double Session" and "Spur: 
Nietzsche's Styles " in A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, edited by Peggy Kamuf. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991.)
5 G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences (1830), translated by A.V. Miller, with additions by Leopold Von Hemming and K.L. Michelet 
(1970), at http://www.hegel.org/links.html/tftexts
6 G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, § 44, B) The Second Position of Thought 
with Respect to Objectivity, II Critical Philosophy, in The Hegel Reader, edited by Stephen Houlgate, 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), p. 156. See also Stace, where he comments the difficulty for Hegel 
was that: "The thing-in-itself is the reality; it is what really exists apart from the subjective conceptions of 
our minds. The thing we know as appearance. The thing as it is in reality is not in space and time, has 
neither quantity, nor quality, nor relation and is (consequently) inconceivable to us". W. T. Stace, The 
Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition. (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd, 1924), p. 42.
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With knowledge limited by appearance, and with experience demarking the 
infinite, the true is unknowable, things- in- themselves are unknowable, the 
source of the causality of the will is unknowable and the transcendental 
apperception is unknowable.7 Hegel points out:
"... The need arises to be cognizant of this identity or the empty thing-in- 
itself. To be cognizant, however, means nothing else but the knowing of 
the ob-ject according to its determinate content. A determinate content, 
however, contains a manifold connection within itself and is the basis for 
connections with many other ob-jects. So, this [Kantian] reason has 
nothing but the categories for its determination of the thing-in-itself, or of 
that infinite; and when it wants to use them for this purpose, it flies off 
(and becomes 'transcendent')."8
This 'unknowability' means that the thing-in-itself is not graspable as an object 
for knowledge and is therefore not considered to be necessary or important.
Hegel's dialectical concern lies in his challenge to the Kantian move, 
whereby in Kant, the unknowability is posited within a transcendental closure of 
knowledge. In so doing, Hegel views this move as resulting in the 
unknowability of ourselves both as subjects of experience and as moral agents 
capable of freedom. Consequently the political and historical determinants of 
thought remain unknowable and unknown. According to Hegel, this restriction 
of knowledge to a discursive rather than a fuller conceptual understanding, 
allows even the finite to be unknowable.9 Hegel wished to make the case that 
all of reality (both knowable and unknowable) could not be separated into 
different logics. This totalising or universalising of Concept into one
7 G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, §60, Part 1, IV: Second Attribute of 
Thought to Objectivity, Critical Philosophy" in Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), 
translated by A.V. Miller, with additions by Leopold Von Hemming and K.L. Michelet (1970) at 
http://wvm.hegel.org/links.html/fltexts.
8 G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, § 46, B) The Second Position of Thought 
 with Respect to Objectivity, II Critical Philosophy, in The Hegel Reader, 
9 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Introduction section, pp. 46 - 262
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(dialectical) logic meant, further, that the thing-in-itself must have an essence or 
a substance, a universal substance, which would further promote the movement 
of infinity in order for it to be grasped fully by thought - a move that both 
required and presupposed consciousness as the distinction, and definition of, 
finite and infinite truth. 10 This move becomes the fatal flaw for positing the 
pornographical as anything other than marginal to the ethical system. 
Hegel remarks on his concerns that:
"In critical philosophy, thinking is interpreted as being subjective, and its 
ultimate, unsurpassable determination is abstract universality, or formal 
identity; thus, thinking is set in opposition to the truth, which is inwardly 
concrete universality. In this highest determination of thinking, which is 
reason, the categories are left out of account. - From the opposed 
standpoint thinking is interpreted as an activity of the particular, and in 
that way, too, it is declared to be incapable of grasping truth."11
Hegel hoped to unify the gap between pure theoretical and practical reason 
through an architectonics composed of a phenomenology of the Spirit (Geist\ 
one that expresses and encapsulated in its very movement the idea of absolute 
ethical life (Sittlichkeit\ and that of the logic of the pure concept. Hegel's 
architectonics conveys on the one hand the concrete fullness of each related 
layer of any given 'sublated and transcended now'; and on the other the hand 
the concrete substance of an immanent unfolding and unveiling of self- 
consciousness on both an individual level and at the spiritual level of the ethical
17
community and its self-reflected path on living an ethical life.
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Section A, "Consciousness", pp. 58 - 104.
11 G.W.F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, § 61, C) The Third Position of Thought 
with Respect to Objectivity, "Immediate Knowing", in The Hegel Reader, 
12 For Hegel, the concept of 'now' if not sublated or transcended would remain at the level of singularity 
and would, consequently be banished as 'abstract'. As discussed later, the recuperation of the notion of 
'singularity' when lifted away from a dialectical logic bears a whole new set of opportunities, both ethical 
and creative.
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This is the movement of the Hegelian self-differentiating concept or 
consciousness as it is provides context to itself, in being for-itself, as a synthetic 
unity by means of a negation. 13 Knowledge addresses itself, ready for its future 
unity. In this way the now is sublated into intuition and transcended to form the 
synthetic concrete unity of Intuition; in turn Intuition is sublated into sense- 
certainty and transcended to create the synthetic concrete unity of Sense- 
Certainty; this concrete fullness of Sense-Certainty is sublated into perception 
and transcended to generate a concrete synthetic unity of Perception; this 
concrete synthesis of Perception is sublated into understanding and transcended 
to fashion a full synthesis of Understanding which in turn is sublated into 
knowledge and transcended to produce a conceptual fullness of concrete 
absolute Knowledge. Within the Hegelian epistemology the knowledge 
pornography creates of and for itself as a conceptual ideology and the identities 
of its consuming participants is informed and fashioned along such a spherical 
journey. 14
The 'This' of the 'Here' and 'Now' is both always immediate in the 
newness of its occurrence whilst at the same time mediated through the 
spherical layers of its consciousness of itself. In this way the immediate 
presence of a thing is always-already im-mediate, i.e. 'not mediated'. 15 The
13 Dialectical negation is the 'unsayable' movement of Hegel's logic of absolute thought. It provides the 
limit for the self-determination of the subject (and the objective world by extension of subjectivity). 
Negation is affirmative in that it expresses the absolute negativity of the ascending motion of the whole, 
the mediation its content. G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), translated 
by A.V. Miller, with additions by Leopold Von Hemming and K.L. Michelet (1970) at 
http://www.hegel.org/links.html/Wtexts.
14 See G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit and G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical 
Sciences.
15 Several contemporary philosophers point out this move. See for example, Adomo, "Situation " in 
Aesthetic Theory, translated by Robert Hullot - Kentor. (London: The Athlone Press, 1997); and further, S. 
Golding, "Curiosity", Eight Technologies of Otherness. (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 10 - 26.
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'This' of the 'Here' and 'Now' is always-already mediated by the division 
between the here and the not Here. The terrain of the present, the "is" can only 
be understood in its necessary relation to the that which it is "not". The Here 
passes into the not-Here, the not-Here negates itself in passing into the Here and 
affirming the identity of the This. 16 It is by means of the mediating Negation 
that Hegel attempts to demonstrate that nothing exists as an immediate first 
rather everything is always-already mediated. 17 Negation is Hegel's tool or 
unsayable dynamic that allows him to evade giving a context to something that 
is not yet actualised but is immanently related to and has a place within the 
wholeness of the spiritual and ethical world. 18
There is nothing first and independent except for the ontological necessity 
of the absolute negativity of the ascending motion of the whole, though even 
this motion cannot exist without its mediated content. This ontological 
necessity is inferred by the proposition that everything that exists, or finite 
reality, is posited by Geist (God, Spirit), according to Hegel's dialectical logic 
of rational necessity. The infinite or absolute is present, but not yet known, 
neither treated methodologically from the outside as an unknowable, nor an 
immediate certainty. This "whole" can only become known, as a result of the 
contradictory/antagonistic experiences of consciousness that gradually realise it,
16 Hegel works within the framework of Fichte and Schelling reworkings of Kant's metaphysics. Fichte in 
The Science of Knowledge developed the idea that the ego or self is active and self-legislating, but that it 
can only come to have knowledge of itself by positing a non-self as opposed to it. A self-conscious self is 
produced through the transcendence of self-reflection, which limits absolute activity in its resulting deposit 
of a self-conscious self and not-self. Schelling took this a step further in his assertion that because the 
knowing self is active, s/he gains self-knowledge not only through this action, but in the confirmation of 
her/his existence that this activity produces.
17 D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1988) pp. 38-56.
18 Bringing to mind the well-known critique by Marx, 'the point is not just to interpret the world, but to 
change it.' K. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", in KarlMarx: Selected Writings, edited by David 
McLellan. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), no. XI, pp. 156 - 158.
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by the unfolding motion of the totalising dialectical synthesis. 19 As Hegel 
writes:
"Becoming is in this way in a double determination. In one of them, 
nothing is immediate, that is, the determination starts from nothing which 
relates itself to being, or in other words changes into it; in the other, being 
is immediate, that is, the determination starts from being which changes 
into nothing: the former is coming-to-be and the latter is ceasing-to-be. 
Both are the same, becoming, and although they differ so in direction 
they interpenetrate and paralyse each other. The one is ceasing-to-be: 
being passes over into nothing, but nothing is equally the opposite of 
itself, transition into being, coming-to-be. This coming-to-be is the other 
direction: nothing passes over into being, but being equally sublates itself 
and is rather transition into nothing, is ceasing-to-be. They are not 
reciprocally sublated -the one does not sublate the other externally - but 
each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself."20
It is in this way that Hegel argues for the actuality (subject) of the object, of an 
objective world.
At the level of sense-certainty "pure being at once splits up into what we
*^ 1
have called the two 'Thises', one 'This' as I, the other 'This' as object." 
Through reflection on this difference, Being discovers that neither is only 
immediately present, but each simultaneously mediated. Through the 
determining movement of negation, the T has a 'sense-certainty' only through 
the other as object.22 A distinction is made between instance and essence. 
Being is what is there, immediately seen, where as essence is what is not there 
present. Geist being the essence of the world is present but veiled as the unseen
19 Crucial to Hegel's teleological/dialectical system was the assumption that the ontological process was 
ultimately knowable to the human subject, whose rationality partakes of the general rationality permeating 
the whole.
20 G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic: Doctrine of Being, Section One: Determinateness (Quality), Chapter 1: 
Being, C) Becoming, 2) "Moments of becoming: Coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be ", in The Hegel Reader, 
21 G. W. F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 
22 G. W. F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 66-67.
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source. As such it is indicated as a negative source. If this could mean that 
the pornographical and all things bodily related would maintain the materiality 
of its suffering, then perhaps the Hegelian move would be all that one might 
require; for in this sense, the pornographical as Negative (source, concept or 
dynamic simultaneously veiling-unveiling its meaning), could, in an idealist 
world, sublate different tonalities without jeopardizing its manner of fashioning 
its peculiar communal identities.
But for Hegel, negativity is a dynamic of the absolute and a manifestation 
of purity that is disclosed in the unfolding of the infinite multiplicity of living 
beings. Hegel's epistemology of the negative provides plurality to any given 
unity, concept or organisation and a method for isolating and exposing 
vanishing moments and fragments of an infinite system of multiplicity 
unfolding its synthetic unity. Hegel posits the individual as one such fragment 
of a system, or a systemised collective whole of an ethical community, 
Sittlichkeit, that reflects the wholeness ofGeist. Unfortunately Hegel's notion 
of an individual and its relation to collective whole of the ethical state is one 
that becomes totalised and in the purity and mastery of its objective extension 
divorces itself from its bodily needs and pleasures.
An individual for Hegel is a multiple organisation that is conceived in 
abstraction from the absolute manifold but is at the same time internally related 
and connected to the living whole that is excluded from it. He writes:
"The unity is an organisation or an individual. It is self-evident that this 
life, whose manifold is regarded purely as being related and whose very 
existence is exactly this relation, can also be regarded as being 
differentiated within itself, as a mere multiplicity, because the relation
23 G. W. F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 68 -70.
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between the separated is not more intrinsic to it than the separation 
between that which is related. On the other hand, it must also be 
considered as capable of entering into relation with what is excluded from 
it, as capable of losing its individuality or being linked with what has been 
excluded."24
Identity to Hegel is the self-reflexive relation of essence to itself. In negating 
itself by itself, it affirms its identity as the ground of itself. The ground is 
identical with what is grounded, whilst maintaining the distinctions that make it 
fully what it is - a self-differentiating unity whose totality exhausts all the 
possibilities of the real. For Hegel, reality is the actuality of essence 
manifesting itself through its negative relation with appearance as substance, 
that is to say its self-groundedness. Rational necessity is that which has its 
ground in itself, that of its own reason, for all that is actual is rational and vice 
versa.
The patterns that constitute the basis of reality demand that the subject's 
conformity with them is through their own individual choice and particularity. 
True individual self-determination is limited by the finite set of options 
available within the architectonics/ structures of the ethical state. The 
architectonics creates a variety of particular social spaces within which 
individuals can dwell.
"These particular substantive modes of interaction grow naturally from 
civil society, expressing natural groupings of self-interest, and they also 
express the rational divisions of the state...... When an individual chooses
his mode of life, he internalises the identity offered by a group. This helps 
order his desires and impulses from within. Knowing and participating in 
the articulation of the state, he can will the common good and his own 
good at the same time."25
24 G.W.F. Hegel, "Fragment of a System", in The Hegel Reader, 
25 D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After, 
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If the basis of a political unity is in a deeper shared logos, reason or will, 
which differs from the surface consciousness of the average citizen, how then, 
does the citizen know that the state is rational and that in her/his free decisions 
her/his is "willing the universal in the light of the universal" instead of pursuing 
his/her selfish interest?26 For Hegel the answer lies in his famous statement, that 
'all that is real is rational'.27
It is precisely the expressive actuality, drawn from and rooted relationally 
in the realm of rational necessity, that allows for the ground to be a groundless 
ground, capable of movement and change.28 Though this is to be understood 
within the Hegelian framework as a synthetic, constitutive unity whose elements 
are predetermined as homogeneously contained entities, by the movement of the 
whole, Geist of absolute thought. As Hegel writes the difficulty and necessity 
of the universal is the cognition of God, infinite and indeterminate. For Hegel 
God:
"... Has to be cognised, i.e., determined by thinking. But as opposed to 
simple identity, all determination is for the understanding only a 
restriction, i.e., a negation as such. Hence, all reality is to be taken only 
without restriction, i.e.' as indeterminate, and God, as the essential sum of 
all realities or as the supremely real Essence, becomes the simple 
abstraction; while the only determination that remains available for him is 
the just as strictly abstract determinacy of being. Abstract identity (which 
is what is here also is called 'concept') and being are the two moments 
that reason seeks to unify; this unification is the Ideal of reason."29
26 D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After, 
27 G.W.F. Hegel, "Preface", Philosophy of the Right: Preface and Introduction, in The Hegel Reader, p. 
325. The exact quote reads, "what is rational is actual; and what is actual is real".
28 Following the Enlightenment theorists of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Mill in allowing for the 
separation of the church and state, meant that identity was necessarily contingent according to the 
dialectical movement of the synthesis. Logos was fixed in the very movement of absolute thought (Geist) 
becoming known to itself, through its expressive actuality.
29 G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, §49, Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (1830), translated by A. V. Miller, with additions by Leopold Von Hemming and 
K.L. Michelet (1970), at http://www.hegel.org/links.html/tftexts.
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This unification or ideal of reason expresses objectivity for Hegel through its 
link with the fullness of one's and the community's subjectivity.
The objective antinomy of time reflects this unification, or idealisation of 
reason; that is the antinomy between a moment and the "time needed by life". 
As Hegel comments:
"The infinite being, filling the immeasurability of space, exists at the same 
time in a definite space, as is said, for instance, in the verse: "He whom 
all heaven's heaven ne'er contained, Lies now in Mary's womb."30
It is in this fashion that Hegel conceives of the mechanics of space and time. He 
names space as pure quantity, the immediate determination of nature or rather as 
the abstract universality of nature's self-externality. The pornographical, and 
with it pornography, is given no other alternative within the Hegelian 
speculative logic than marginalisation. The fact that space is 'external' makes a 
pre-determined essence the identity of any subject and the body in being 
relegated to 'space' is placed in a hypostatised relation to the more expressive - 
and free - Time.
30Hegel is quoting a hymn by Martin Luther beginning 'Gelobet seist Du, Jesu Christ.' G.W.F. Hegel, 
"Fragment of a System ", in The Hegel Reader, p. 37. In is through this conceptual dispute with Hegel, 
that Bataille put forward God as a whore. Bataille located the movement of absolute negativity within the 
sexual profanities of the sacred, within the religious appropriation of the erotic arts. As an individual each 
person is discontinuous for Bataille, and eroticism provides a path for establishing continuity of being in 
death. Carnality is a violation of this discontinuity and creates a rich source of anguish, as a regulated 
method of transgressing taboos that ruptures boundaries and joins human beings together on an intimate 
level. Bataille notes that eroticism opens up to otherness and forms the very foundations of the sacred. 
For him communities are fashioned and conjugated through tears, wounds and violation of boundaries. 
Bataille locates the basis or origins of the processes of exchange and expenditure in the need to 
destroy and to lose, rather than that of the need of acquisition and the satisfaction of consumption. G. 
Bataille, "The Notion Of Expenditure" in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939, edited, 
introduced and translated by Allan Stoekl. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp. 116- 
129. It is the excesses of systems, the excreted waste products of laughter, tears, cries, poetry, and bodily 
excrements that create disequilibrium and expenditure without return of reciprocity or equivalence. For 
Bataille it is the heterogeneous elements of excess and loss, of chance and impossibility that form the base 
of a 'general economy.' It is these elements that are expressed through acts of sacrifice and bodily 
mutilation, which in turn rupture and mutilate the homogeneity of self. Bataille locates knowledge in the 
expenditures of energy and its bursts of self-blindness and heterogeneity. G. Bataille, The Accursed 
Share: Volume I, translated by Robert Hurley. (New York: Zone Books, 1991); G. Bataille, The 
Accursed Share: Volumes II and HI, translated by Robert Hurley. (New York: Zone Books, 1993); G. 
Bataille, Eroticism, translated by Mary Dalwood. (London: Marion Boyers Publishers Ltd., 1994) and G. 
Bataille, The Tears of Eros, translated by Peter Connor. (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1989).
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Within this indifference of space are immediately the three dimensions, 
diverse but as yet indeterminate. The negation of space begins as a point, an 
immediate differenceless self-externality, but as it sublates the relation formed 
of first other-being is itself spatial. In other words the negation of space is itself 
spatial and forms a line. The truth of other-being becomes concrete in the 
transcendence of space, whereby the line passes over into the plane of a surface, 
one that provides a determinateness or qualitative difference of the concept of 
space. As Hegel writes it is:
"... The restoration of the spatial totality which now contains the negative 
moment within itself, an enclosing surface which separates off a single 
whole space."31
The self-externalisation as an enclosed space creates a pre-determined essence 
for the identity of any subject, and the body in being relegated to an externalised 
'space' of an enclosed surface is placed in a hypostatised relation to an idealised 
notion of time. In such a way Hegel forms the basis for a kind of heterogeneous 
totalising of community without allowing for the marginality of unethical or a- 
radical forms of morality that transgress social boundaries and bodily 
proprieties.
For Hegel time is the development of this dialectical determination of 
space or rather time is the truth of space. Time is, as point, related to space and 
matures in the spatial determinations of line and plane, but in the sphere of self- 
externality it is the moment that negativity posits for itself. Hegel conceives of 
time as the negative unity of self-externality, an abstract and ideal being, which 
like space is continuous expressing as yet, no real difference. For Hegel, time is
31 G.W.F. Hegel, §256, "Mechanics: Space and Time", in The Hegel Reader, 
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becoming directly intuited; any differences are purely momentary and as 
directly self-sublating they are determined as external, as external to 
themselves. In this way Hegel names time as the becoming rather than being a 
receptacle in which things are placed and flow. Or to rephrase this it is not 
because things are in time that they come-to-be or pass away, but that time itself
is the becoming of coming-to-be and passing away.
Hegel conceives of the dimensions of time, the present, future and past as 
the becoming of externality and its resolutions into differences of being as 
passing over into nothing and nothing as passing over into being. Hegel 
specifies the present as now, or as the immediate vanishing of these differences 
into singularity. Hegel names singularity as place, or as a spatial now of the 
posited identity of space and time. Such a singularity is exclusive of the other 
moments whilst being simultaneously continuous in them. A spatial singularity 
of place is immediately posited as temporal, or as motion, and collapses into its 
contradiction and existent unity of both, that of matter. Whilst bringing to life 
the notion of negation as a vital dynamic that creates surfaces of totalised 
spaces, placed as matter in motion, i.e. concepts and bodies, Hegel manages to 
marginalize the fractal singularity of the body and the pornographical only to 
replace it as 'matter'.
For Hegel, matter forms the negative unity of the two moments of it's self- 
attraction and self-repulsion, and he names this an ideal singularity, one not yet
32 As Hegel remarks: "The finite is perishable and temporal because, unlike the Notion, it is not in its own 
self total negativity; true, this negativity is immanent in it as its universal essence, but the finite is not 
adequate to this essence: it is one-sided, and consequently it is related to negativity as to the power that 
dominates it. The Notion, however, in its freely self-existent identity as I = I, is in and for itself absolute 
negativity and freedom. Time, therefore, has no power over the Notion, nor is the Notion in time or 
temporal; on the contrary, it is the power over time, which is this negativity only qua externality." G. W.F. 
Hegel, § 258, "Mechanics: Space and Time ", in The Hegel Reader, p. 266.
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posited as material but one that provides a centre, that of gravity. It is here that 
Hegel locates the constant striving motion of absolute negativity and the 
restlessness of striving to reach the centre. He states that:
"Gravity constitutes the substantiality of matter; this itself is the nisus 
[Streben], the striving to reach the centre; but - and this is the other 
essential determination of matter - this centre falls outside it. It can be 
said that matter is attracted by the centre, i.e. its existence as a self- 
external continuum is negated; but if the centre itself is conceived of as 
material; then the attraction is merely reciprocal, is at the same time a 
being-attracted, so that the centre again exists in distinction from them 
both. The centre, however, is not to be taken as material; for the 
characteristic of the material object is, precisely, to posit its centre outside 
itself. It is not the centre, but the striving to reach it, which is immanent in 
matter. Gravity is, so to speak, the confession of the nullity of the self- 
externality of matter in its being-for-itself, of its lack of self-subsistence, 
of its contradiction."33
Duration is the universal of all of these nows, being the sublatedness of the
A A
process of things that do not endure, and eternity is the true present for Hegel.
The dialectic posits the question of grounding the truth on the "is" and 
from this is posited what "ought" to be, or rather what will be-come through the 
movement of the expressive actualisation of Geist. For Hegel, the unity of 
gravity, the constitutive substance of the subject, is this ought, this striving to 
reach the centre, this longing and as Hegel writes this:
"... Unhappy nisus to which matter is eternally condemned; for this unity 
does not come to itself or reach itself."35
33 G. W.F. Hegel, £262, "Mechanics: Space and Time ", in The Hegel Reader, p. 211.
34 Hegel specifically remarks on this point in clarifying that: "The finite present is the Now fixed as being 
and distinguished as the concrete unity, and hence as the affirmative, from what is negative, from the 
abstract moments of past and future; but this being is itself only abstract, vanishing into nothing. 
Furthermore, in Nature where time is a Now, being does not reach the existence of the difference of these 
dimensions; they are, of necessity, only in subjective imagination, in remembrance and fear or hope. But 
the past and future of time as being in Nature, are space, for space is negated time; just as sublated space is 
immediately the point, which developed for itself is time." G.W.F. Hegel, £259, "Mechanics: Space and 
Time", in The Hegel Reader, 
35 G. W.F. Hegel, §262, "Mechanics: Space and Time ", in The Hegel Reader, 
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And yet the question of grounding the truth on the "is" is always-already 
immanent in/to the movement of absolute negativity or negation. For as the 
Idea passes into externality and creates an objective external world of nature, so 
does the subjectiveness of Spirit create a world external to itself. By means of 
the extension of subjectivity of Spirit, in its self-reflective creation of the ground 
itself, the "irrationality" of its natural world, its impulses and passions are 
rationalized.36
Hegel asserts that the fullness of the universality of reason expresses the 
purification of our perceptions and understandings by thinking. Hegel writes:
"Thinking of this fullness of being means stripping it of its form of the 
singularities and contingencies, and grasping it as universal being, 
necessary in and for itself, one that is self-determining and active in 
accordance with universal purposes, one that is diverse from that 
contingent and singular collection: [i.e.,] grasping it as God."37
For Hegel it is the impulses and passions that concretely form the necessarily 
rational contingency of the self-grounding that establishes the will. In this way 
the will becomes, or is the fruit of the relational separation of nature and
freedom. Hegel's concept of the will maintains the requirement of radical 
autonomy, necessary for freedom, in that it deduces the whole content out of 
itself; its own immanent rationality.
The individual self-will gains its ethical substance and expression within 
the mediation of the state, Sittlichkeit. The family is the first ethical root of the
36 Within the Enlightenment framework of Logos, of the centrality of reason, the natural world of passion 
and sexual activity is understood as irrational. For Kant it was to be suppressed, for Hegel it was to be 
used, but it will argued throughout this thesis that sex itself has a logic or a kind of harmony to it.
37 G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic: Preliminary Conception, §50, Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (2830), translated by A.V. Miller, with additions by Leopold Von Hemming and 
K.L. Michelet (1970), at http://www.hegel.org/links.html/tftexts.
38 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 211-236.
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state and the corporation forms the second.39 Both are based and develop their 
substantiality from civil society and find their ethical expression and fulfilment 
within the state. As being part of the corporation the family has its livelihood or 
secure resources guaranteed and its capabilities recognised. A person is 
somebody in belonging to and being a member of a whole community, and in 
this way one's honour is in one's estate.
Despite being able to form a conceptual journey of representation, 
pornography always fails to be placed within the higher realms of a spiritual 
journey of absolute knowing, and is judged as worthless in such respects. Any 
conceptual representation of pornography within the Hegelian speculative logic 
must recognise the dishonour that it brings to the relationship between the 
family and the corporation. As Hegel remarks the disorganization of civil 
society revolves around "the sanctity of marriage and the honour attaching to 
the corporation."40 In other words sexual disorder, or sexual pleasure outside of 
the sanctity of marriage, is conceived of here as being connected to the 
breakdown of public order.
The constitution ofGeist in the creation of an objective world external to 
the subject is brought about in the actualisation of the spiritual institutions of 
law, morality and the state. The state to Hegel is the ethical ground of the 
absolute Sittlichkeit. The state becomes or always-already is the "architectonics 
of life's rationality", in that it sets the limits and determines the values given to
39 As Hegel writes: "The family, as the immediate substantiality of spirit, has as its determination the 
spirit's feeling [Empfindung] of its own unity, which is love. Thus, the disposition [appropriate to the 
family] is to have self-consciousness of one's individuality -within this unity as essentially which has being 
in and for itself, so that one is present in it not as an independent person [eine Person far sich] but as a 
member." G.W.F. Hegel, §158, "Philosophy of Right: Ethical Life ", in The Hegel Reader, 
40 G.W.F. Hegel, £255, 2. Civil Society, c) The Police and the Corporation, "Philosophy of Right: Ethical 
Life", in The Hegel Reader, 
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the different circles of public life and their rights.41 Morality is only given a 
concrete content and realisation through the notion of a fuller community.
^ Sittlichkeit' refers to the moral obligations I have to an on going 
community of which I am part. These obligations are based on 
established norms and uses.....The crucial characteristic of Sittlichkeit is 
that it enjoins us to bring about what already is. This is a paradoxical way 
of putting it, but in fact the common life which is the basis of my sittlich 
obligation is already there in existence. It is in virtue of its being an 
ongoing affair that I have these obligations; and my fulfilment of these 
obligations is what sustains it and keeps it in being. Hence in Sittlichkeit, 
there is no gap between what ought to be and what is, between Sollen and 
Sein.
With Moralitat, the opposite holds. Here we have an obligation to 
realise something that does not exist. What ought to be contrasts with 
what is. And connected with this, the obligation holds of me not in virtue 
of being part of a larger community life, but as an individual rational 
will."42
In distinguishing between ethics and morality, Hegel runs counter to the 
moral precepts of liberalism:43
"Because the realisation of the Idea requires that man be part of a larger 
life in society, moral life reaches its highest realisation in Sittlichkeit. 
This highest realisation is an achievement, of course, it is not present 
throughout history, and there are even periods where public life has been
41 Hegel uses an architectonics that expresses the trajectory of the movement in the articulation of life's 
"contradictories", one that can voice the harmony of the ethical state and the phases of public life. An 
architectonic expresses the ethics of a scientific systematisation of knowledge for modernist thinkers such 
as Hegel. He defines the 'architectonics of state's rationality' as the social system of "the marked phases 
of public life, one that forms a 'supreme science of state architecture'". Hegel writes in his preface for 
Philosophy of the Right, "Now the Organic connection of the manifold branches of the social system is the 
architectonics of the state's rationality, and in this supreme science of state architecture the strength of the 
whole, is made to depend upon the harmony of all the clearly marked phases of public life, and the stability 
of every pillar, arch, and buttress of the social edifice." G. W. F. Hegel, Preface, The Philosophy of 
Right, translated by T. M. Knox (1821), at 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/Dr/Dreface.htm
42 C. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 376.
43 The liberalism of Hobbes and Locke, established the notion of individual freedom on an obligation to an 
external authority of the monarchy or state, which could not guarantee the necessary social cohesion. 
Rousseau, in attempting to solve this impasse, linked the radical autonomy of the moral will. The common 
good was consequently based on an arbitrary collection of particular wills. Hegel argued that the general 
will could only ever be an abstract majority based on a proxy of representation of the true. See G. W. F. 
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 372- 374. The liberal 'utilitarian' ethics of Bentham and Mill 
allowed for the value attributed to objects to be one that must lie outside of themselves, in their use. The 
ends, or goal that serves to regulate the subject's actions as one of utility of objects and policies which 
enabled their possibility of becoming a means for the contingency of human desire.
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so emptied of spirit, that Moralitat expresses something higher. But the 
fulfilment of morality comes in a realised Sittlichkeit.
For Hegel the role of community is paramount and one cannot attain the fullness 
of an ethical life without membership of the community. In differentiating 
between ethics and morality Hegel looks at the way in which ethics/culture 
informs one's moral conduct - in this sense, morality/ the moral code is part of 
a 'discourse.' Or to rephrase this, for Hegel, the moral code and conduct is 
connected to the individual will and is directly related to the individual's 'being- 
in-itself, though to be fully 'for-itself the individual must be recognised as a 
member of the community; by which point he/she let's go, or 'gives up' the 
'selfishness of his/her particular desires in order to be part of the 'ethical', 
'greater good' of the state. This is the fulfilment; and pornography, in this sense 
has no place to go but downward within social standing, value and prestige. 
Civil society and culture remain at the level of abstraction for Hegel.
"Individuals in their independent freedom ....have themselves as their goal 
- a system of social atoms."45
The difficulty that Hegel has with freedom at the level of civil society is that the 
individual is still beholden to the contingent content of her/his desires and the 
external fate generated by the decisions of others on the market. For Hegel: "... 
The will becomes actual only as subjective and contingent."46
44 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 
45 G. W. F. Hegel, Part Hi: The Philosophy of the Mind, §523, C) Moral Life or Social Ethics, b) Civil 
Society, in Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), translated by A. V. Miller, with additions 
by Leopold Von Hemming and K.L. Michelet (1970) at http://www.hegel.org/links.htmWtexts
46 G. W. F. Hegel, Part Hi: The Philosophy of Mind, §475- 4 78, Mind Subjective, Psychology, Mind, B) 
Mind Practical, b) Impulses and Choices, in Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), 
translated by A.V. Miller, with additions by Leopold Von Hemming and K..L. Michelet (1970) at 
http://www.hegel.org/links.html/#texts
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Hegel posits that the will is a process of self- withdrawal that affirms the 
subject's non-identity with any particular item among the subject's desires, 
needs and impulses. Hegel's conception of freedom is one of self-determination 
whereby the subject posits a goal. But:
"An impulse is simply a unidirectional urge and thus has no measuring 
rod in itself, so the determination of its subordination or sacrifice is the 
contingent decision of the arbitrary will which in deciding, may proceed 
either by using intelligence to calculate which impulse will give it the 
most satisfaction, or else in accordance with any other optional
consideration.
There are many possible rules and no way to derive only one of them; the 
choice remains arbitrary. For true self-determination there has to be something 
that can serve as a measure. This is provided by the mediating role of the 
ethical state.
The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea, of the ethical Spirit; its 
unfolding substantiation moves according to an externalisation of space and a 
hypostatised relationship to Time. Such an ideological predetermination of a 
subjective identity is based on a notion of essence and a bloodless, pure sense of 
body. The pornographical is posited as dishonourable and marginal to this 
conceptual enclosure and ideological predetermination of the ethical system. 
The pornographical communities provide an ethical structure that evades or 
perhaps persists despite state mediation and enclosure. Pornography's dynamic 
is one that is bloody, stripped of moral consolation in presenting the 
unspeakable, in demonstrating the fluidities of sexual roles, the shifting of 
identities, the complicity of ideologies and the confusion between victims and 
oppressors. The pornographical communities operate through a peculiar 'ana-
47 G. W. F. Hegel, §17, The Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (1821), at 
httD://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/Dreface.htm
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linguistic' language structure that belongs paradoxically to the political presence 
of bodies, of skin.48 It forms an 'ana-aesthetic'.49
The individual needs to find their place within the (objective) structures of 
mutual recognition of a rationally structured community, a social whole whose 
partition into roles and ways of life is itself inherently rational in that it is 
derived from the motions of the concept.
"True freedom exists as a customary moral life (Sittlichkeit) in which the 
will does not have subjective or selfish content but universal content for 
its goals."50
The universal is determinate in and for itself. The content that differentiates and 
completes the whole is not some limitation from outside the universal but a 
positive progression within the whole's self-identity.51
The category of thought that could provide the necessary totality that 
Hegel envisioned in the movement of the absolute Idea is that of teleology. 
This category is one where the fulfilments of ends are external to things. It has 
its place in the material artefacts and finite goals or activities of the subject. In 
this category's maintenance of the separation of content and form Hegel's 
exposition of Geist is lost. The inadequate notion is that of external teleology.
"On this view, I stand over against an external world. I have at first a 
purely subjective goal, and I put it into effect. So External Teleology 
presupposes at the start a separation between matter and form which is to 
be fulfilled. And this separation is not really overcome, since the form is
48 The notion of the pornographical being 'ana-linguistic', or forming a kind of a-radicality to any 
linguistic totality is raised in the introduction, supra pp. 1 - 23, and is considered in detail in chapter two, 
supra pp. 82-125.
49 As is introduced in the introduction, supra pp. 1- 23, and is discussed in greater detail in chapter 4, supra, 
pp. 176-221.
50 G. W. F. Hegel, Part iii: The Philosophy of Mind, § 469, Mind Subjective, Psychology, Mind, B) Mind 
Practical in Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), translated by A.V. Miller, with 
additions by Leopold Von Hemming and K.L. Michelet (1970) at http://www.hegel.org/links.html/fltexts
51 D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and After, pp. 65-69.
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just something I impose on pre-existing matter, it does not come from 
matter itself.
This is the case with the teleological explanation of things posited in the 
world to serve the intentions/ embodiment of Geist. The objects are formed 
from outside and remain indifferent to this form or purpose. It does not arise 
from the objects themselves. The purpose remains hidden unless Geist comes to 
be known, for truth is in the knowing. However, with the "cunning of reason", 
the cunning of Geist allows for finite beings to follow their own passions and 
interests. Whatever happens in the history of the ethical state is always-already 
the fulfilment of the intentions of Geist.
However the distinction made between Sittlichkeit and Moralitat, allows 
for the possibility of rethinking morality as open to individual corruption, and 
ethics as the regulative trajectory, or as the codes and techniques of conduct, 
capable of differentiating between the moral rules and customs. In this way it is 
possible to be morally corrupt, whilst being ethically substantial. Pornography 
could be judged as morally corrupt whilst still being ethically substantial in its 
architectonic grounding. The problem remains one of judgement.
The problem inherent in Hegel's logic is its inability to demonstrate the 
actualisation of the movement of absolute negativity in history, for the terrain of 
absolute thought is the motor force of history, for Hegel. With Geist immanent 
in each of the moments of the movement of the whole, it becomes clear that the 
dialectic itself rests upon a final cause or telos that remains external to it. Only 
if history has been completed, and Geist' plan for humanity be known, could 
Hegel dispense with the need to assert a desire for actualisation to make the
52 C. Taylor, Hegel, 
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various developments compulsory for humankind. Politics and the body are 
refused as a determination of a "pure" history.
1.2 A paradox of ethical suspension: Kierkegaard.
Kierkegaard unravels the Hegelian architectonics of the state's 
rationality in Fear and Trembling, and yet, as will be shown, Kierkegaard 
solves one difficulty but paradoxically brings in a separate issue regarding the 
body and a concept of sin.53 Kierkegaard is useful in discussing the 
pornographical as he raises the idea that ethics forms a paradox, albeit one of 
pluralism. There is no sense of singularity or of the importance of flesh and 
sinew, and the invasions of bodily proprieties with Kierkegaard. However, the 
paradox of ethics that Kierkegaard conceptualises, in this book, places the 
singular individual higher than the universal and holds the ethical teleology in 
suspension.54 Kierkegaard reveals what it means to dwell in the borderlands of 
faith and its paradoxical ethics. Whilst there is no comparison between faith 
and pornography, to dwell in the pornographical is to dwell anonymously in a 
public domain and to witness the anaesthetic, the marginalized sections of 
cultural predilections that do not quite measure up to the social sensibilities.
In placing the individual higher than the community in its relation to the
53 And yet, as will see, even with this 'unsayable something', Kierkegaard's move gets us closer but not 
yet at a fuller understanding and use of the pornographical. He helps muddy the waters, at the very least. 
The main text that this chapter utilizes for this argument is S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, translated 
and introduced by Alastair Hannay. (London: Penguin Books, 1985). This book has been chosen as the 
main focus for this chapter as it deals specifically with a paradox of ethics revealed by the leap of passion, 
of faith and its reliance on absurdity. Fear and Trembling raises questions about what it means to witness 
a paradox and despite its ability to be translated into the universal. Other books of Kierkegaard that this 
thesis draws upon are: S. Kierkegaard, Either/Or: A Fragment of Life, translated by A. Hannay. (London: 
Penguin Books, 1992); S. Kierkegaard, Repetition, translated by H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong. (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983); S. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, translated by A. Hannay. 
(London: Penguin Books, 1989); and S. Kierkegaard, The Essential Kierkegaard, edited by H.V. Hong 
and E.H. Hong. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.)
54 S. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 
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absolute, the individual has no ability to express the anguish of faith in the 
strength of absurdity. Without mediation there can be no relief of speech, as 
that would translate the individual into the universal. The individual, in such a 
situation, has to bear the responsibility of his/her secret in silence. It is this 
silence of his/her trembling distress and anguish that forms the weight of the 
responsibility of witnessing his/her incommensurability and concealment from 
the universal. The pornographical is a harsh domain, coloured by a brutal and 
crude humour of the comic, relying on every stereotype imaginable that might 
be sexual, aesthetically offensive and crass. 55
Restaging the theological story of Abraham's sacrifice (or murder) on 
Mount Moriah of his only and beloved son Isaac, Kierkegaard delves into the 
murky waters of the passions of faith, showing how the ethical is neither a 
feature of dogmatic belief or individual will. Kierkegaard writes that in fact 
'faith begins where thinking leaves off:56
44The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he was willing to 
murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he was willing to sacrifice 
Isaac; but in this contradiction lies the very anguish that can indeed make 
one sleepless; and yet without that anguish Abraham is not the one he is.57
Kierkegaard stresses that it is only through monstrous and paradoxical passion 
of faith that Abraham's story can be approached.
55 As Kipnis remarks: "As with transvestite porn and fat porn, pornography can provide a home for those 
narratives exiled from sanctioned speech and mainstream political discourse, making pornography, in 
essence, an oppositional political form." L. Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of 
Fantasy in America, 
56 He writes: "(The) extract from the story of Abraham its dialectical element, in the form of Problemata, 
in order to see how monstrous a paradox faith is, a paradox which gives Isaac back to Abraham, which no 
thought can grasp because faith begins precisely where thinking leaves off." S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, 
"Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, 
57 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, 
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For Kierkegaard every movement of infinity occurs only through passion, 
rather than through the movement of a self-fulfilling substance, for no reflection 
can bring about such a movement.58 Kierkegaard makes it clear that there is 
more to the creation and maintenance of any community than acts that 
precipitate reflection and recognition from its members. Faith is a passion; no 
human being is excluded from it; and passion unites all human life.59 It is the 
essential ingredient of passion that forms the building blocks of an ethical 
community and its language structures of taste and individual autonomy. 
Kierkegaard's suggestion that the movement of infinity is one created through, 
or rather by a leap of faith, and its movement of a particular kind of resignation 
in relation to a question of absurdity, allows us to approach the ethical in terms 
of its paradox.
Whilst Kierkegaard's focus is welded to the plurality of faith and it's 
ethical paradox and it may seem as if this has very little to do with pornography, 
Kierkegaard serves as a useful method for approaching or rather coming within 
reach of the grisly singularity that is pornography and the pornographical 
communities. Both faith and pornography share the same impossible terrain, 
situated on the margins of a dialectical aesthetics and ethics, of an ethical 
paradox - without a universal mediation or wholeness. Both share the essential 
and murky ingredient of bodily passion, whether it is one of faith, lust or 
humour, which forms the organization of an ethical community and its language
58 Kierkegaard is dismissive of Hegel here in explaining everything through mediation and yet omitting the 
key ingredient to the 'perpetual leap in life' of passion that movement requires. As Kierkegaard writes: 
"What we lack today is not reflection but passion. For that reason our age is really in a sense too tenacious 
of life to die, for dying is one of the most remarkable leaps, and a small verse has always greatly attracted 
me, because having wished himself all the good and simple things in life in five or six lines previously, the 
poet ends thus: 'ein seliger Sprung in die Ewigkeit' [a blessed leap into eternity]." S. Kierkegaard, 
Problemata, "Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, 
59 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema I", Fear and Trembling, 
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structures of taste and individual autonomy. No human being is excluded from 
the pornographical; as such it names thinking as a sexual bodily activity.
Kierkegaard asserts the ability of what he names a 'knight of faith', rather 
than a tragic hero in order to distinguish between the aesthetic and ethical 
realms of a dialectical journey. He defines a 'knight of faith, as one who:
"... Is at every moment making the movement of infinity. He drains in 
infinite resignation the deep sorrow of existence, he knows the bliss of 
infinity, he has felt the pain of renouncing everything, whatever is most 
precious in the world, and yet to him finitude tastes as good as to one who 
had never known anything higher, for his remaining in the finite bore no 
trace of a stunted, anxious training, and still he has this sense of being 
secure to take pleasure in it, as though it were the most certain thing of all. 
And yet, and yet the whole earthly form he presents is new creation on the 
strength of the absurd. He resigned everything infinitely, and then took 
everything back on the strength of the absurd."60
He puts forward that a knight of faith is one of the greatest and hardest thing to 
be; it is no simple matter of performing a duty.
Kierkegaard's knight of faith needs to be a dancer, to be able to leap in a 
particular manner that creates a movement of infinity, in order to make the 
paradoxical movement of a leap of faith.61 This is a very different way to define 
what it means to think and is a step away from the Hegelian concept, as well as 
a move closer to the pornographical. The hero of faith performs the hardest task 
for all dancers; he/she leaps, as Kierkegaard writes:
"... Straight into a definite position, so that not for a second does he have 
to catch at the position but stands there in the leap itself'.62
60 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, pp. 
61 The question and specific nature of a leap will be addressed further in this chapter and throughout this 
thesis with Heidegger's 'event of appropriation'. With such a framework the principle of identity 
becomes a leap out of metaphysics or an attitude of representational thinking. Heidegger names this leap 
as a spring, a spring that springs away from the ground into an abyss, a spring towards the realm of 
belonging of Being and us, that of the event of appropriation. M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
translated by J. Stambaugh. (Harper & Row Publishers: New York, 1969), pp. 30 - 41.
S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, 
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This standing there within the leap itself, caught in the rebounding movement of 
infinity is what this thesis is naming the anaesthetic, it comes closer to 
approaching the movement of the pomographical. Such a leap requires the 
focus and concentration of the whole of his/her life's content, without this 
his/her soul would be disintegrated from the start and the movement could not 
be made. In this way Kierkegaard contrasts faith to the passions of irony and 
humour, for these he comments merely:
"... Reflect also upon themselves and belong in the sphere of infinite 
resignation, they owe their resilience to the individual's 
incommensurability with reality."63
For faith is no aesthetic emotion; it is no immediate infatuation rather it is the 
paradox of existence. It is the 'incommensurability with reality' that creates a 
kind of witnessing that comes from a marginalized lifestyle.
Kierkegaard places faith as something higher than the plane of aesthetics 
because it presupposes resignation. It is a specific kind of resignation that 
Kierkegaard affirms, one that allows an individual to be resigned to walking 
his/her path, one that does not facilitate any wavering from the journey at hand. 
Such a type of resignation lays the ground for a leap, a leap of the dancer that 
creates a movement of infinity and suspends the ethical teleology within its 
movement.64 Kierkegaard comes close to approaching the pomographical here 
in terms of it's being an 'ana-aesthetic'.65 It is important here that Kierkegaard 
creates a different pathway of the installation of meaning and of thought, one
63 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, 
64 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, pp. 
65 The notion of the pomographical as an 'ana-aesthetic' is discussed in greater detail in the introduction, 
supra pp. 1 -23, and in chapter four, supra pp. 176-221.
56
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
that draws infinity towards the finite, and reconfigures a relationship of 
concealing-revealing. In the movement of resignation the knight of faith not 
only renounces everything, but also leaps to make the courageous movement of 
faith on the strength of the absurd that in faith he/she receives everything. 
As Kierkegaard points out it is through faith that: "Abraham did not 
renounce his claim on Isaac, through his faith he received Isaac."66 It is a 
question of temporality for Kierkegaard; it pivots upon finitude. It is a kind of 
finitude that suspends the real in an act of resignation that draws its strength 
from that of the absurd, and in doing so creates a mark or moment of meaning, 
one that differs from a conceptual fullness but is nevertheless concrete. He 
writes:
"I am able by my own strength to renounce everything, and then find 
peace and repose in the pain; I can put up with everything even if that 
demon, more horrifying than the skull and bones that put terror into men's 
hearts - even if madness itself were to hold up some fool's costume 
before my eyes and I could tell from its look that it was I who was to put it 
on; I can still save my soul as long as it is more important for me that my 
love of God should triumph in me than my worldly happiness. A man can 
still, in that last moment, concentrate his whole soul in a single glance 
towards the heaven from which all good gifts come, and this glance is 
something both he and the one he seeks understand; it means he has 
nevertheless remained true to his love."67
It is only on the strength of the absurd that one can receive something that 
belongs to finitude, for one's own energy, in such a movement, is always 
employed in the act of resignation, of renouncing everything. With the 
pornographical such energy is libidinal.
The plurality of the paradoxical nature of faith and the singularity of 
pornography, fall outside of a Hegelian dialectical logic of ethics but remain
Problemata, "Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, 
Problemata, "Preamble from the Heart", Fear and Trembling, 
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well within the remit set by Kierkegaard. This is not to make a comparison or 
even to draw a parallel between faith - a passion, and pornography - a product, 
but rather to place them as sharing the same impossible terrain of a paradox of 
ethics, without a universal mediation or wholeness; of a strange leap within and 
out of a totalising metaphysics. This is supportive too for this discussion in that 
it enables the possibility of a way in which to rethink the pornographical as a 
fragment, a singularity that is not abstract despite its lack of incorporation 
within Hegel's architectonics and Sittlichkeit. These lead to a kind of 
heterogeneous totalising of community without allowing for the marginality of 
unethical or a-radical forms of morality that are part of the pornographical and 
of 'playing with' social boundaries around bodily disgust and 'good' manners. 
The Hegelian dialectic posits aesthetics as the immediacy of unreflective 
knowledge of the Absolute Mind and religion provides the substance of vision 
and narrative structure to Absolute Knowledge.68 For Hegel, philosophy is the 
highest manifestation of the Absolute Mind, and it is within this movement that 
the forms of consciousness, of art and religion, manifest themselves and acquire 
the fullness of their conceptual, rational expression. For Kierkegaard considers 
an aesthetic life as one committed to immediacy and in dissolving the Hegelian 
dialectic he places faith as both an aesthetic immediacy, as a life "absolutely 
committed to relative ends" and as something so much more than an immediate 
inclination, something at the core of the paradox of existence.69 Faith lies in a
68 These are part of Hegel's architectonics of life's rationality. Supra pp. 30 - 48.
69 Alastair Hannay, in his introduction to Fear and Trembling, raises this statement taken from 
Kierkegaard's later and major dialectical work, Concluding Unscientific Postscript He writes that to " 
treat something aesthetically is to grasp it in terms of the immediate impact it makes, of how it strikes you 
in the here and now, of its tendency to attract or to repel you. In a more general way it is, in Kierkegaard's 
terms, also to treat life itself as a repository of objects of longing or loathing, as well as degrees of lesser 
affect in between, in short as a pool of goods (of whatever kind) to be secured and the lack of them to be
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non-conceptual plane somewhere between aesthetics and ethics. Kierkegaard is 
beneficial here with the questions he raises over the hegemonic details of 
Hegel's concept of aesthetics. He raises ways of looking at how aesthetics are 
posited in the lofty social hierarchies that create an ethical community and ways 
of thinking. Hegel's narrow vision of aesthetics and the role of the imagination, 
in the movement of absolute knowledge, cleave out a method of thought that is 
dominated by a religious idealism and the clean efficiency of reason. It is not 
only pornography that falls short of such a 'pure' rationality, being grasped as 
nothing other than immoral, but as Kierkegaard argues, faith itself cannot be 
approached in such a manner.
The ethical is the universal in Hegel's dialectical becoming of Geist. As a 
universal, the ethical applies to everyone; it applies at every moment, but for 
Kierkegaard the problem lies in the teleological unfolding. He comments:
"It rests immanently in itself, has nothing outside of itself that is its telos 
[end, purpose] but is itself the telos for everything outside, and when that 
is taken up into it, it has no further to go. Seen as an immediate, no more 
than sensate and psychic, being, the single individual is the particular that 
has its telos in the universal, and the individual's ethical task is always to 
express himself in this, to abrogate his particularity so as to become the 
universal."70
In asserting his/her particularity a single individual would place himself/herself 
in a position of direct opposition to the universal. A reconciliation with the 
ethical universal could consequently only be brought about by the individual 
recognising his /her behaviour as a sin. 71
avoided." As Hannay remarks for Kierkegaard to posit faith as an aesthetic immediacy is of vital 
importance to his challenge of the Hegelian dialectic. A. Hannay in S. Kierkegaard, "Introduction", Fear 
and Trembling, 
70 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema I: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? ", Fear and 
Trembling, 
71 Kierkegaard states: "Whenever, having entered the universal, the single individual feels an urge to assert
59
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
It is here that Kierkegaard locates the paradox of faith that Hegel leaves 
under-explored, for faith is such a paradoxical relation, in which the particular is 
higher than the universal. For Kierkegaard a paradox remains 'inaccessible to 
thought' and such lingers as incommunicable; it cannot be recuperated into a 
heterogeneous totalised concept or mutually self-reflective community. 
Kierkegaard introduces a concept of witnessing that cannot be communicated; 
what is witnessed is 'unutterable'. This concept enables for the liberal notion of 
individual to be rethought, for if it's ethical relationship to the universal is 
superfluous and the individual's relationship to the absolute remains 
unutterable, then the privacy and the autonomy of an individual intensely persist 
as peculiar and incommunicable. This enables the pornographical as an 
anaesthetic to be approached with respect to its own peculiar inhabitation and 
acts of witnessing by 'de-individualised' subjects.72 To Kierkegaard this 
paradox of faith is more than a state of temptation for Abraham acts on the 
strength of the absurd, and it is exactly an act of absurdity and the energetic 
strength of such an act that places a single individual higher than the ethical
plane of the universal.
his particularity, he is in a state of temptation, from which he can extricate himself only by surrendering his 
particularity to the universal in repentance. If that is the highest that can be said of man and his existence, 
then the ethical and a person's eternal blessedness, which is his telos in all eternity and at every moment, 
are identical; for in that case would be a contradiction to say that one surrendered the telos (i.e. suspended 
it teleologically) since by suspending the telos one would be forfeiting it, while what is said to be 
suspended in this sense is not forfeited but preserved in something higher, the latter being precisely its 
telos. " S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema I: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? ", Fear 
and Trembling, 
72 This sense of an individual/ subject as 'fourth person singular' is discussed in greater detail in the 
introduction, supra pp. 1 - 23; in chapter two through, the nuances of the 'ana-linguistic' nature of 
pornography; through fascination and through a philosophy of pleasure, supra pp. 82 -125, in chapter four 
as an ana-aesthetic, supra pp. 176- 221; and in chapter through the notion of mimesis and mimetic bodies 
and their communal creations of fantasy and fetish, supra pp. 222 - 237.
73 For such a paradox of ethics to be mediated Abraham would have to admit that he was in a state of 
temptation and not sacrifice Isaac or he would have to repent such a sacrificial act and return to the 
universal seeking redemption.
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If such a task could be defined as a temptation then it would be a 
temptation of the ethical itself. However an ethical duty is the expression of 
God's will, and as such it makes little sense to claim that in doing his ethical 
duty Abraham resisted the temptation of fulfilling God's will. Abraham's 
action bears no relation to the universal; his sacrifice of Isaac was done for God, 
out of his love and duty to God. He strove at all times to even maintain Isaac's 
faith in God. His actions were not those of a tragic hero but of a knight of faith 
committed to his own private understanding; his own unmediated relationship to 
the absolute.
In order to begin to approach the grisly and singular, ideological entity of 
pornography and the pornographical communities this chapter has looked at a 
selection of the works of these two metaphysical thinkers and the marginality of 
pornography. The plurality of faith and its ethical paradox, and the singularity 
of pornography, lie in the murky borderlands of a realm that is uncapturable by 
neither the architectonics of Hegel's aesthetics nor Sittlichkeit. Yet it is the 
essential ingredient of bodily passion, whether it is faith, lust or humour, which 
forms the building blocks of an ethical community and its language structures of 
taste and individual autonomy.
Kierkegaard is fascinated by how Abraham can exist in such extremities at 
the particular in suspended opposition to the universal. Such a man cannot be 
wept over; cannot be pitied. Kierkegaard finds Abraham both admirable and 
appalling; a lonely figure to be approached with a kind of holy terror. Abraham 
gives up the universal in order to grasp something higher still that is not the 
universal; he teleologically suspends the ethical. Abraham had faith. As 
Kierkegaard comments:
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it- is the paradox that keeps him at the extremity and which he cannot 
make himself as the single individual in an absolute relation to the 
absolute. Is he justified? His justification is, once again, the paradox; for 
if he is the paradox it is not by virtue of being anything universal but of 
being the particular."74
To dwell in the extremities of the boundary lands between aesthetics and ethics 
is dwell in the paradox of faith; it is to dwell without relief of the distress, the 
agony and the fear of the paradox. For Kierkegaard it is precisely this lack of 
relief, this endurance that makes a leap of greatness. With regards to the 
pornographical, it is the brutality of such of dwelling that is 'incommensurable 
with reality', that creates its 'ana-aesthetic', alongside its employment of crass, 
comic humour and gestures that accompany the witnessing of the 
pornographical.
One of the important aspects of Abraham's journey to Kierkegaard is this 
endurance that is needed to make a leap of faith. Abraham's journey is 
incommunicable to his community; he must remain involved with his peers, 
with Sarah and with Isaac, whilst being infinitely distanced from them through 
his secret knowledge of his deeds to come. Kierkegaard defines the paradox of 
faith as an incommensurability between a new interiority and the exterior. It is 
this that provides the inexpressibility of a paradoxical faith, of a movement of 
infinity. For faith to remain unmediated by the universal the single individual 
must be unable to make him/herself intelligible to anyone.75 The fear, the 
trembling of the anguish that Abraham endures in the paradox means he is
74 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema I: Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? ", Fear and 
Trembling, 
75 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema II: Is there an absolute duty to God? ", Fear and Trembling, 
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utterly incapable of making himself understood. He must sacrifice his only son, 
Isaac who he loves most in the world. Abraham must do this in such a way so 
that Isaac keeps his faith and love of God. He does this for his love of God, on 
the strength of the absurd hope that he will get Isaac back.
The passion of Abraham's concentration must have been intense. 
Kierkegaard notes that:
"He knows it is beautiful to be born to the particular with the universal as 
his friendly abode, which receives him straightaway with open arms when 
he wishes to stay there. But he also knows that higher up there winds a 
lonely path, narrow and steep; he knows it is terrible to be born in solitude 
outside the universal, to walk without meeting a single traveller. He 
knows very well where he is, and how he is related to men. Humanly 
speaking he is insane and cannot make himself understood to anyone. 
And yet 'insane' is the mildest expression for him."76
Abraham was a witness, exiled from human discourse, assigned to the solitude 
of his trembling, his faith an affront to humanity. Kierkegaard notes that:
"The true knight of faith is a witness, never a teacher, and in this lies the 
deep humanity in him which is worth more than this foolish concern for 
others' weal and woe which is honoured under the name of sympathy, but 
which is really nothing but vanity. A person who wants only to be a 
witness confesses thereby that no one, not even the least, needs another 
person's sympathy, or is to be put down so another can raise himself 
up."77
It is through a notion of witnessing that Kierkegaard delves into the act of 
concealment and disclosure. Recognition and concealment are crucial dynamics 
in the establishment of any meaning throughout the ages and provides a vital 
ingredient for the dramatic arts and of cultural narrative structures. Kierkegaard 
notes that in Greek tragedies the dramatic epic springs from an obscure and
76 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema II: Is there an absolute duty to God? ", Fear and Trembling, 
77 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema II: Is there an absolute duty to God? ", Fear and Trembling, 
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hidden origin of Fate, whereas in modern reflective tragedies fate has been 
incorporated within a dramatic consciousness that observes itself. Modernity 
has bestowed the acts of concealment (tension) and disclosure (relaxation) as 
the hero's responsibility and free act.
The pornographical is 'brought forth' and witnessed through the 
comportment of a techne of comic humour.78 Kierkegaard locates the key for 
the formulation of modern comedy within the act of concealment and 
disclosure. In highlighting the difference between the paradox of ethics and 
aesthetic concealment, he remarks that:
"If a person doing the hiding, i.e. the one who puts the dramatic yeast into 
play, hides something nonsensical, we have comedy. But if the concealer 
is related to the idea, he may come close to being a tragic hero."79
Modernity's relationship to comedy makes an essential comment for 
Kierkegaard and reveals what he names as a turning point in human affairs. A 
turning point that he places within the category of crisis in noting that modernity
has fallen victim to the comic. For Kierkegaard what has been lost is the 
anguish and horror of the dark passions that lie concealed within every human 
life and alongside this the courage to believe in the spirit, rather than abjection.
78 This is looked at in more depth in chapter three, supra pp. 126-175.
79 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema III: Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his 
purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar, from Isaac? ", Fear and Trembling, p. 111. This thesis develops this 
notion of revealing the concealing of something nonsensical as comedy in naming the pornographical 
techne as one of comic humour. See the introduction, supra pp. 1 - 23, and chapter three, supra pp. 126 - 
175.
80 Kierkegaard laments that: "Just as a demonic person always reveals himself without understanding 
himself, our age betrays its own defects in a kind of clairvoyance, for it always calling for the comical.... 
Does this age really need a ridiculous Erscheinung [appearance, show] of an enthusiast in order to have 
something to laugh at? Or does it not rather need such an enthusiastic figure in reality to remind it of what 
it has forgotten?" S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema III: Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to 
conceal his purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar, from Isaac? ", Fear and Trembling, 
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A sense of disgust and shame with the body seems historically to have 
arisen with the rise of individualism and a concept of privacy. A predominant 
and recognisable trait of pornography is to offensively tease and highlight any 
cultural sensitive areas over bodily proprieties and sensibilities. Pornography is 
a modern concept and product of the Enlightenment and a response to this by 
presenting the improper body.81 The conceptual invention of the pornography 
industry has always been closely related and tied to the emergence of new 
scientific discourses, to the invention of new technologies as well as political 
criticism. It was the technology of the printing press that made it possible to 
copy in large quantities the libertine texts and comic images of sexual satire. 
The danger and effectiveness of libertine literature arose in that it was able to be 
distributed en mass throughout the social classes. The sexually graphic 
pamphlets were no longer a pleasure or tool of an elite section of society.
Technological inventions have not only mutated the pornography industry 
and the accessibility of its market as well as the means of its regulation, but they 
themselves have also been a function and have been given impetus by the 
pornography market. Pornography is part of this technological age that has 
meant a turning point in human affairs. Its thrust comes in the compressed
81 Kipnis traces the emergence of bodily disgust to the increased regulation of carnivals and the sanitisation 
of the 'out-of-control' and unmannerly body. She writes: "An increasingly heightened sense of disgust at 
the bodies and bodily functions of others emerged, and simultaneous with this process of privatization 
came a corresponding sense of shame about one's own body and its functions. Certain once common 
behaviors become socially frowned on: spitting, scratching, farting, wiping your mouth on the tablecloth, 
or blowing your nose on your sleeve were replaced by increasingly detailed rules devoted to restraining the 
conduct of the body (and even how it might be spoken of) in public." L. Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: 
Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America, 
In looking at the role that Larry Flynt has played, through his magazine, Hustler, in the U.S. battles 
over freedom of expression, Kipnis charts the entwining relationships between aesthetics, manners and 
bodily disgust as the basis of social, class distinction. She finds that 'our' cultural psyches are threatened 
by any transgressions of these cultural codes of manners and the social body. These social structures are 
deeply embedded and essential to a sense of identity. See also I. Tang, Pornography: The Secret History 
of Civilization; L. Hunt, The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the Origins of Modernity, 1500- 
1800; Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire.
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package of bawdy sexual humour that enables a viewer the emotional and 
physical distance to indulge in the dark passions of bodily lust, horror and satire. 
To witness pornography, to dwell in the pornographical is to partake in a 
cultural 'ana-aesthetic', at the borders of a dialectical ethics and aesthetics. 
Pornography names a crucial part of this time period, something that previous 
epistemologies cannot grasp, due in part to the elusiveness of its singularity and 
its ephemeral and gestural nature. Whether or not pornography brings a viewer 
the courage to believe in the depth of life and spirit, it does not dwell entirely in 
abjection of the body and self either.
Kierkegaard asks what it must have been like for Abraham to dwell in the 
suspension of the ethical; as a witness to the secret he concealed dialectically 
from both the aesthetic and ethical spheres. For a paradox of ethics is very 
different from that of aesthetic concealment; a leap of faith on the strength of 
the absurd is necessary in order to endure the weight and barrenness of keeping 
a secret, of concealing a secret from ethics and suspending its teleological 
unfolding. Abraham incurred a secret on his own responsibility. With the case 
of the tragic hero Kierkegaard finds that aesthetics can reward concealment, for 
to keep silent at an aesthetic level of immediacy can perhaps save or aid 
someone, whereas the ethical level demands disclosure in order for the state/ 
community to play a mediating role. Faith has no reward for keeping 'faithful', 
rather it is more of a case of an impossible witnessing: one that is observable, 
but the observation cannot be communicated both because it 'cannot' and 
'should not' be. Abraham could not speak; he remained silent and unable to be 
understood, thwarting any translation into the universal.
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Abraham was no aesthetic hero for his silence is not to save Isaac. His 
aesthetic concealment "was on the strength of his accidental particularity" and 
as Kierkegaard points out he was no tragic hero:
"The genuine tragic hero sacrifices himself and everything he has for the 
universal; his action, every emotion in him belongs to the universal, he is 
revealed, and in disclosure he is the beloved son of ethics. This does not 
apply to Abraham. He does nothing for the universal and he is concealed.
We are now at the paradox. Either the individual can stand in 
particular relation to the absolute, and he is done for, he is neither a tragic 
hero nor an aesthetic hero."82
Abraham is silent, not from a decision or choice but because he cannot speak. 
Herein lies his distress and anguish; he must bear the terrible responsibility of 
solitude.
Abraham discloses the incommensurability of subjectivity with reality and
even to its having the right to deceive. Kierkegaard puts forward irony as a 
tool of primitive strength for a paradox of ethics, an implement of a particular 
kind of silence, fortitude, and ethical deception.84 Kierkegaard attributes the 
last decisive actions, of speech, a certain kind of silent speech, which are made 
by Abraham and indeed Socrates, as ironic. Abraham cannot speak, he says 
nothing of his intentions to his family and community, hi the final moments
82 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema III: Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his 
purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar, from Isaac? ", Fear and Trembling, 
83 S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema III: Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his 
purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar, from Isaac?", Fear and Trembling, pp. 142-143.
84 Kierkegaard provides an example of an ironist as someone: "... Whose sharp eye has taken radical 
measure of the ludicrous of life, who through a secret understanding with the forces of life ascertains what 
the patient needs. He knows he commands the power of laughter; should he wish to wield it he would be 
sure of victory and, what is even better, of his happiness. He knows some voice is going to raise itself 
against him, but also that he himself is the stronger; he knows people can still be brought for a moment to 
appear serious - but also that, privately, they long to laugh with him: he knows that it is still possible to 
bring a woman for a moment to hold up her fan before her eyes when she speaks, but he also knows that 
behind her fan she is laughing, he knows the fan is not completely opaque, he knows one can make 
invisible inscriptions on it, he knows that when a woman strikes at him with the fan it is because she has 
understood him, he knows infallibly how laughter creeps into a person and dwells there secretly, and how 
once lodged there it lies in ambush and waits." S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema III: Was it 
ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar, from Isaac? ", Fear and 
Trembling, 
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Isaac asks his father what is happening and Abraham replies; he utters no
Of
untruth. Abraham remains true to his love of God. Either there is a paradox 
and the individual, as the particular, stands in an absolute relation to the 
absolute, or as Kierkegaard concludes, 'Abraham is done for'.
In this way Kierkegaard prioritises the individual over the community and 
argues for a sense of community based on a paradox of ethics; one that allows 
for concealment, that provides space for secrets and their weighty responsibility, 
for Abraham stood in a relationship with the absolute without mediation of, or 
need to sacrifice everything to, the universal. The paradox of ethics reveals a 
community that is formed neither through an aesthetic judgement of taste nor 
through recognition of the universal, but in the silence of a terrible witnessing. 
What sort of community is this? Kierkegaard is helpful to this thesis in pointing 
out a direction that looks towards the peculiar nature of the pornographical 
communities.
2. Abyssal Logic: Heidegger.
A new ontology is required; a kind of 'groundless ontology', one that 
allows for difference to be rethought in such a way that offered, or seemed to 
offer, a promise to provide for its paradoxical nature. Such a difference, rather 
than being reduced to a mere distinction between things, is in excess of a
85 As Kierkegaard notes: "His answer has the form of irony for it is always irony to say something and yet 
not say it. Isaac asks Abraham because he assumes that Abraham knows. Now if Abraham had replied, 'I 
know nothing', he would have uttered an untruth. He cannot say anything since he knows he cannot say. 
So he replies, 'My son, God will provide himself a lamb for a burnt offering.' Here one sees the double 
movement in Abraham's soul as it has been described in the foregoing. Had Abraham simply renounced 
his claim on Isaac, and he knows that precisely at this moment he himself is ready to sacrifice him. So, 
after having made this movement Abraham has at every instant been performing the next, making the 
movement on the strength of the absurd. To the extent he utters no untruth for on the strength of the 
absurd it is after all possible that God might do something quite different. He utters no untruth then, but 
neither does he say anything, for he speaks in a foreign tongue." S. Kierkegaard, Problemata, "Problema 
III: Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar, from 
Isaac?", Fear and Trembling, 
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dialectical mediation whilst at the same time able to produce a mimetic copy of 
and through its own excessive movement. For this kind of difference, a move 
that is not available in either Hegel or Kierkegaard is required. As we will see 
below, and also in chapter three, this Heideggerian move enables a different 
way in which to approach questions around the installation of meaning in 
relation to the 'event', pornography and the pornographical.86
2.1 Identity as the originarv difference of an event of appropriation: the 
Heideggerian move.
For Heidegger such a difference or rather the thought of such a difference 
requires leaping from the speculative thinking of Hegel and any such 
resembling systems of thought, including the pluralism offered by 
Kierkegaard's paradox of ethics. Heidegger purports that identity is a 
singularity, formed through an originary relation of "belonging-together ", and 
posits an alternative path that gathers meaning as belonging rather than as a 
fixed and totalised, heterogeneous unity. He writes:
"If the element of together in belonging-together is emphasized, we have 
the metaphysical concept of identity which orders the manifold into a 
unity mediated by synthesis. This unity forms a synthetic totality of the 
world with God or Being as the ground, as the first cause and as the 
highest being. But if the element of belonging in belonging together is 
emphasized, we have, thinking and Being held apart and at the same time 
held together (not fitted together) in the Same. To come to an 
understanding of the belonging together of man and Being, we must leave 
metaphysical thinking which thinks Being exclusively as the cause of 
beings and thinks beings primarily as what is caused. We must simply
86 See chapter three, supra pp. 126 - 175. The main books this thesis employs are: M. Heidegger, The 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, translated and introduced by William Lovitt. (New 
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1977); M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, translated by J. 
Stambaugh. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969); M. Heidegger, Basic Writings, edited by David 
Farrell Krell. (London: Routledge, 1996); M. Heidegger, The Concept of Time, translated by William 
McNeill. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); M. Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, translated by J. 
Glenn Gray. (New York: Harper TorchBooks, 1968.) The main concepts that this thesis utilizes 
throughout are that of'the event of appropriation' and 'techne'.
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leap out of it. Thus the principle of (Satz) of identity becomes a leap
(Satz) out of metaphysics."
To Heidegger what is original or primary in a constitution of meaning is 
the relation of belonging, rather than what is related. He prefers to place the 
emphasis on 'how' something is taking place rather than the 'why' of its 
occurrence. For him the 'reality', or 'presencings', that takes place is manifold 
and layered with subtle shifts and gatherings of meaning that are continuously 
occurring in the movements and interactions of things. Such a shift in emphasis 
grasps meaning from that which lies closest to hand; that which lies before one. 
It is in the 'is' that Being is uttered, and it is in such a shift that pornography can 
be approached as difference, rather than a dishonourable and marginalized 
concept. However Heidegger allows for the body, for bodies to be passed over 
and sealed in an abyssal crypt of the presence or presencing of the present, as 
we shall see.
The epochal truth of the belonging-together of being and Being is revealed 
to man but in a manner that comes upon him veiled. In other words for 
Heidegger truth is an unconcealment that is simultaneously a concealment. 
Heidegger traces back the origins of man's scientific modernity to the Greek 
age, and discovers the belonging of technology to techne. As he writes:
"... Techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of the 
craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Techne
oobelongs to bringing-forth, topoiesis; it is something poetic."
87 J. Stambaugh, "Introduction" in M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, pp. 
88 M. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, 
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Techne is a mode of a kind of poetic truth, that ofaletheia. As such techne is 
not an instrumental kind of truth concerned with the ordering and causes of 
things; rather it is a bringing-forth of truth in the sense of revealing what 'does 
not yet lie here before us'. Although Heidegger would stop short of the 
pornographical, this thesis is posing this as a movement of dynamic that has a 
techne to it, one that contours a bloody and complicit, bodily meaning.89 
One can form a sense of objectivity from the how or techne of this 
relation, but one can never predict what is to be related. There is no static 
essence of a subjective man here.90 Man is the da-sein, the Being-there or rather 
the there of Being.91
89 Chapter three of this thesis focuses specifically on techne as being libidinal in it's bringing -forth; and 
looks at comic humour as a techne of pornography and the pornographical communities. Supra pp. 126 - 
175.
90 Heidegger charts the notion of modern man as a self-conscious subject back to Descartes, whereby his 
ego cogito [ergo] sum established man as a subject that finds self-certainty or security within himself, and 
as such became the shaper and guarantor of all that comes from beyond himself. As Lovitt summarises: 
"Man's thinking (cogitare), which Heidegger says was also a "driving together" (co-agitare), was found to 
contain within itself the needed sureness. Man could represent reality to himself, that is he could set it up 
over against himself, as it appeared to him, as an object of thought. In so doing, he felt assured at once of 
his own existence and of the existence of the reality thus conceived." W. Lovitt, "Introduction" in "The 
Question Concerning Technology" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p. xxv, 
and see also M. Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture " in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, 
91 As noted earlier, Hegel placed the history of philosophy and philosophy itself in an external relation. 
This externality is not a crude form of indifference or of superficiality, rather as that "outside dimension in 
which all history and every real course of events have their place in comparison to the movement of the 
absolute Idea." M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 44. The externality of history develops as a 
result of the Idea's self-externalisation. If Hegel thinks of Being as the Being of beings, speculative- 
historically, then Heidegger wished to approach thinking about the relationship of the belonging of thought 
and Being in the same fashion. In this way, within the sameness, difference can be seen more persistently, 
whereas within the identical it disappears.
For Heidegger time has meaning in its temporality and as such time is Dasein; the Being of Dasein 
is historicity itself. Dasein expresses 'my' authentic and inauthentic possibilities through the hermeneutic 
principles, as Heidegger writes: "The possibility of access to history is grounded in the possibility 
according to which any specific present understands how to be futural." M. Heidegger, The Concept of 
Time, translated by William McNeill. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), p. 20E. Heidegger 
designates the temporality of Dasein as an 'ecstatical' standing out which allows him to rethink the 
paradoxes of time as futural rather than either a continuum of infinite moments that stretch behind and in 
front of oneself or according to a 'clock' measurement of time; a measurement of the present as now, the 
past as no-longer-present and irretrievable, and the future as not-yet-present and indeterminate. Heidegger 
remarks that: "Dasein is authentically alongside itself, it is truly existent, whenever it maintains itself in 
this running ahead. This running ahead is nothing other than the authentic and singular future of one's 
own Dasein. In running ahead Dasein is its future, in such a way that this being futural it comes back to its 
past and present." M. Heidegger, The Concept of Time, 
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"Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only 
this. This "only" does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess. A 
belonging to Being prevails within man, a belonging which listens to 
Being because it is appropriated to Being."92
This move that discloses identity is a leap away from representational thinking 
that considers Being to be the ground of beings, and as such it is also a leap 
away from Being in the sense of 'a spring'. In springing away from the ground 
this is not necessarily a spring into an abyss, this would only be the case if 
viewed from a horizon of metaphysical thinking.93 This spring takes us to the 
realm that we have access to: the belonging to Being. Being also belongs to us; 
for Being can only become present as Being through us. This spring springs 
into the event of appropriation 94
"The spring is the abrupt entry into the realm from which man and Being 
have already reached each other in their active nature, since both are 
mutually appropriated, extended as a gift, one to the other. Only the entry 
into the realm of this mutual appropriation determines and defines the 
experience of thinking."95
The event of appropriation is the neutral expression of the pornographical. 
Heidegger cannot get beyond this as we shall see, but this thesis is using this as 
the movement and dynamic of a discursive economy.
92 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
93 There are a variety of scholars that fall into the trap of accepting either a negation or an ethical 
suspension of the moral, or/and an abyssal logic of desire, some of whose work we will consider in a bit 
more detail later in the thesis; for example, Butler, Agamben, Derrida, Badou, Zizek, Irigaray, and Kristeva 
amongst others.
103 For the event of appropriation Heidegger uses Ereignis, a word that is used in everyday language to 
mean 'events', but Heidegger's usage of this term is both more abstract and concrete. Abstract in that it is 
being, as Heidegger writes, that is "...Infinitely removed from everyday events and yet of being that which 
is so close to us that we cannot see it." Concrete in that its use of the very roots of the word er-eignen. 
Eigen can be translated as to own and to thus come into one's own, or to come to where one belongs and 
er-augnen as to catch sight of, to see with the mind's eye, or to see face-to-face. J. Stambaugh, 
"Introduction" in M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
95 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
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Heidegger asserts that it is this contemporary age of technology that forms 
a prelude to such an occurrence as an event of appropriation and the possibility 
of a fuller relationship between man and Being than there has been before.96 
For Heidegger, technology is not about technicality anymore than it is simply a 
product of man. Heidegger puts forward technology as something that man 'is' 
right now. The emphasis here is again on a move away from paradigm of 
thought that places man as a subjective rational animal. This is not an order of 
thought centred on a concept of logos, existentialism or humanism. 
Pornography's identity is entwined with technological invention and impetus, 
and is as much a part of what mankind is right now. The pornographical 
presents a commentary on contemporary mankind and its relationship between 
technology and the body.
The ethics conceived of a technological world and all its political 
manifestations reduce everything down to man and whether he will become the 
servant of or remain the master of technology. Heidegger suggests that:
"... We confirm our own opinion that technology is of man's making 
alone. We fail to hear the claim of Being which speaks in the essence of 
technology."97
The manner of this paradigm shift, or the manner in which man and Being 
belong to each other in the technological world, is one that Heidegger names the
framework, or the Enframing, Ge-StelL It is this claim that is made in the
96 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 36. As Stambaugh writes: "The framework is far more real 
than all the atomic energy and all machines. But it is nothing necessarily ultimate. It could be a prelude to 
what Heidegger calls the event of appropriation. The event of appropriation is the very realm in which 
man and Being reach each other in their very core. They lose the determinations placed upon them by 
metaphysics." J. Stambaugh "Introduction" in M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
97 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
98 Stambaugh advises the translation ofGe-Stell as one that expresses the chain or group of activities of the
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gathering of the mutual challenge between man and Being as they face each 
other by turns that is Enframing. With the Enframing or the Framework, 
Heidegger puts forward a diverse step towards understanding a concept of 
identity as something other than a transcendentally mediated unity that 
subsumes all the particulars beneath it.
To rephrase this, Heidegger designates the essence of modern technology 
as a 'challenging revealing', that has a character of 'setting -upon'. This 
particular revealing sets a kind of challenge and setting of the boundaries that 
form identities. This leads one to assume that marginal or minority concepts 
such as 'pornography' would have some bearing or place within the 
Heideggerian logic. Heidegger states:
"That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is 
unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored 
up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed is 
switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, 
and switching about are ways of revealing. But the revealing never 
simply comes to an end. Neither does it run off into the indeterminate. 
The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, 
through regulating their course. This regulating itself is, for its part, 
everywhere secured. Regulating and securing even become the chief 
characteristics of the challenging revealing.
What kind of unconcealment is it, then, that is peculiar to that 
which comes to stand forth through this setting - upon that challenges? 
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, 
indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for further ordering. 
Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it
OO
standing reserve [Bestand]"
verb Stellen, to place, put, or set The chain consists of: vor-stellen, to represent, or think; stellen, to 
challenge; ent-stellen, to disfigure; nach-stellen, to be after someone, or to pursue him/her stealthily; and 
sicher-stellen, to make certain of something. J. Stambaugh "Introduction" in M. Heidegger, Identity and 
Difference, 
99 M. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, 
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Man is gathered to order everything as standing-reserve creating an 
undifferentiated supply of the available. 100 For Heidegger, such an ordering of 
everything as standing-reserve is a manner of self-revealing of the 'real' and a 
manifestation of destining of Being and man. For Heidegger the threat lies not 
to the devastation of beings but to the abandonment and failure to hear Being. 
Whilst such language has religious overtures, in regarding Being as an 
event, Heidegger is positing Being as something other than an eternal object, as 
something that is time specific and historical. History in this sense is a practice 
that is both present-at-hand and passes by in front of 'us', in the running ahead 
of itself of Dasein. History for Heidegger is not a natural continuum or a series 
of changes but a happening, one in which 'our' fate and destining are bound in 
how Being is sent to 'us'. Being is thrown to 'us' and Heidegger poses history 
as something that 'we' are thrown into and from which 'we' project into the 
future. Time is the temporality of Dasein for Heidegger, the hermeneutic 
paradox of this is that time is futural. Heidegger allows for the body, for bodies 
to be passed over and sealed in an abyssal crypt of the presence or presencing of 
the present, however he argues that the temporality of Dasein throws mankind 
the opportunity to hear the 'call' of Being, and as such preserves it's authentic 
belongings that forge a sense of community.
100 Richard Polt illuminates Heidegger here by looking at contemporary discourses and their references to a 
multiplicity of things as resources; humans are human resources, books and art are information resources, 
time is a time resource and writing is word processing. Everything and anything is a resource of data to be 
manipulated, processed and reprocessed. Heidegger conceives of this as an age whereby we are caught in 
the 'compulsion to grip things'. Polt uses Heidegger's chilling comment on a technological worldview to 
further illustrate this: "Agriculture is now a motorized food industry, essentially the same as the 
manufacture of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockade and starvation 
of countries, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs." R. Polt, Heidegger: An Introduction. 
(London: UCL Press, 1999), pp. 171 - 172, and M. Heidegger, "Das Ge-Stell" in Bremer und Freiburger 
Vortrdge, GA 79, p.27.
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It is in this way that Heidegger conceives of the Enframing of 
technological mankind as both a saving power as well as a possible danger. Part 
of the manifestation of the destining of Being and man in the standing-reserve 
of Enframing is man's estrangement from himself/herself. Heidegger believes 
that man is summoned and claimed in the challenging revealing of Enframing, 
and what is paramount in this age is for man to know that he is so claimed. For 
Heidegger the need is for man to recognise this essential relation to Being and 
to the world, for as long as man does not know himself/herself then he/she 
cannot be open to Being and tends to become trapped within two vain 
approaches to a technological 'world picture': being the master and controller of 
technology or being dominated by technological implements.
Heidegger locates the danger for contemporary man in the oblivion 
that blinds the self-manifestation of Being. To him man needs to know that 
he/she belongs to a destining, to recognize it as a destining and to discern the 
'how' of this belonging. As Lovitt summarises:
"A destining of Being is never a blind fate that simply compels man from 
beyond himself. It is, rather an opening way in which man is called upon 
to move to bring about that which is taking place. For man to know 
himself as the one so called upon is for him to be free. For Heidegger 
freedom is not a matter of man's willing or not willing particular things. 
Freedom is man's opening himself- his submitting himself in attentive 
awareness - to the summons addressed to him and to the way on which he 
is already being sent. It is to apprehend and accept the dominion of Being 
already holding sway, and so to be "taken into a freeing claim". 101
The dilemma for man, Heidegger suggests, with Enframing, is not only that 
man's relationship to himself/herself is banished, by this destining of a 
technological age (alongside his/her relationship to everything that is), but also
101 W. Lovitt, "Introduction" in M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
pp. xxxiii - xxxiv.
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and most importantly this destining expels man into one specific way of 
revealing; that of ordering. Man is challenged 'more originally' into the process 
of ordering and evades becoming merely 'standing-reserve', and since man 
drives forward technological advancement and transformations, he/she forms an 
active role in the ordering unconcealment/ revealing, though the unconcealment 
itself is never a deed of mankind. 
As Heidegger warns:
"Where Enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing - 
reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own 
fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such.
Thus the challenging Enframing not only conceals a former 
way of revealing, bring - forth, but it conceals revealing itself and with it 
That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass."102
It is here that Heidegger locates the twofold meaning of the 'turning' within 
Enframing as the danger that also bears within itself the saving power for the 
estranged relationship of Being and man. The entrapping of the truth of Being 
by way of oblivion is its concealment at the very instance of its revealing. 103
Heidegger puts forward this instant turning about of unconcealing 
concealing as an 'in-flashing' the self-revealing turning within Being of
102 M. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, p. 27. Heidegger connects the possible saving power of Enframing to the former way of 
revealing that of thepoiesis of the fine arts and bringing - forth of the true: techne. More will be discussed 
on this in chapter three, libidinal technologies, supra pp. 126-175.
103 Heidegger writes, "When this entrapping-with-oblivion does come expressly to pass, then oblivion as 
such turns in and abides. Thus rescued through this abiding from falling away out of remembrance, it is no 
longer oblivion. With such in-turning, the oblivion relating to Being's safekeeping is no longer the 
oblivion of Being; but rather, turning in thus, it turns about into the safekeeping of Being. When the 
danger is as the danger, with the turning about of oblivion, the safekeeping of Being comes to pass; world 
comes to pass. That world comes to pass as world, that the thing things, this is the distant advent of the 
coming to presence of being itself.
The self-denying of the truth of Being, which entraps itself with oblivion, harbors the favor as yet 
ungranted, that this self-entrapping will turn about; that, in turning, oblivion will turn and become the 
safekeeping belonging to the coming to presence of Being, instead of allowing that coming to presence to 
fall into disguise. In the coming to presence and dwells a favor, namely the favor of the turning about of 
the oblivion of Being into the truth of Being. In the coming to presence of the danger, where it is as the 
danger, is the turning about into the safekeeping, is this safekeeping itself, is the saving power of Being." 
M. Heidegger, "The Turning" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, pp. 
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Ereignis, the event of appropriation. From what is cleared and lit -up in the 'in- 
flashing', 'we' witness a letting -belong that gathers the belonging together of 
man and Being. 104 Heidegger puts forward:
"... In all the disguising belonging to Enframing, the bright open-space of 
world lights up, the truth of Being flashes. At the instant, that is, when 
Enframing lights up, in its coming to presence as the danger, i.e., as the 
saving power. In Enframing, moreover, as a destining of the coming to 
presence of Being, there comes to presence a light from the flashing of 
Being. Enframing is, though veiled, still glance, and no blind destiny in 
the sense of a completely ordained fate.
Insight into that which is - thus do we name the sudden 
flash of the truth of Being into truthless Being.
When insight comes disclosingly to pass, then men are the 
ones who are struck in their essence by the flashing of Being. In insight, 
men are the ones who are caught sight of.
Only when man, in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the 
insight by which he himself is beheld, renounces human self-will and 
projects himself toward that insight, away from himself, does he 
correspond in his essence to the claim of that insight. In thus 
corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eignef]"m
Heidegger looks for difference between Being and beings as difference, as the 
ontological difference, rather than Being as the ground of beings. He questions 
that which had yet to be thought, the oblivion of that difference, given that for 
him, oblivion belongs inherently to difference. This is more than a simple 
forgetting of difference by man. Instead of inserting this difference between 
beings and Being ahead of time and progressing towards an all-inclusive 
conceptual totality, the step back heeds ontological difference as difference. 106
M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, pp. 
105 M. Heidegger, "The Turning" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p. 47. 
Lovitt comments that Heidegger discusses Enframing as ""the photographic negative" of that disclosing 
(Sem. 42). In enframing, Being and man confront each other, but they meet in estrangement. In the 
unique disclosing that brings them into their own, they meet in the very same relationship; but now, 
instead of and yet within the skeletal darkness of Enframing, their flashes also the light of that disclosing 
which brings them to belong together, which grants them what is truly their own. W. Lovitt, 
"Introduction " in M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, p. xxxvii.
106 Joan Stambaugh comments: "... Thinking for Heidegger attempts to move forward by the step back 
into the realm of the essence of truth which has never yet come to light. This step back allows Being as
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Here Heidegger, despite his turning, remains steadfast in his commitment to 
removing the presence of the present, except as a memorial, a remembering, and 
a futural encounter that is projected backwards. 107 The pornographical is a 
different kind of an 'insistent eksistent' dynamic, one that is bloody and stripped 
of the moral consolation in presenting the unspeakable of the improper body 
and the complicit confusion between victims and oppressors, one that 
Heidegger, ignores and places in an abyssal crypt, alongside the spatiality of 
time.
Instead of thinking unfolding towards an all-inclusive totality of absolute 
knowledge or self-reflective community, Heidegger looks at a direction of 
thought that moves forward with a step back, a step back that brings-forth Being 
as difference, rather than as different elements of that difference, or as the 
ground of beings. This difference between Being and beings, Heidegger 
characterises as the difference between Overwhelming and Arrival. Stambaugh 
translates Uberkommnis, overwhelming as the:
"... Manner in which Being reaches beings. It preserves the meaning of 
sur-prise (over-taking) and thus of incalculability" and arrival oiAnkunft
^_. 1 f\Q
as "the "place" (in beings) in which Being arrives."
The Heideggerian concept of difference provides a between in which the 
overwhelming of Being and the arrival in beings are held toward each other and 
yet simultaneously apart. Heidegger names this between, perdurance, and
difference to come before thinking without being its object. The step back, which is actually a direction 
and a manner of thinking and not an isolated step of thought, leads out of metaphysics into the essential 
origin of metaphysics." J. Stambaugh, "Introduction" in M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
107 This is discussed in more detail with regards to the pornographical being an 'ana-aesthetic', in chapter 
four, supra pp. 176 - 221.
J. Stambaugh, "Introduction" in M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
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whilst perdurance provides the naming for a kind of intensity, this is not 
'enough' to name the fractal aspect or singularity of the body. 109
The distance of a step back brings the matter of thinking closer; and it 
emphasises that 'thinking' is not merely a 'contemplative' activity; but it does 
so by a step back that providing a direction to the essential origin of difference: 
the perdurance of overwhelming and arrival, of the two in unconcealing keeping 
in concealment. 110 In the perdurance of the difference of Overwhelming and 
Arrival there reigns clearing, which is a Heideggerian presupposition for 
revealing and securing, for anything to be or happen at all. 111 Or as Heidegger 
phrases it:
"... Within this perdurance there prevails a clearing of what veils and 
closes off- and this its prevalence bestows the being apart, and the being 
toward each other, of overwhelming and arrival."112
For Heidegger the nearness of the historic is only attained in that sudden 
moment of a recall in thinking, hi Heidegger's step back out of the oblivion of 
difference he rethinks the difference as the perdurance of unconcealing 
overcoming (transition or transcendence) and of self-keeping arrival 
(presence). 113 One comes over the other whilst one arrives in the other. 114 
Being becomes present in the manner of a transition to beings. As Heidegger 
states:
109 The perdurance (Austrag) is the carrying out of the relation of beings and Being, a relation that is 
'endured with an intensity that never lets up.'
110 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
111 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
112 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
113 See the last section of chapter two of this thesis on the notion of fascination and self-hoodedness or 
keeping. Supra pp. 82 - 125.
114 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, pp. 
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"Being transits (that), comes unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as 
something of itself unconcealed only by that coming-over. Arrival means: 
to keep concealed in unconcealedness - to abide present in this keeping - 
to be a being." 115
Being for Heidegger is an event, an event of appropriation, and it 
essentially unfolds in such a way as the appropriative event of the grounding of 
the there. Heidegger does not posit Being as universal or as eternal but as sent 
to 'us'. Heidegger puts forward that it is appropriation that gives Being and 
time. In owning an event it becomes related to oneself, the 'there' is founded 
and one can leap into the fullness of Being-there, of Dasein. Heidegger posits 
language as a mode of appropriation through which Dasein can remain steadfast 
in the realm that is opened up. Pornography's discourse and the pornographical 
dynamic, however vibrate with the presence of impurities and communal 
displacements and 'inauthentic' belongings.
In the self-vibrating realm of the event of appropriation, vibrates the active 
or transitional nature of what speaks as language. For Heidegger thought 
receives its tools for this "self-suspended structure" of an event of appropriation 
from language. As he puts it:
"(Language is) the most susceptible vibration holding everything within 
the suspended structure of appropriation. We dwell in the appropriation 
inasmuch as our active nature is given over to language."116
Language as such for Heidegger is the house of Being, or to rephrase this, 
language is that which founds rather than that which is founded. So identity, as 
the event of appropriation, can be defined as a demand for an abyssal spring that
115 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
116 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
steps back to the belonging together of Being and man in an effort to attain the 
essential light of appropriation. Heidegger leaves his readers with the question:
"... Do our Western languages have an intrinsic metaphysical structure so 
that they are forever destined to be onto-theo-logical in their nature or do 
they harbor other possibilities of thinking?"117
Pornography is not necessarily concerned with appropriation and yet it still 
creates pornographical communities that manoeuvre and permeate a peculiar 
'ana-linguistic' language structure that belongs paradoxically to the political 
presence of bodies, of skin.
117 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 
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Fascination: The Paradox of a Philosophy of Pleasure.
1: Fascination as 'ana-linguistic': Dilemmas of sexuality in linguistic captivity. 
Theories of sexuality tend to posit a linguistic captivation at the genital stage 
during the Oedipus complex, creating an originary and traumatic foundation to 
both language and sexual difference. Freud, Lacan, Irigaray, Zizek, Kristeva, 
Butler and J. Rose all posit a sense of constitutive subjectivity in their differing 
ways of approaching questions of sexual difference in terms of castration, the 
symbolic law and abyssal 'real'. These theories tend to double into an abyssal 
logic - one which tends to sterilise the body and its needs, mapping those needs 
into unrequited forms of 'desire' or, worse, into dualist preconditions of sexual 
interest (male v. female, gay v. straight, presence v. lack /absence, and passive 
v. active). As a dynamic to thought, the pornographical is raised as a way of 
thinking that allows thought to be muscular and sexual, rather than driven by a 
need for administrative efficiency to classify, categorize, and cleanly represent. 
The pornographical is posited as an economy of identity that does not arise from 
a castration, a lack, a deep cut, an inbetween or an economy of signs or a 
politics of equivalences.
1.1 Problematics of a Philosophy of Phallic Desire. (Freud and Lacan)
Freud's psychoanalytic theory of the castration complex and its mark on 
sexuality forms the basis for Lacan's reworkings of the Oedipal and castration 
complexes. Freud names three stages to the sexual development of a child that 
psychoanalysis attaches importance to, these 'experiences' are thought to
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prepare the child for the loss of highly valued body parts. 1 The first of these are 
the oral stage in which the child has to separate from the mother's breast and the 
second is the anal stage of 'gift giving' whereby the child has to donate the 
content's of his/her bowel on a daily demand. The third stage is that of the 
genital (phallic) organization stage which coincides with the Oedipus complex, 
and dissolves, or is repressed by the ego, with the threat of castration. The 
phallic phase takes places differently for girls and boys and effectively creates 
the webbing the child's future gender and sexual preferences.
Freud puts forward that a boy is offered two choices of satisfaction during 
the Oedipus complex, either he can accept the 'masculine' role and sexually 
desire his mother, or the 'feminine' role and desire to be sexually loved by his 
father. With the former choice the father is a problematic rival for the mother, 
and with the latter his mother is 'superfluous'. It is only through the sight of the 
female genitalia [without penis, castrated] that a boy comes to realize that the 
threat of castration is real and possible, and as such has to choose between his 
narcissistic relationship with his genitals and the 'libidinal - cathexis' with his 
parental objects. As Freud writes:
"The object - cathexes are given up and replaced by identifications. The 
authority of the father or the parents is introjected into the ego, and there it 
forms the nucleus of the super-ego, which takes over the severity of the 
father and perpetuates his prohibition against incest, and so secures the 
ego from the return of the libidinal object-cathexis. The libidinal trends 
belonging to a Oedipus complex are in part desexualized and sublimated 
(a thing which probably happens with every transformation into an 
identification) and in part inhibited in their aim and changed impulses into 
affection."2
1 The main works of Freud that this particular section draws upon are:' S. Freud, On Sexuality, translated 
by James Strachey. (London: Penguin, 1991); S. Freud, On Metapsychology, translated by James Strachey. 
(London: Penguin, 1991); S. Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, translated by James 
Strachey. (London: Penguin Books, 1991); S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, translated by David 
McLintock. (London: Penguin Books, 2002); S. Freud, Origins of Religion, translated by James Strachey. 
London: Penguin Books, 1990), S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-analysis and 
Other Works, translated by James Strachey. (London: Vintage, 2001).
2 S. Freud, "Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" in On Sexuality, translated by James Strachey. (London:
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The female child also develops an Oedipus complex, a phallic organisation, a 
castration complex, a latency period and a super-ego, though as she is already in 
a state of castration [being always without a penis], the girl looses the strong 
motive to create a super-ego and separate from the infantile genital organisation. 
However in accepting castration as an 'accomplished fact' Freud argues that the 
girl feels both wronged and inferior.3 The girl is left with a desire for a penis, 
which Freud states she places in a 'symbolic equation' with a wish for a baby. 
It is in these terms that the little girl takes her father as the love object and her 
mother as a rival, after deferring from masculinity and 'masculine 
masturbation'.4 Pornography deals with sexuality in terms of sexual exchanges, 
rather than a complexity of possible causes and chains of substitutions, that 
have been issued in the place of such a traumatic occurrence.
In looking at the levels of repression and guilt installed in individuals, 
Freud asks the question how much repression is necessary for civilisation? 
Whilst he concludes that repression is a necessary factor in being social, too 
much repression can have the opposite effect and prove dangerous and
Penguin Books, 1991), p. 319.
3 Freud names this heady mixture of a sense of anger, penis envy and inferiority a scar, one that a woman 
develops through her wounded narcissism Freud argues that if the girls accept this state of castration as a 
universal one, then they too begin to share the same attitude as the boys, with regard to women. He 
describes this as either one of "horror of the mutilated creature or triumphant contempt for her." S. Freud, 
"Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes" in On Sexuality, pp. 
4 Freud puts forward that the castration complex and the divided attitude it leaves in the female provides 
three lines of development for any female child. He writes: "The first leads to a general revulsion from 
sexuality. The little girl, frightened by the comparison with boys, grows dissatisfied with her clitoris, and 
gives up her phallic activity and with it her masculinity in other fields. The second line leads her to cling 
with defiant self-assertiveness to her threatened masculinity. To an incredibly late age she clings to the 
hope of getting a penis some time. That hope becomes her life's main aim; and the phantasy of being a 
man in spite of everything often persists as a formative factor over long periods. This 'masculine complex' 
in women can result in a manifest homosexual choice of object. Only if her development follows the third, 
very circuitous, path does she reach the final normal female attitude, in which she takes her father as her 
object and so finds her way to the feminine form of the Oedipus complex. S. Freud, "Female Sexuality" in 
On Sexuality, 
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regressive for human societies. 5 If sexual repression were to be lessened on a 
global scale accordingly with the fashion of each culture, would pornography 
still exist or even have the same impact?
The more contemporary philosophic scholarship on this kind of genital 
'event' comes from two different but intertwined paths: psychoanalysis and 
structuralism, the proponents of whom are best exemplified for purposes of this 
discussion in the work of Lacan and Zizek.6 These theorists rework subjectivity 
and sexuality through looking at language as a system of differences that 
decentre and unhinge the human being. Part of the complexity in presenting 
language as the house of Being is that the very being of language reveals the 
disappearance of the subject, as we shall see. This chapter proposes to provide 
a brief overview of Lacan and Zizek's work, on the relationship between 
castration and language and the political implications of this. The 
pornographical and pornography offer more than a site of castration and lack, 
more than a phallocentric logic and its echoed jouissance, an 'ana-linguistic' 
trace of such an excessive and erased subjectivity. This chapter purports to 
discuss Zizek's political ideology in the final section which looks specifically at 
the nature of this erased subjectivity and its Lacanian 'quilting points', 
alongside fascination as a way of gathering and straddling the instant of the 
crossing or folding an identification and its other.
5 See S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents.
6 With regard to Lacan and Zizek the main books used throughout this thesis are: J. Lacan, Ecrits: A 
Selection, translated by Bruce Fink; J. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, 
translated by Alan Sheridan and edited by Jacques - Alain Miller; J. Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar 
of Jacques Lacan, Book HI, translated by Russell Grigg and edited by Jacques - Alain Miller; J. Lacan, 
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, translated Dennis Porter and 
edited by Jacques - Alain Miller; and S. Zizek, The ZizekReader, edited by Elizabeth and Edmond 
Wright. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.)
But also see for example, J Rose, Irigaray (despite her fall and utter dismissal of Lacanianism), 
Butler, Agamben, Derrida, Badou and Zizek - some of whose work we will consider in a bit more detail 
later in the thesis, supra pp. 82 - 125.
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1.2 Identity: Castration and the Master Signifier: Lacan.
For Lacan the decentring of identity begins at an early age in human 
development, somewhere between 6 to 24 months, with the "Mirror Stage". 
This stage names a fundamental alienating tension at the crux of human identity 
and emphasises the importance of the visual and specular relationship in the 
baby's raptness with it's own image in the mirror. It is the fascination of the 
baby with its own image that tempts a hoped for unity of identity within the 
imaginary, however the real lack of muscular coordination of the infant's motor 
functions cannot be erased. The infant's ego is established through this 
discordance as an alienated ego, that of an alter ego. The image through which 
the infant recognises him/herself is always an alienating identification of the 
reality of his/her fragmented and uncoordinated body and nervous system.7
The fragmented body forms, for Lacan, the underbelly of the (alter) ego 
that crystallizes in the ensuing castration of the Oedipal conflict. Anika 
Lemaire in her book, Jacques Lacan, raises the mirror stage as an advent for a 
kind of "coenaesthetic subjectivity", one that precedes the sense of the 
fragmentation of one's body and names the dualism of the relationship of
identity that dramatically occurs during this stage. In keeping with Freud, 
Lacan here posits the ego as a bodily ego, one that is fragmented, and dislocated
7 Lacan writes that: "For the total form of his body, by which the subject anticipates the maturation of his 
power in a mirage, is given to him only as a gestalt, that is, in an exteriority in which, to be sure, this form 
is more constitutive than constituted, but in which, above all, it appears to him as the contour of his stature 
that freezes it and in a symmetry that reverses it, in opposition to the turbulent movements with which the 
subject feels he animates it. Through these two aspects of its appearance, this gestalt - whose power 
[pregnance] should be linked to the species, though its motor style is as yet unrecognisable - symbolizes 
the Ts mental permanence, at the same time as it prefigures its alienating destination. This gestalt is also 
replete with the correspondences that unite the /with the statue onto which man projects himself, the 
phantoms that dominate him, and the automaton with which the world of his own making tends to achieve 
fruition in an ambiguous relation." J. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function, as 
Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience", in Ecrits: A Selection, translated by Bruce Fink. (W.W. Norton 
& Company: New York), pp. 4 -5.
8 A. Lemaire, Jacques Lacan, translated by David Macey. (Routledge: London, 1979), p. 81. The notion 
of the pornographical as an 'ana-aesthetic' will be looked at in greater detail in chapter four, supra pp. 176
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from itself, in the wake of the formation of the super-ego during 
dissolution/repression of the Oedipal complex.9 What is formed here is an 
identity in the moment that it is numb sensationally to its own alienating bodily 
fragmentation. If the reflection of the body is one of unity for the infant whilst 
his/her narcissistic identification is alienated, then for Lemaire, the subject's 
consciousness gives way to its double without maintaining its distance from it. 
As Lacan writes:
"There is a sort of structural crossroads here to which we must 
accommodate our thinking if we are to understand the nature of 
aggressiveness in man and in relation to the formalism of his ego and 
objects. It is in this erotic relationship, in which the human individual 
fixates on an image that alienates him from himself, that we find the 
energy and the form from which the organization of the ego originates."10
This abyssal and alienating dualism is reincorporated, and re-erotised, 
within the relationship between the imaginary and the symbolic. 11 The subject 
enters the symbolic through the developmental stage of the Oedipus complex, 
which for Lacan is the site of castration and symbolisation of the child's
-221.
9 Freud defines the ego as a 'bodily ego', one that is 'the projection of a surface', rather than being merely 
a surface entity. He notes: "The ego is ultimately derived from bodily sensations, chiefly from those 
springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental projection of the surface of the 
body." S. Freud, "The Ego and the Id" in On Metapsychology, pp. 
10 J. Lacan, "Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis", in Ecrits: A Selection, pp. 
11 It is this relationship that gives Lacan's thought strength in its anthropological dimension. Lacan does 
not define mankind through an innate desire that springs from it's animal inheritance, rather as a 
community that is shaped through it's relationship to the imaginary and symbolic, and is shaped in 
accordance with his structuralist and psychoanalytic methodology. As Lacan states: "But if the ego 
seems to be marked right from the outset, by this aggressive relativity - which minds starved for 
objectivity might equate with an animal's emotional erections when it is distracted by a desire in the course 
of its experimental conditioning - how can we escape the conclusion that each great instinctual 
metamorphosis, punctuating the individual's life, throws its great delimitation back into question, 
composed as it is of the conjunction of the subject's history with the unthinkable innateness of desire?
This is why man's ego is never reducible to his lived identity, except at the limit that even the 
greatest geniuses have never been able to approach; and why, in the depressive disruptions constituted by 
reversals experienced due to a sense of inferiority, the ego essentially engenders deadly negations that 
freeze it in its formalism. "What happens to me has nothing to do with what I am. There's nothing about 
you that is worthwhile." J. Lacan, "Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis", in Ecrits: A Selection, 
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simultaneous separation from the mother and entry into language. 12 Within the 
imaginary the child fails to see the lack of reality in the symbolic, and as such 
the imaginary is the realm of illusion, one that Lacan asserts is a necessary one. 
Lacan argues that it is at this level of primary narcissism that the child attempts, 
unconsciously, to be all that the mother desires and adopts identification with 
her desired object: her absent phallus. During this period of imaginary 
possession the child has no register within the symbolic circuit of exchange; 
having no symbolic substitute for him/herself the child lacks individuality,
f^
sexuality and a place within the social schemata.
Occurring during the Oedipus complex the father's intervention in the 
relationship between the mother and child is prohibitive, and marks both the end 
of the imaginary [loss/prohibition of the mother] and the promise of the phallic 
order. 1 If the subject is to emerge through language then the symbolic Law 
must be imposed, recognised and accepted. For Lacan the symbolic order is the 
realm of the father and he puts forward that the 'Name- of- the- Father' is the 
representative agent of the Law. This is not the real and actually existing father 
but a signifier that interrupts the imaginary with the prohibition of incest. As 
Lacan writes:
"The Oedipus complex means that the imaginary, in itself an incestuous 
and conflictual relation, is doomed to conflict and ruin. In order for the 
human being to be able to establish the most natural of relations, that 
between male and female, a third party has to intervene, one that is the 
model of something successful, the model of some harmony. This does 
not go far enough - there has to be a law, a chain, a symbolic order, the 
intervention of the order of speech, that is, of the father. Not the natural
12 J. Lacan, "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis" and "The Signification of 
the Phallus", in Ecrits: A Selection, pp. 31-106 and pp. 
13 See Chris Fynsk, Infant Figures: The Death of the 'Infans' and Other Scenes of Origin. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000.) Fynsk draws on two scenes from the works of Blanchot and Lacan in 
order to reflect on the mortal exposure that marks the limits of language.
The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III.
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father, but what is called the father. The order that prevents the collision 
and explosion of the situation as a whole is founded on the existence of 
this name of the father."15
For Lacan a subject becomes a competent, language -speaking member of the 
social community once he/she has accepted the resolution of the Oedipal 
complex, that of castration and the Law of the Father. Any linguistic difficulties 
and ruptures can be traced to this point, and tend to reveal a subject suffering 
from psychosis.
Lacan gives language, and its constitutive subjective memory, a privileged 
place within the symbolic order, for the symbolic is always a substitute for what 
is absent from its place. In other words a symbol or word always entails, for 
Lacan, the absence of the referent or object; of that which is real. The order of 
the 'real' is, to Lacan, abyssal in that it is always missing from its place and 
cannot be symbolised and formalised. 16 To rephrase this one's subjectivity is 
constituted as a 'lack', through an acceptance of the symbolic signifier 
alongside the sacrifice and exclusion of the signified, the essence of, or that 
which one is seeking within, the symbolic realm. 17 In this way Lacan evades a 
totalisation of the symbolic, whilst offering the simultaneous relationship of the 
signifier, one that gives a universal representation of language whilst remaining 
incapable of representing the singularity of the body and the subject; the 
signified is missing.
Here is the kernel of desire, Lacan's abyssal logic places the constitutive 
subjective identity as that of a failed one% identity continues to be desirable as it
15 J. Lacan, The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book HI, 
16 J. Lacan, "Seminar on the Purloined Letter", translated by J. Melhman, in J. Muller and W. Richardson, 
(eds), The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida and Psychoanalytic Reading, (Baltimore: John Hopkins 
University Press, 1988), p. 51.
17 See J. Lacan, "The Signifier, as such, Signifies Nothing", Chapter XIV, in The Psychoses: The Seminar
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is ultimately an impossibility to create and maintain a stable, continuous and 
universal identity. Lacan's subject is always a divided subject formed through 
the interplay of the desire for identification and its ultimate failure, alienation 
and lack. 18 The enunciation, or linguistic articulation, of the subject, 
presupposes a certain loss or sacrifice of the maternal object. Nothing can ever 
restore this sacrifice again, and one is driven to identify again and again in the 
longing for the impossible, and out of reach, promised gift. Lacan proposes that 
this sacrifice or exclusion is brought about through an act of decision, a decision 
made in accepting the symbolic and fleeing from the immanent threat of 
castration.
Such an act of decision forms a proliferation of non-identificatications, or 
at best unstable ones, and whilst this evades a totalised form of identity, Lacan's 
posits the singularity of the subject as one permanently marked by with a 
dimension of alienation: any unmediated access to the body, or to the 'real' as 
anything other than a symbolic construct, is lost. Under the symbolic Law the 
pornographical is 'lost', its cohesion never reached. In proposing that the 
pornographical has an 'ana-linguistic' nature to it or an a-radicality (without 
root) to it, allows for a different kind of thinking, one that allows for the body 
and also embodies and mediates the body, as we shall see.
of Jacques Lacan, Book HI, pp. 183 
18 Yannis Stavrakakis suggests that within this abyssal relationship the signifier expresses an immortal 
sense of representation and the objective universality of language, whilst also refusing the singularity of 
the subject, presupposing the subject's death. As Stavrakakis writes: "Entering the order of the signifier 
entails a certain mortification. Insofar as life has meaning only within a symbolic universe then life 
presupposes a continuous death: Media vita, in morte sumus. The subject is petrified and alienated exactly 
in the place where it seeks the birth of itself." Y. Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political (London:
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1.3 Pregenital Language: Perverse Bodies and the Mother (Enveloping Slits): 
Irigarav. Kristcva and Marcuse.
In moving towards approaching the 'ana-linguistic' nature of the 
pornographical, we will now look at the pregenital and pre-symbolic theoretical 
attempts to recast the relationship of sexuality, language and the body in 
different but still problematic ways. Irigaray argues that Lacan condemns not 
just the body into a sealed abyss of the 'real' but also death and woman (the 
feminine, the castrated). She suggests that Lacan merely reinforces the social 
and cultural status quo of language and institutional practices. If Lacan has 
posed woman as a castrated man, lacking the phallus and access to both the 
'real' body and to the symbolic order, then for Irigaray the only way that 
women can speak or communicate is to gain the phallus they lack, by speaking 
and acting sexually 'like a man'. For Irigaray women are in a state of 
'dereliction' (abandonment) through their lack of mediation of the symbolic 
order; men are in a position to objectify themselves and women, whereas 
women are a 'sex which is not one', a gender that is not whole, excluded from 
the fullness of being and dependent. 19
Irigaray looks back towards the origin of language whereby the child, the 
son, accepts the master signifier of the 'Name- of-the -Father' and retreats from 
the immanent threat of castration, and reveals the difficulties of Lacanianism in 
presenting the symbolisation of the mother-daughter relationship. The daughter 
has the potential for motherhood but has little access to language and the tools
Routledge, 1999), p. 28. See also C. Fynsk, Infant Figures: The Death of the 'Infans' and Other Scenes 
ofOrigin.
19 See L. Irigaray, The Sex Which is Not One, translated by Catherine Porter with Carolyn Burke. (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1988); L. Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, translated by Gillian 
C. Gill. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1987); and L. Irigaray, "SexualDifference" in Thelrigaray 
Reader, edited by Margaret Whitford. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991).
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with which to symbolise herself, Irigaray states the greater likelihood of 
suffering from melancholia and psychosis. The daughter's language, according 
to Irigaray's research on delirium, tends to be dominated by the drives. In 
searching for a way of creating, or attempting to build, a feminine jouissance, a 
symbolisation of woman by women and securing for them an access to the 
symbolic order as women, Irigaray warns that the mother must not be killed. 
She writes:
"We have to be careful about one thing: we must not once more kill the 
mother who was sacrificed to the origins of our culture. We must give her 
new life, new life to that mother, to our mother within us and between us. 
We must refuse to let her desire be annihilated by the law of the father. 
We must give her the right to pleasure, to jouissance, to passion, restore 
her right to speech, and sometimes cries and anger."20
In protecting and recognizing the mother as sexual and desiring, Irigaray 
hopes to provide the daughter, and mother, with a differentiated relationship that 
allows each to 'house' and create 'envelopes' for themselves both as women as
well as, as mothers. She states that:
".. .This ethical question is played out in the realms of nudity and 
perversity. Woman is to be nude, since she cannot be located, cannot 
remain in her place. She attempts to envelop herself in clothes, make-up 
and jewellery. She cannot use the envelope that she is, and so she must
create artificial ones."22
In order to evade a fatal immediacy whereby the daughter devours the mother's 
insides, her membranes, her mucous, her body, to create her own protective 
skin, and so removing the figure of a desiring sexual woman with whom the 
daughter can return to and identify with, Irigaray asserts the need for women to
20 L. Irigaray, "The Bodily Encounter With the Mother" in The Irigaray Reader, p. 43.
21 Irigaray utilises the term 'house' by making specific reference to Heidegger's 'house of language' and 
'dwelling'. See L. Irigaray, The Sex Which is Not One, and L. Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman.
22 L. Irigaray, "Ethics and Subjectivity: Towards the Future" in The Irigaray Reader, p. 170.
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form their own divinity to measure themselves against qualitatively rather than
T5
quantitatively against each other. Irigaray gives psychoanalysis the task of 
creating boundaries, which allow the separation between mother and daughter, 
in a manner un-fuelled by hatred, mastery, rejection and jealous, bitter 
competition.
Whilst Irigaray falls into the trap of gendering negativity, albeit not in the 
effort of producing an essence to woman but to bring a symbolization of woman 
into being that is not deficient to 'women', and maintaining the logic of desire, 
it's subjective lack and intervals that provide the inconsistencies of identity and 
the chase for its illusive trail, she draws on the language of both the mystical 
and the pornographical in order to so. Irigaray writes in a poetic fashion, in an 
effort to point to some other language that evades the mimetic appropriation of 
the Oedipal; she appeals to a feminine ideal or God figure and draws into her
/* A ____
work the eastern mystical properties of earth, wind, fire, water and breath. For 
Irigaray the 'ethical gesture' is one that discloses a spiritual and 'sexuate' 
respect for the body. Her writings all draw on the pornographical in order to 
express this gesture, of the ethical breath of the body.25 With Irigaray bodies
23 See L. Irigaray, The Sex Which is Not One.
24 See L. Irigaray, "Women-Mothers, the Silent Substratum of the Social Order", "Volume -without 
Contours", "The Limits of Transference", "Sexual Difference", "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas", 
"Woman-Amongst-Themselves: Creating a Woman-to-Woman Sociality" in The Irigaray Reader; L. 
Irigaray, The Sex Which is Not One; and L. Irigaray, Between East and West: From Singularity to 
Community, translated by S. PluhaSek. (New Delhi, India: New Age Books, 2005).
25 Annie Sprinkle defines the separation of the sexy goddess and the slut as one of the art of breath. Her 
sexy goddess videos and books advocate the re-birthing breathing of tantra sex as a transformation of 
sexual energy. She states: "Through the slut, though the animal, through the body you can go into the 
goddess or spiritual, or you can go through the goddess into the intensely physical.
The goddess part of the workshop is a real erotic and sensual atmosphere. We do some ritual, we do 
a lot of breathing because breathing moves sexual energy up from the bottom out of the top of your head. 
You start building a sweet energy, with the breathing. We get very high. A lot of women have orgasms 
just from the breathing." Annie Sprinkle, "Whore Interview -with Annie Sprinkle " in S. Bell, Whore 
Carnival". (New York: Automedia, 1993). See also A. Sprinkle, Annie Sprinkle: Post Porn Modernist. 
(New York: Torch Books, 1991).
Irigaray names sexual difference as one that is a difference in relation to breath. She writes: 
""What attracts man and woman to one another is not a simple sexual instinct, which could be satisfied by
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envelop, are volumic, the two lips touch, mucous membranes are exposed, 
alongside breasts, clitoris, vulva, labia, pubis, vagina, uterus, womb; her bodies 
are fluidities. As she maintains:
"Now, the/a woman who does not have one sex [sexe] - which will 
usually have been interpreted as meaning no sex - cannot subsume 
it/herself under one term, generic or specific. Body, breasts, pubis, 
clitoris, labia, vulva, vagina, neck of the uterus, womb ... and this nothing 
which already makes them take pleasure in/from their apartness \jouir 
dans / de lew ecart] thwarts their reduction to any proper name, any 
specific meaning, any concept. Women's sexuality therefore cannot be 
inscribed as such in any theory, unless it is standardized to male 
parameters. Within the fortune of the clitoris was that it was not thought 
of in pleasure of apartness \un ecart], and from other pleasures too.26
For Irigaray the ethical gesture comes in the material encounter of the self and 
the exteriority of self as other, as we shall see.
Irigaray not only genders negativity but she sexualises it too, or rather she 
names it a dynamic of the sexual, as something other than a genital sexuality, 
divorced and alienated from its skin. In challenging the status quo of 
psychoanalysis and her mentor, Lacan, Irigaray paid a high price and was 
dismissed from her post in the Department of Psychoanalysis at Vincennes, on 
the publication of her book, Speculum of the Other Woman. Whilst not naming 
the pornographical, Irigaray demonstrates the cultural 'sore-spots' that it 
highlights and their political entanglements. 'Codes' of identity and bodily 
proprieties are deeply embedded within every culture; transgressions of these 
are dangerous and are taken as physically threatening to people and institutions 
alike.
a passage to the act. We also regress to this stage because man and woman forget the mystery of their 
difference, they reduce it to a corporeal particularity useful for the production of an orgasm and of a child.
What is at stake in the attraction between the sexes thus disappears. All sorts of stimulants and 
drugs become necessary in order to arouse desire, a desire that will retain its hunger because it does not 
involve the entire being...... In fact, what attracts man and woman to each other, beyond a simple
corporeal difference, is a difference of subjectivity, and notably a difference of relation to the breath." L. 
Irigaray, Between East and West: From Singularity to Community, 
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Kristeva turns to the realm of the pre-Oedipal phase in order to create a 
theory of language and an ethical subject that bridges the antagonist relationship
between semiotics and the symbolic. Kristeva puts forward the semiotic as 
the pre-Oedipal and pre-symbolic stage of the pre-linguistic subject. She argues 
that within the semiotic the infant possesses no identity of itself separate from 
its mother, and its existence is regulated by physical drives, pulsations and 
impulses that are socially structured by the mother, not just biologically at this 
phase. Kristeva asserts that in organising the infant's food, the mother 
commands what enters and leaves the child's body, and she inscribes the oral 
and anal drives. For Kristeva it is this pattern that the mother arranges that will 
be re-organised later in the infant's entry into the symbolic linguistic frame. 
She writes:
"What I call 'the semiotic' is a state of disintegration in which patterns 
appear but which do not have any stable identity: they are blurred and 
fluctuating. The processes which are at work here are those Freud calls 
'primary': processes of transfer. We have an example of this if we refer 
once again to the again to melodies and babblings of infants which are a 
sound image of their bodily instability."28
Kristeva puts forward the social dimension that the mother brings to the 
infant's drives as musical and spatial. For Kristeva the child's drives have 
already been structured according to the rhythms and gestures of the mother's
26 L. Irigaray, "Volume -without Contours" in The Irigaray Reader, pp. 59 - 60.
27 The main texts this chapter will draw upon of Kristeva's are those directly discussing her assertions 
around the semiotic, the chora, the thetic and the abject body: J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on 
Abjection, translated by Leon S. Roudiez. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); J. Kristeva, 
"Revolution in Poetic Language" in The Kristeva Reader, edited by Toril Moi. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1992) and J. Kristeva, "A Question of Subjectivity- An Interview" in Postmodernism, edited by 
R. Rice and P. Waugh. (London: Edward Arnold, 1989).
28 J. Kristeva, "A Question of Subjectivity-An Interview" in Postmodernism, p. 129. Kristeva defines the 
etymology of the semiotic as implying distinctiveness in the signifying process. She writes: We 
understand the term 'semiotic' in its Greek sense... Distinctive mark, trace, index, precursory sign, proof, 
engraved or written sign, imprint, trace, figuration." J. Kristeva, "Revolution in Poetic Language" in The 
Kristeva Reader, 
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voice and flesh, whilst in the mother's womb. As Diana Coole writes:
".. .There is already a maternal prohibition and identification operative 
prior to language, a bio-logic, a maternal law that 'logically and 
chronologically' precedes the paternal law and which is the register of the 
semiotic. Here there is a literal singing of the flesh, where 'meaning' 
(signifiance) and matter, sign and desire, are not (yet) severed but where 
negativity does entail a certain rhythmic lawfulness that lends to energy 
flows an economy of libidinal/sadistic patterning and to pre-linguistic life, 
a musical cadence."29
Kristeva formulates that the drives, energy charges and psychical marks 
organised in the semiotic, articulate a chora, whereby the drives generate a 
'non-expressive totality', one that is mobilised as it is regulated.
Originally Plato, in the Timaeus, uses the term of the chora to designate a 
vessel whose deity is absent, consequently this receptacle remains without 
unification and identity; a container of the maternal and nourishing mother,
imprint bearer, and wet-nurse. Kristeva posits the singularity and event of 
thought with the chora. Kristeva argues that the chora is a 'nominability' of 
rhythm of an infinitely repeated separation, or rather that the chora as an 
infinitely repeatable separation is ontologized when a 'name or a word replaces 
it, making it intelligible.' She writes:
"The chora is not yet a position that represents something for someone 
(i.e., it is not a sign); nor is it a position that represents someone for 
another position (i.e., it is not yet a signifier either); it is, however, 
generated in order to attain to this signifying position. Neither model nor 
copy, the chora precedes and underlies figuration and thus
29 D. Coole, Negativity and Politics: Dionysus and dialectics from Kant to poststructuralism. (London: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 206.
30 J. Kristeva, "Revolution in Poetic Language" in The Kristeva Reader, p. 94. Kristeva writes: "Plato 
emphasises that the receptacle ..., which is also called space ... vis-a-vis reason, is necessary - but not 
divine since it is unstable, uncertain, ever changing and becoming; it is even unnameable, improbable, 
bastard: 'Space, which is everlasting, not admitting destruction; providing a situation for all tilings that 
come into being but itself apprehended without the senses by a sort of bastard reasoning, and hardly an 
object of belief. This, indeed, is that which we look upon as in a dream and say that anything that is must 
needs be in some place and occupy some room...'. (Timaeus, tr. Francis M. Cornford, 52a- 52b). Is the 
receptacle a 'thing' or a mode of language? Plato's hesitation between the two gives the receptacle an 
even more uncertain status. It is one of the elements that antedate not only the universe but also names and 
even syllables." J. Kristeva, "Revolution in Poetic Language" in The Kristeva Reader, 
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specularization, and is analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm. We 
must restore this mobility's gestural and vocal play (to mention only the 
aspect relevant to language) on the level of the socialized body in order to 
remove motility from ontology and amorphousness where Plato confines 
it in an apparent attempt to conceal it from Democritean rhythm."31
Kristeva argues that the 'physical marks' or semiotic of the mother-infant 
relationship orders and creates a kind of mediated assemblage for the 
articulation of the chora, one that precedes the establishment of the sign and 
symbolic order.
Kristeva puts forward that within the symbolic order, the symbolic 
networks of signifiers and signs do not supersede the semiotic; the two 
arrangements combine 'within the signifying process of the subject.' She notes 
that different modes of discourse are generated by the hesitant relationship 
between the symbolic and the semiotic, for instance the symbolic dominates 
scientific discursive formations with the semiotic remaining repressed, and 
within poetic discourse and dream logic the semiotic is hegemonic. Kristeva 
formulates:
"It may be hypothesized that certain semiotic articulations are transmitted 
through the biological code or physiological 'memory' and thus form the 
inborn bases of the symbolic function. Indeed, one branch of generative 
linguistics asserts the principle of innate language universals. As it will 
become apparent, however, the symbolic - and therefore syntax and all 
linguistic categories - is a social effect of the relation to the other, 
established through the objective constraints of biological (including 
sexual) differences and concrete, historical family structures. Genetic 
programmings are necessarily semiotic: they include the primary 
processes such as displacement and condensation, absorption and 
repulsion, rejection and stasis, all of which function as innate 
preconditions, 'memorizable' by the species, for language acquisition."32
Kristeva also puts forwards Mallarme's notion of semiotic rhythm within
"Revolution in Poetic Language" The Kristeva Reader, 
"Revolution in Poetic Language " The Kristeva Reader, p. 
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language, in order to illustrate her conception of the semiotic chora; one that 
creates discontinuities 'temporarily articulating them', and beginning again 
afresh, and again. At the same time, by putting the semiotic chora forward as a 
'psychosomatic modality' of language, Kristeva differentiates it again from the 
symbolic, as an assemblage/ receptacle that also effectuates a continuum in 
generating links between the sphincters, both 'glottal and anal', within vocal 
modulations.
Kristeva argues that the distinctive rupture of the thetic phase forms the 
break and establishes the boundaries between the two heterogeneous realms of 
the semiotic chora and the symbolic orderings, occurring between the mirror 
and the Oedipal stages. She poses the receptacle of the semiotic chora as a kind 
of site of primary processes that bear the social subject and the realm of 
meaning, and thetic phase as one in which this subject attains the secondary 
processes that allow partial self-denial and the entry into selfhood with the 
positing of signification. The thetic phase, for Kristeva is the positing of the 
imaged ego of the mirror and castration stages and the positing of the semiotic 
motility; it is the place of the Other and the precondition for the positing of
language.
For Kristeva the break of the thetic, as the threshold for language, yields 
the subject to a frozen oppositional structure in the scission between subject and 
object, and the signifier and signified. She writes:
"Not only is the symbolic, thetic unity divided (into signifier and
33 Kristeva states: "The sign can be conceived as the voice that is projected from the agitated body (from 
the semiotic chord) on to the facing imago or on to the object, which simultaneously detach from the 
surrounding continuity. Indeed, a child's first holophrastic utterances occur at this time, within what are 
considered the boundaries of the mirror stage (six to eighteen months). On the basis of this positing, which 
constitutes a break, signification becomes established as a digital system with a double articulation 
combining discrete elements. Language-learning can therefore be thought of as an acute and dramatic 
confrontation between positing-separating-identifying and the motility of the semiotic chora." J. Kristeva, 
"Revolution in Poetic Language " in The Kristeva Reader, 
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signified), but this division is itself the result of a break that put a 
heterogeneous functioning in the position of the signifier. This 
functioning is the instinctual semiotic, preceding meaning and 
signification, mobile, amorphous, but already regulated, which we have 
attempted to represent through references to child psychoanalysis 
(particularly at the pre-Oedipal stage) and the theory of drives. In the 
speaking subject, fantasises articulate this irruption of drives within the 
realm of the signifier; they disrupt the signifier and shift the metonymy of 
desire, which acts within the place of the Other, or on to ajouissance that 
divests the object and turns back towards the auto-erotic body. That 
language is a defensive construction reveals its ambiguity - the death 
drive underlying it. If language, constituted as symbolic through 
narcissistic, specular, imaginary investment, protects the body can signify 
itself through positions; and if, therefore, language, in the service of the 
death drive, is a pocket of narcissism towards which this drive may be 
directed, then fantasies remind us, if we have forgotten, of the insistent 
presence of drive heterogeneity."34
Kristeva posits a semiotic negativity in which the porous and traversable 
boundary of the thetic ceaselessly challenges the limits of the symbolic in a kind 
of subjective internal dialectic. Kristeva offers a variety of routes for the 
transgression of the boundaries of the symbolic Law.
Two of these transgressive possibilities, that Kristeva names, are those of 
rejection and abjection; both processes arise from further divisions to the subject 
during the pre-Oedipal phase. She points out that during the anal phase, a 
process of rejection arises whilst the infant expels the waste matter from its 
body and discovers pleasure in excretion when its sphincters are erotised during 
the bodily discharge.35 Kristeva puts forward rejection as a possible means for 
interrupting the symbolic with a reminder of the promise of pleasure. With 
abjection Kristeva provides a more primitive and archaic dimension to the pre- 
Oedipal splitting of the subject. She writes:
"We are no longer within the sphere of the unconscious but at the limit of 
primal repression that, nevertheless, has discovered an intrinsically
34 J. Kristeva, "Revolution in Poetic Language " in The Kristeva Reader, pp. 102-103.
35 J. Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 147.
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corporeal and already signifying brand, symptom, and sign: repugnance, 
disgust, abjection. There is an effervescence of object and sign - not of 
desire but of intolerable significance; they tumble over into non-sense or 
the impossible real, but they appear even so in spite of "myself'(which is 
not) as abjection."36
Kristeva names this primordial 'well of memory' something that is both 
unapproachable and intimate, neither subject nor object it lies at the horizon as a 
fascinating repulsion that pulls one 'toward the place where meaning collapses', 
where one is confronted with the bodily vulnerability and eroticism strays onto 
the terrain of the animal?1 Kristeva points out that it is not the improper, 
excessive body, or decaying health or un-cleanliness that causes the abject; 
rather it is what disturbs identity, the symbolic system and the Law. She puts 
forward the abject as that positionless point of the 'deject' whereby death 
infuses life and things disintegrate into a 'heterogeneous flux'. Kristeva writes:
"What does not respect borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the 
ambiguous, the composite. The traitor, the liar, the criminal with a good 
conscience, the shameless rapist, the killer who claims he is a savior ... 
Any crime, because it draws attention to the fragility of the law, is abject, 
but premeditated crime, cunning murder, hypocritical revenge are even 
more so because they heighten the display of such fragility. He who 
denies morality is not abject; there can be grandeur in amorality and even 
in crime that flaunts its disrespect for the law - rebellious, liberating, and 
suicidal crime. Abjection, on the other hand, is immoral, sinister,
36 J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, p. 11. She describes abjection as a state of 
immemorial violence through the separation of the fragmented body. Kristeva writes: " But when I seek 
(myself), lose (myself), or experience jouissance - then "I" is heterogeneous. Discomfort, unease, 
dizziness stemming from an ambiguity that, through the violence of revolt against, demarcates a space out 
of which signs and objects arise. Thus braided, woven, ambivalent, a heterogeneous flux marks out a 
territory that I can call my own because the Other, having dwelt in me as alter ego, points it out to me 
through loathing." J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, p. 10. It is in this way that 
Kristeva gives significance to the human body.
37 J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, pp. 1-18. Kristeva introduces a notion of 
fascination as a kind of drawing point for the abyss of the abject well of fear. She writes: " Loathing an 
item of food, a piece of filth, waste, or dung. The spasms and vomiting that protect me. The repugnance, 
the retching that thrusts me to the side and turns me away from defilement, sewage, and muck. The shame 
of compromise, of being in the middle of treachery. The fascinated start that leads me toward and 
separates me from them." J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, p. 2. The 
pornographical whilst sometimes being met with abjection in its disruption of identity and concentration 
on bodies and their various possibilities for fantasy sexual exchanges, also operates by compressing data 
through a techne of comic humour. This allows for an emotional distance for the participants of the 
pornographical in order to be able to engage with the material or surface that is created, as we shall see. 
Supra chapter three, pp. 126 - 175.
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scheming, and shady: a terror that dissembles, a hatred that smiles, a 
passion that uses the body for barter instead of inflaming it, a debtor who 
sells you up, a friend who stabs you.. ,"38
One of the difficulties with the abject is its threat of annihilation, the abject 
subject neither belongs nor refuses and remains caught inbetween exclusion and 
the entrapping of the symbolic.
Kristeva locates the promise of the semiotic negativity through Freud's 
processes of the unconscious, alongside those of condensation and 
displacement; Kristeva develops the 'intertexuality' of transposition, the 
passage from one sign system to another. She offers transposition as a process 
that is effectuated by both condensation and displacement but includes the 
altering of the thetic position, through the generation of a new one- a new 
articulation of the thetic and its denotative and enunciative positonality. She 
states:
"Poetic mimesis maintains and transgresses thetic unicity by making it 
undergo a kind of anamnesis, by introducing into the thetic position the 
stream of semiotic drives and making it signify. This telescoping of the 
symbolic and the semiotic pluralizes signification or denotation: it 
pluralizes the thetic doxy. Mimesis and poetic language do not therefore 
disavow the thetic, instead they go through its truth (signification, 
denotation) to 'tell' the truth about it"39
Kristeva designates the semiotic chora as both analog and digital finding it able 
to take on the role of a linguistic signifier, and representing an object for the 
ego.
In this way she constitutes both as thetic and able to represent the subject 
through poetic mimesis and the mechanisms of fetish, and able to breach 
Freud's 'primal repression' and return to the animalistic heritage of humankind.
38 J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, 
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She discusses:
"Making the analog digital is thus not enough to ensure our bodily 
survival, because it cannot check the drives' endless facilitations. An 
alteration and the totality called the ecosystem. This alteration makes it 
possible to gather together the analog and digital 'code' and, through a 
break prepared by the mirror stage posit it as unified, mastered, dominated 
and in another space - imaginary, representational, symbolic. Through 
this alteration, the 'code' leaves the place of the body and the ecosystem 
and, freed from their constraints, acquires the variability characteristic of a 
system of 'arbitrary' signs - human language - the later development of 
which forms the immense edifice of signifying practices." 40
A signifier formed in this manner, Kristeva argues is indebted to return to the 
semiotic and in one of the contrary movements the thetic can be displaced. She 
posits the textual experience as one that grounds the social and provides the 
signifying subject the manner in which to explore his/her constitutive process. 
Kristeva introduces two textual registers within language of the 'genotext' and 
the 'phenotext', the latent/mimetic and the manifest/classifying. These are 
Kristeva's method for allowing the materiality of the body to beat the rhythms 
of desire and rejection.
Unfortunately Kristeva posits the semiotic in a way that can be argued to 
be pre-discursive or pre-Oedipal.41 Her use of the term chora is problematic 
through its history of association with the feminine mother and wet-nurse; 
Kristeva posits an essentializing of negativity, one that maintains the body as 
abject or rejected or in a state of abyssal desire. The pornographical rather
39 J. Kristeva, "Revolution in Poetic Language " in The Kristeva Reader, 
40 J. Kristeva, "Revolution in Poetic Language " in The Kristeva Reader, 
41 Judith Butler critiques Kristeva's use of the semiotic chora as one that creates a 'prediscursive libidinal 
economy', established before language through the biological telos of the maternal body. Butler asserts 
that neither Lacan's nor Kristeva's theoretical premises of the role of the maternal body and the feminine 
lack have been substantiated as correct, and are just another suggestion of cultural operatives. Butler also 
defines Kristeva's theory as self-defeating in the semiotics' inability to sustain itself as a source of cultural 
subversion, often leading to the annihilation and of the subject. See J. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism 
and the Power of Identity. (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 80, J. Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of Sex". (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 71, and J. Derrida, Positions, translated and
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fascinates and provides a gathering point for its bodily surface, but in a manner 
that is ana-linguistic, or rather it has an a-rootedness to it's surface; a surface 
that is both non-discursive and discursive, as we shall see.42
Marcuse also delves into the Freudian realm of the pregenital in order to 
search for a way to liberate sexuality from its 'chokeholds' within technological 
and capitalist societies.43 Marcuse looks at the performance principle and its 
generative levels of 'surplus- repression', to discover the conditions under 
which it may be liberated, alongside Eros as a form of libidinous morality. 
Under specific conditions Marcuse argues it is possible for sexuality to create a 
civilised society; this is not the release of a suppressed sexuality or that of a 
genital sexuality, but a sexuality that reactivates the erogenous zones of the 
body in the formation of a 'pregenital polymorphous sexuality'.
For Freud the history of mankind and civilisation is one of 
repression; 'natural' humankind is governed by two instincts, those of Eros and 
Thanatos (the death, destructive instinct), which if uncontrolled are 
incompatible with any communal association and preservation of longevity.44 
In life the death instinct, and sexuality, is subjected to the life instinct and any
annotated by Alan Bass. (London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 17 - 36.
42 This chapter proposes to discuss the pornographical's ana-linguistic nature and its relationship to 
fascination as the ability to create an identity, or form a discursive coherence without relying on notions of 
temporality and an 'undecidable'.
43 This thesis draws mainly upon: H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into 
Freud. (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1987.) This book is particularly relevant to this debate on the 'ana- 
linguistic' nature of the pornographical, in that Marcuse delves into the pregenital and pre- Oedipal realms 
of sexuality in order to discover the possibilities of a society that alters it's levels of repression and the 
kind of community that could grow from such a vision of sexuality and pleasure. Is there a pregenital 
language and sexuality? How would such a discovery impact at an individual and communal level? See 
also H. Marcuse, One - Dimensional Man, Introduced by Douglas Kellner. (London: Routledge, 1991), 
H. Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), H. Marcuse, The Aesthetic 
Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist Aesthetics. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), H. Marcuse, Five 
Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), and H. Marcuse, Reason 
and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. (New York: Humanity Books, 1999).
44 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, pp. 11 -54; and S. Freud, 
Civilization and its Discontents, pp. 36 - 59. See also S. Freud, Chapter IV, "The Ego and the Id", in On
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destructive or sexual energy is channelled into 'socially useful aggression'; the 
last refuge of the individual is dissipated, the individual must now control 
his/her inner impulses and engage only in socially productive activities, such as 
work or procreative genital sex.45 Whilst 'stopping short' of the pornographical, 
Marcuse looks for some kind of autonomy for the individual within the 
pregenital phrase, before the human appetite for pleasure is thwarted and the 
body is dominated by a masterful super-ego that creates a socially 'one- 
dimensional man', as we shall see.
Freud names three principles that govern the social functioning of these 
instincts within people; these are the pleasure principle (the quest for 
satisfaction), the nirvana principle (the pursuit for diminution of excitation) and 
the reality principle (the transformation of sexual energy into socially useful 
goal-directed behaviour necessitated by the quest for civilisation). He puts 
forward that civilisation is based upon the conversion of the pleasure principle 
into the reality principle, since an unmediated thirst for pleasure is incompatible 
with the scarcity (Ananke) of the human and natural environment; pleasure 
requires 'restraint, renunciation, delay'.46 Freud writes:
" The sexually mature individual finds that his choice of object is 
restricted to the opposite sex, and that most extra-genital gratifications are 
forbidden perversions. The demand for a uniform sexual life for all, 
which is proclaimed in all these prohibitions, disregards all the disparities, 
innate and acquired, in the sexual constitution of human beings, thereby 
depriving fairly large numbers of sexual enjoyment and becoming a 
source of grave injustice. .... But what is not outlawed - heterosexual 
genital love - is still limited by legitimacy and monogamy."47
Metapsychology, pp. 
45 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, pp. 23- 27; and S. Freud, 
Civilization and its Discontents, pp. 12 - 44. See also S. Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle " in On 
Metapsychology, 
46 S. Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle " in On Metapsychology, pp. 271 - 338; H. Marcuse, Eros and 
Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, pp. 11 -54; and S. Freud, Civilization and Discontents, 
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Sexuality as a font of pleasure is prohibited and channelled into re-productive 
functionally and aim-inhibited libidinal friendships. The pornographical is 
marginalized, repressed and labelled morally repugnant.
Freud considers 'being civilized' as equivalent to being efficient and 
orderly; squalor, bodily waste, excess, grossness, decay, flab and a lack of 
cleanliness are intolerable, morally offensive and physically disgusting.48 The 
bodily offensive and unpalatable aspects of the improper body drive the 'ana- 
aesthetic' of the pornographical, as we shall see.49 Freud points out the cultural 
frustration that stems from continued renunciation of the pleasure principle, by 
suppression, repression, or a variety of methods of sublimation, as the cause of 
hostility that tends to dominate aspects of interpersonal relationships. This 
hostility and the aim-inhibited libido are, for Freud, the ingredients that bind a 
libidinal community together. As he writes:
"It is clearly not easy for people to forgo the satisfaction of their tendency 
to aggression. To do so makes them feel uneasy. One should not belittle 
the advantage that is enjoyed by a fairly small cultural circle, which is that 
it allows the aggressive drive an outlet in the form of hostility to outsiders. 
It is always possible to bind quite large numbers of people together in 
love, provided that others are left out as targets for aggression."50
In order to look at the difficulties posed by the levels of aggression 
produced through the transformation of the pleasure principle into that of the
47 S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 
48 S. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 
49 Supra, Chapter four, pp. 176-221.
50 S. Freud, Civilization audits Discontents, p. 50. Freud had originally named this phenomenon 'the 
narcissism of small differences', but within Civilization and its Discontents, he argues that this term does 
little to delve into the psychological aspects of racism and acts of genocide. Freud states his concern that 
these lethal aspects of civilization defy reform. He writes: "In addition to the tasks involved in restricting 
the drives - for which we are prepared - we are faced with the danger of a condition that we may call 'the 
psychological misery of the mass'. This danger is most threatening where social bonding is produced 
mainly by the participants' identification with one another, while individuals of leadership calibre do not 
acquire the importance that should be accorded to them in the formation of the mass." S. Freud,
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reality principle, Marcuse introduces two new terms into the Freudian 
cartography, those of surplus-repression and the performance principle. 
Surplus-repression is a term that Marcuse uses to denote that whilst society may 
require a certain amount of basic repression, the amount demonstrated within 
the prevailing historical conditions of the contemporary world is surplus to this 
actual requirement. In this way Marcuse develops Freud's categories and 
analyses the accumulative and quantitative impact of the repression of political 
institutions, economics and social relations that constitute the social body of the 
reality principle.51 It is this social body that that the pornographical so blatantly 
flouts with its demonstrative exchange of bodily fluids and codes improper 
bodily decorum.
What Marcuse discovers is that there has been a 'transubstantiation of 
pleasure itself, with gratification being converted into a by-product of the 
organisation of labour and the actual change of the reality principle into the 
prevailing historical form of the performance principle, organised by the rule of 
exchange and instrumental reason. As he writes:
"The performance principle, which is that of an acquisitive and antagonist 
society in the process of constant expansion, presupposes a long 
development during which domination has been increasingly rationalized: 
control over social labor now reproduces society on an enlarged scale and 
under improving conditions. For a long way, the interests of domination 
and the interests of the whole coincide: the profitable utilization of the 
productive apparatus fulfils the needs and faculties of individuals. For the 
vast majority of the population, the scope and mode of satisfaction are 
determined by their own labor; but their labor is work for an apparatus 
which they do not control, which operates as an independent power to 
which individuals must submit if they want to live. And it becomes the 
more alien the more specialized the division of labor becomes. Men do 
not live their own lives but perform pre-established functions".52
Civilization and its Discontents, 
Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, 
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The hierarchical distribution of scarcity and labour has intensified the 
instinctual constraints of the human psyche in the contemporary epoch. 
Marcuse argues that the performance principle leads to surplus-repression.
Under the performance principle Marcuse argues the world's population 
spends most of its time in alienated labour, with the libido diverted ever 
increasingly for socially useful purposes. He puts forward that the more these 
constraints are rationalised, the more universal they become in their permeation 
of the social body. For Marcuse in order to rebel against the domination of the 
performance principle, a person would have draw on the pleasure principle and 
reject the strong sense of guilt that accompanies sexual repression, revealing 
that fantasy is an area kept free from the performance principle. As Marcuse 
states:
"Phantasy plays a constitutive role in the perverse manifestations of 
sexuality; as artistic imagination, it also links the perversions with images 
of integral freedom and gratification... Against a society which employs 
sexuality as a means for a useful end, the perversions uphold a sexuality 
as an end in itself; they thus place themselves outside the dominion of the 
performance principle and challenge its very formulation."53
Such perverse sexual activities, Marcuse finds, leave open the possibility of the 
submission of Eros to the death instinct and the regression of the pleasure 
principle to the nirvana principle. According to both Freud and Marcuse this 
can lead to the formation of a severe and punitive super-ego.
Freud names the super-ego as one that is formed as an ego -ideal during 
the Oedipal complex that forms genital sexuality.54 He defines the role of the 
super-ego as one that helps to secure the unity of the ego under the transition
52 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, 
53 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, 
54 S. Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents, pp. 60 - 82, S. Freud, "The Ego and the Id", in On 
Metapsychology, pp. 350 - 401, and H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into
108
Holly Mountain The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
from the pleasure to the reality principle, operating in the service of Eros. 
However the difficulty that Freud and Marcuse point out comes from the part of 
the super-ego that is formed utilising Thanatos, in setting the ego against the id 
and eradicating this unity of the ego, causing the 'splitting' of the personality 
against itself and the life instinct. This self-directed aggression produces the 
moral kernel of the mature adult. 55 If the aggressive instincts of the super-ego 
are liberated then Freud found that both the ego and the morality formed by the 
super-ego are prone to disintegration. Both theorists discover that the dialectic 
of civilisation produces the release of increasingly destructive forces, and locate 
a possible danger for civilisation if the death instincts were to hold Eros in 
submission.
Freud and Marcuse locate the danger of civilisation here with the increased 
unleashing of aggressive tendencies and repression of the bodily ego, especially 
given the rise of dictatorship governments and their accompanied rhetoric of 
racial hatred and genocide. If the ego could be dominated by the super-ego and 
be open to disintegration, what possibilities are left for such a thing as the 
individual, or for the potential of autonomous thought? Whilst Marcuse does 
not himself mention pornography, his work on the liberation of the pregenital 
polymorphous perverse and creation of a libidinal morality enables this thesis to 
approach the site of the pornographical in a number of ways. On the one hand it 
becomes possible to view the liberatory aspects of the pornographical, as we 
shall see, and on the other hand Marcuse highlights the sensitivity of the cultural
Freud, pp. 52 -54.
The danger that Freud locates comes from a continued severity of aggression directed towards the 
personality, which threatens the balance of the psyche. He writes: "The more a man checks his aggressive 
tendencies toward others the more tyrannical, that is aggressive, he becomes in his ego-ideal... The more 
intense become the aggressive tendencies of his-ego-ideal against his ego." S. Freud, "The Ego and the 
Id", in On Metapsychology, p. 395, and H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into
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psyche towards bodily by-products and activities. The social boundaries of 
decorum and identity offer little flexibility and often result in actual psychical 
revulsion, so deeply are they entwined with kernel of one's discursive and 
psychological being.
Marcuse highlights the difficulties for the contemporary genus human as 
one of the dissolution of the individual and an unconscious sense of guilt 
alongside the unconscious need for punishment. For both Freud and Marcuse 
individual psychology is the psychology of the genus, of the mass. As Marcuse 
writes:
"It is in the child that the reality principle completes its work, with such 
thoroughness and severity that the mature individual's behavior is hardly 
more than a repetitive pattern of childhood experiences and reactions. But 
the childhood experiences which become traumatic under the impact of 
reality arepre-individual, generic: with individual variations, the 
protracted dependence of the human infant, the Oedipus situation, and 
pregenital sexuality all belong to the genus man."56
Freud asserts that the civilised genus is determined by its archaic heritage that 
transmits ideational contents, dispositions and the 'memory - traces' of 
previous generations.57 Marcuse argues that Freud discloses the power of the
Freud, 
56 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, p. 55. Freud theorises that the 
human race exhibits a sexual life that develops and ends at approximately the fifth year of life and is 
followed by a period of latency that lasts until puberty, when undergoes a retrogression. He writes: "This 
theory is confirmed by the anatomical investigation of the growth of the internal genitalia; it leads us to 
suppose that the human race is descended from a species of animal which reached sexual maturity in five 
years and rouses a suspicion that the postponement of sexual life its diphasic onset [in two waves] are 
intimately connected with the history of horninization. Human beings appear to be the only animal 
organisms with a latency period and sexual retardation of this kind.... It cannot be a matter of indifference 
psychologically that the period of infantile amnesia coincides with this early period of sexuality. It may be 
that this state of things provides the true determinant for the possibility of neurosis, which is in a sense a 
human prerogative and from this point of view appears as a vestige - a survival- of primeaval times like 
certain portions of our bodily anatomy." S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII, 
57 S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Volume XXIII, pp. 99 - 100, and H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into
Freud, pp. 56 - 57. Such an assertion challenges the religious doctrines of all faiths and places human 
beings on a par with the animal kingdom in sharing Darwin's theory of evolution. Freud argues that the 
archaic heritage contains the guilt of former generations and puts forward an earlier period of wo/mankind 
as one of domination, domination by the father. In this primal horde the father monopolised the woman
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universal in and over individuals.
In using Freud's logic in order to find a way to break with it and create a 
vision of a plausible non-repressive order, Marcuse argues that the performance 
principle provides the conditions for its own negation as the technological 
development of industry undermines the historical necessity of repression. He 
puts forward that automation of machinery means that much employment of 
alienating labour is unnecessary and the body is free for something other than 
being a tool of production. Marcuse finds that the technical need for sexual 
repression can be contested. With regard to the elimination of all 'surplus- 
repression' Marcuse writes:
".. .The emergence of a non-repressive reality principle involving 
instinctual liberation would regress behind the attainted level of civilized 
rationality. This regression would be psychical as well as social: it would 
reactivate early stages of the libido which were surpassed in the 
development of the reality ego, and it would dissolve the institutions of 
society in which the reality ego exists. In terms of these institutions, 
instinctual liberation is a relapse into barbarism. However, occurring at 
the height of civilization, as a consequence not of defeat but of victory in 
the struggle for existence, and supported by a free society, such liberation 
might have very different results. It would still be a reversal of the 
process of civilization, a subversion of culture - but after culture had done 
its work and created the mankind and the world that could be free. It 
would still be "regression" - but in the light of mature consciousness and
guided by a new rationality."
Marcuse argues that under changing societal conditions brought about by the 
eradication of surplus-repression, the sexual instincts can generate lasting erotic 
relationships between adults, in forming a libidinal rationality and morality. He
and the font of pleasure, and his sons suffered. Eventually the sons were exiled and in rebellion they 
collectively killed and devoured the father, setting up the bother clan. Freud and Marcuse argue that it is 
the taboos and social restraints that this clan established that form the guilt and punitive sense of social 
morality of contemporary society. S. Freud, Moses and Monotheism, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XXIII, pp. 132 137, and H. Marcuse, Eros and 
Civilisation; A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, pp. 55 - 105. See also, S. Freud, "Totem and Taboo" in 
Origins of Religion.
58 H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, 
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foresees that the libido released under these circumstances would be a 
transformed libido that is capable of erotising the whole personality.
With the reactivation of all erogenous zones, Marcuse asserts there are a 
recovery of pregenital polymorphous sexuality and a refusal of genital 
superiority; the body becomes an implement of pleasure and imaginative play, 
rather than repressed toil. He states:
"The erotic aim of sustaining the entire body as subject-object of pleasure 
calls for the continual refinement of the organism, the intensification of its 
receptivity, the growth of its sensuousness. The aim generates its own 
projects of realization: the abolition of toil, the amelioration of the 
environment, the conquest of disease and decay, the creation of luxury. 
All of these activities flow directly from the pleasure principle, and, at the 
same time, they constitute work which associates individuals to "greater 
unities"; no longer confined within the mutilating dominion of the 
performance principle, they modify the impulse without deflecting it from 
its aim. There is sublimation and, consequently, culture; but this 
sublimation proceeds in a system of expanding and enduring libidinal 
relations, which are in themselves work relations."59
Marcuse puts forward that since the nirvana principle aims at a state of 
minimum tension; a state without want, it can stifle the death instinct and strive 
to minimise its destructive manifestations. The conflict between life and death 
would be reduced through a state of gratification and a strengthened Eros can 
'absorb the objective of the death instinct.' Whilst still 'falling into the traps' of 
positing a pre-discursive essence to sexuality and to 'being human' he allows us 
to re-think the necessary or required limits of social and sexual repression, 
alongside some of the ethical and social costs of maintaining surplus levels of 
repression.
Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, 
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2: The Paradox of the Philosophy of Pleasure.
In shifting the paradigm to that of a philosophy of pleasure, this chapter 
seeks to demonstrate a reconfiguration of a different route than the pathway 
created by a philosophy of desire. In posing the pornographical in terms of a 
paradoxical site of a transitive present, a site that is both related to pleasure and 
desire, it can be understood as simultaneously constituting both the 
impossibilities and the very possibilities of representation. This chapter 
proposes to approach the pornographical as a paradox of a philosophy of 
pleasure (and desire) through three ethical routes that all pursue the ethical in 
terms of its relationship to the body: that of Adorno's aesthetic comportment of 
the shuddering physical; Foucault's network of micro- powers; and fascination 
as 'the immanence transgression' (Lacan's 'quilting point', Nancy's 'clinamen' 
and Foucault/ Klossowski/ Baudrillard's use of simulacrum) - the 
pornographical is only graspable at the moment of its multiple other crossing; 
the immanence transgression.
For Michel Foucault the term pleasure was crucial in that it:
".... Escapes the medical and naturalistic connotations inherent in the 
notion of desire. That notion has been used as a tool, as a grid of 
intelligibility, a calibration in terms of normality: "Tell me what your 
desire is and I will tell you who you are, whether you are normal or not, 
and then I can validate or invalidate your desire.".... Desire is not an event 
but a permanent feature of the subject: it provides a basis onto which all 
that psychological-medical armature can attach itself. The term 
"pleasure" on the other hand is virgin territory, unused, almost devoid of 
meaning. There is no "pathology" of pleasure, no "abnormal" pleasure. It 
is an event "outside of the subject", taking place in that something which 
is neither of the body nor of the soul, which is neither inside nor outside - 
in short, a notion neither assignable nor unassignable."60
An event installs and gathers meaning through dispersion and intersection,
60 Michel Foucault in "Le Gai Savoir" (II), p. 32. Quoted from D. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards A 
Gay Hagiography (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995), pp. 93-94.
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whereas a telos of desire takes on a secret position of an unfolding of meaning 
towards and given with a goal. For Foucault, an event of pleasure can interrupt, 
disintegrate and disperse a telos of desire, a trajectory of needs that give rise to a 
desire for satisfaction and fulfilment. Such an event can spill into other, new 
events of pleasure, which in turn give rise to and scatter other trajectories of 
desire; intense experiences of pleasure serve to decentre a subject and fragment 
personal identities, as such they take place at the "limit of the subject". 
The pornographicaFs identity/ expression is uncapturable by any 
philosophy whose framework is based only upon desire; this is not to say 
however that the pornographical is not an actuality, the common noun, name, 
industry and genres of pornography are not being posed as a metaphor or as an 
empty void that can have no meaning at all, but that a system of desire can 
never grasp its object or subject. Philosophies of desire cannot deal with the 
'trans' of an impossible present time or a space-time that is present that is in 
transit, in flux, they can never meet their desired objects; their subjects can 
never meet their desired objects/identities - themselves, they must always be 
held in suspension, or in hesitation, or anaesthetised. If what is impossible 
about a presence of a present space-time is configured neither as an excess, an 
inbetween nor a lack as such, but rather as something that is in its singularity or 
eventness, in its co-existence with other singularities, translocating, dispersing, 
intersecting and installing a porous meaning in the flux of its movement; then 
meaning is possible through the dimensions of pleasure, through a surface. The 
pornographical is proposed as a singularity that is both bodily and a surface.
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2.1 The Aesthetic Comportment of the Surface: Suffering Physical (AdornoX 
For Adorno, in his critique of metaphysical systems of thought, identity 
finds its ground in the excess that is configured as negation.61 Adorno puts 
forward that pluralism seen as an excessive difference provides another content 
and necessity: that of a 'logic of disintegration'; identity is always in the process 
of disintegrating and in this way difference is not reduced to a unitary base. 
Identity whether put forward as essentialist or contingent is a precondition for 
meaning, politics, ethics and thinking as such, these paradigms invoke a 
relationship with time that is trans-historical [that is always placed in a position 
of trans-lating what has gone before], and one that reifies space and the body. 
In giving primacy to the importance of the object and the physicality of the 
body, Adorno is drawn upon here in order to begin to shift the epistemological 
framework away from semiotics and linguistics and their psychoanalytical 
dimension. The aim is to 'side-step' and move away from questions of the lack 
and essentializing forms of sexual identities and practices, in order to look at the 
formation of a singularity as a surface, generated through the relationship 
between pleasure and the body: the site of the pornographical.
Adorno states that 'objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a 
remainder'.62 There is a gap between the concept and its corresponding object; 
there is an excess value and the object is non-identical to its excessive identity. 
Adorno asserts that the difficulty with concepts of identity is that they produce a 
reified process of thinking: they make unlike things alike. He puts forward non- 
identity thinking (or negative dialectics) as a method, though not a model, that
61 T. W. Adorno, "Logic of Disintegration" in Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton. (London: 
Routledge, 1973), p. 144.
62 T.W. Adorno, "Dialectics not a Standpoint" in Negative Dialectics, 
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identifies, but in a way that it seeks to say what something is, as opposed to 
under what category or sign or representative tool, something falls.63
Adorno hopes to remain loyal and give the primacy to the object in order 
for the subject to be strengthened and 'break through the fallacy of constitutive 
subjectivity'.64 In this way the objective truth or untruth can be judged, and a 
sense of ethicality that takes account of the bodily presence and conditions of 
the subject/ object as crucial to a just form of politics. For the pornographical 
there is the surface and its repetitions, as we shall see. He writes:
"The judgement that a man is free refers to the concept of freedom; but 
this concept in turn is more than is predicted of the man, and by other 
definitions the man is more than the concept of his freedom. The concept 
says not only that it can be applied to all men as defined as free; it feeds 
on the idea of a condition in which individuals would have qualities not to 
be ascribed to anyone here and now." 65
If the object were to be equivalent to its concept, then it would have a rational 
identity. (Its Utopian possibility.) Adorno places no absolute in negative 
dialectics, nor any universal expression or mediating communal identity, only 
the expression of immanence, a discontinuous dynamic unfolding in history: a 
mimetic comportment of the bodily shudder.
Adorno's hope is that critical theory is able to assess the cleavage between 
ideas and reality by confronting what is existent. Negative dialectics is non- 
identity thinking; immanent criticism, and seeks to be the self-consciousness 
context of ideology. Adorno hopes that negativity in this way does not escape 
this context but breaks out of it from within. Negative dialectics is not true for
63 T.W. Adomo, "On the Dialectics of Identity" in Negative Dialectics, 
64 T.W. Adomo, "Preface" in Negative Dialectics, 
65 T.W. Adorno, "Cogitative Self-Reflection" in Negative Dialectics, pp. 149-150.
66 T. W. Adorno, "Semblance and Expression" in Aesthetic Theory, 
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all time. Adorno seeks to avoid the dangers of positing an original origin, and 
with it a temporal sequence and accompanied, representational narrative 
structure: negative dialectics is not another first principle. It hopes to 
undermine all systems that claim completeness and to preserve the uniqueness 
of the particular. Adorno writes:
"It is the critique of the fact that critique itself, contrary to its own 
tendency must remain within the concept.... It lies in the definition of 
negative dialectics that it will not come to rest in itself, as if it were total. 
This is its form of hope."67
Held defines 'negative dialectics' as a critical practice, rather than an 
epistemology, because its object "resists complete interpretation and itself 
drives thought to dialectics."68 Each time the object must be thought afresh. 
Nor is it simply a reality, for it recasts the real in the process of reflection, as the 
cognitive confrontation of concept and thing. To understand and express this 
contradiction is to contradict reality. To contradict reality is not to leave 
everything as it is. With Adorno, negative dialectics is the 'truth' of an un- 
reconciled reality, awaiting its decline in a redeemed world. "After Auschwitz" 
as a suggestion of negative dialectic has it's identity in difference found in a 
fractured impossible dimensionality of space-time, it is non-identity, in 
suffering. For Adorno it is "the need to let suffering speak that is the condition 
of all truth." Suffering demands redemption, and is for Adorno the unmediated 
sense that cannot be conceptualised into a framework of good and evil, and 
cannot be given this or that constructed meaning. As Adorno puts it: "Suffering
67 T. W. Adorno, "Self-Reflection of Dialectics" in Negative Dialectics, 
68 D. Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. (London: Hutchinson Publishing 
Group, 1980), p. 221.
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speaks: Go away."69 The corporeality of the body cannot and must not be 
dismissed.
Adorno posits an ethical terrain whose objectivity can never be static. It is 
always in the position of recruiting its meaning within and in terms of process 
of synthesis, whose identity, subjectivity is established in terms of its 
dialectical-teleological negativity. Negation-as-excess, as an excess that cannot 
be represented, it is always in the process of exceeding the framework through 
which it could be graspable. An impurity is always-already attached to the 
possibility of any representation. Adorno puts forward the "seriousness of 
unswerving negation lies in its refusal to lend itself to sanctioning things as they 
are."70 Ethically we are always in the trajectory of questioning what is 
"immanently" present. The promise of a fluid objective judgement is for 
Adomo one of an aesthetic comportment, a comportment that as a shudder 
escapes the domination of the super-ego, and is both embodied and mediating. 
He writes:
"... Life in the subject is nothing but what shudders, the reaction to the 
total spell that transcends the spell. Consciousness without shudder is 
reified consciousness. That shudder in which subjectivity stirs without yet 
being subjectivity is the act of being touched by the other. Aesthetic 
comportment assimilates itself to that other rather than subordinating it. 
Such a constitutive relation of subject to objectivity in aesthetic 
comportment joins eros and knowledge."71
It is through the ethics that Adorno posits in the aesthetic comportment of the 
corporeal shudder that allows us to approach the pornographical as 'ana-
69 Adomo uses a battery of techniques to stir the creative imagination of the listener. His constellations 
are juxtaposed rather than an integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common 
denominator or first principle. Through these metaphors it is possible to decipher the object. This 
involves the mimetic capacity and thus the remembering of the forgotten. Mimesis is the capacity for the 
modes of behaviour, which are receptive, expressive and communicative in a sensuous fashion. Mimesis 
identifies with:' it lets the object be.'
70 T. W. Adorno, "'Critique of Positive Negation " in Negative Dialectics, p. 
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linguistic'. The aesthetic comportment that the surface of the pornographical, 
registers will be looked at in chapter three as a techne of comic humour and data 
compression.
2.2 Power: Pleasure and Micro-Ethical Strategies of the Surface (FoucaultX
As a singularity that is co-extensive with other singularities, the 
pornographical is being put forward as a discursive economy, an 'unsayable' 
negativity, a way of thinking that recasts sexuality in terms of non-essentialising 
practices of fantasy and pleasure, as a dynamic to specific artworks and musical 
endeavours, as an assemblage of surface, and as being an event. As such it is 
enmeshed in a micro-relation of power networks that form a sense of ethics 
without relying on universalism. In writing on the ethics of power and its 
relationship to sexuality and bodily pleasures, Butler has suggested that there is 
no subjectivity without a passionate and psychically attached subordination to
T5
those by whom the subject is complicity dominated. In looking at the abuse of 
love in cases of child abuse, Butler writes:
"The child does not know to what he/she attaches; yet the infant as well as 
the child must attach in order to persist in and as itself. No subject, in the 
course of its formation, can ever afford fully to "see" it. The attachment 
in its primary forms must both come to be and be denied, its coming to be 
must consist in its partial denial, for the subject to emerge."73
Butler puts forward the persistence of the subject as one that must continuously 
foil its own desire, for it is the endeavour of desire to 'unravel' the subject. In 
other words for Butler the persistence of one's survival, as a subject requires the 
embrace of one's subordination. As she states:
71 T. W. Adorno, "Theories on the Origin of Art" in Aesthetic Theory, 
72 J. Butler, The Psychic Life of Power. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 7-10.
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"The utterance concedes the possibility it denies, establishing the "I" as 
predicted upon that foreclosure, grounded in and by that firmly imagined 
impossibility. The "I" is thus fundamentally threatened by the spectre of 
this (impossible) love's reappearance and remains condemned to reenact 
that love unconsciously, repeatedly reliving and displacing that scandal, 
that impossibility, orchestrating that threat to one's sense of "I". ... The 
traumatic repetition of what has been foreclosed from contemporary life 
threatens the "I". Through that neurotic repetition the subject pursues its 
own dissolution, its own unravelling, a pursuit that marks an agency, but 
not the subject's agency - rather, the agency of a desire that aims at the 
dissolution of the subject, where the subject stands as a bar to that desire."74
Foucault's understanding of power is one of a network of micro-powers, and 
rather than accepting things as they are, it refuses to sanction them. Power is 
everywhere but it is not everything. He describes power as something that both 
forms and flows through a relational nexus. He writes:
"... A moving substrate offeree relations which, by virtue of their 
inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always 
local and unstable".75
Repetitive mechanisms of repressive power are constituted as "the over-all 
effects that emerges from all these motilities, the concatenation that rests on 
each of them and in turn seeks to arrest their movement."76 Power, for Foucault, 
is never in simple opposition to freedom, for inscribed within its relationality, as 
part of its relational nature, is a plurality of sites of resistance.77 In any actual 
state of affairs, the questions raised should be what power relations are being
73 J. Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 
74 J. Butler, The Psychic Life of Power, 
75 M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley. (London: 
Penguin Books, 1990), p. 93.
76 M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume l:An Introduction, pp. 93-94.
77 "This means that in relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance, for if there were 
on possibility of resistance - of violent resistance, of escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation 
- there would be no relations of power." Michel Foucault, in "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice 
of Freedom ", The Final Foucault, edited by James Bernauer and David Rasmusson (London: The MIT 
Press, 1988), p. 12.
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presupposed, and how these micro-relations can form a singularity and make 
possible certain kinds and aspects of subjects, objects and discourses, which in 
turn may support or destabilise them. The macro or large scales forms of power 
are neither the sum of these relations, nor simply other to them. He writes:
"There is no discontinuity between them, as if one were dealing with two 
different levels (one microscopic and the other macroscopic); but neither 
is there homogeneity (as if one were only the enlarged projection or 
miniaturisation of the other); rather, one must conceive of the double 
strategy by the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the 
strategic envelope that makes them work."78
It is through a composition of micro-forces that is in no way a mere aggregation 
or totalisation that "far reaching, but never completely stable effects of 
domination are produced."79 Foucault opposes this relational discursivity of 
power to juridical-discursive theories that reduce power to restriction, including 
psychoanalytical discourses in which the law constitutes the very desire it
prohibits. He asserts:
"Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, there is no 
exteriority, even if they have specific roles and are linked together on the 
basis of their difference".81
Resistance occurs not in a point for point relation of resistance to disciplinary 
powers, but in the "openings" or discontinuities of these force relations at the
78 M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume l:An Introduction, pp. 99-100.
79 M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume l:An Introduction, 
80 The model of Law, even in an inverted form, as put forward by psychoanalysis, retains a metaphysical 
understanding of synthesis, at the expense of other possibilities. Foucault is not proposing that the subject 
and object has meaning through these power relations as identities enforced against resistance. Rather he 
draws a distinction between power and a will to power/ a searching for a 'core' truth. Disciplinary power 
has, for Foucault, succeeded in producing all but a "normalised" and "disciplined" self, in producing a 
scattering of subject positions and discourses that have subsequently been organised as forms of deviance. 
Both the "will to power" and the "will to truth" have produced difference and dispersion but as an 
expression of power relations, not the relations themselves. See M. Foucault, Michel History of Sexuality, 
Volume 1: An Introduction and M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated 
by Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 1991).
81 M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, Volume l:An Introduction, 
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"limits of the subject".82 A point for point relation is meant here as the degree 
to which there are oppositional effects there is also a non-correspondence that 
occurs between the objects, and discourses of knowledge and the sites of their 
production. For Foucault it is pleasure, in its potential for breaking the subjects 
relationship with her/himself, that can interrupt, scatter and recompose 
difference in these force relations.83 The gaps, openings and breaks that 
constitute an impossible and indeterminate site of a transitive present/subjective 
space-time, is composed of the flux of power relations and as such has potential 
non-coincidental strategic edges.
Philosophies of desire express the unity of a subject's individuality and 
history, where as pleasure is de-subjectivating, a unity in dispersion. Pleasure 
has the potential to shatter a subject's identity, subjectivity, in dissolving the 
subject and breaking its relationship with itself however fleeting, into the
Q A
sensorial continuum of the body, into the unconscious dreaming of the mind. 
Part of the ethics of the pornographical is the creation of the self-to-self relation 
and the non-reflecting communal practice that it develops, as we shall see. 
There is no self-reflexive subject here; there is no production of a superior 
subjectivity and objectivity by extension. For Foucault this is precisely the 
promise that pleasure holds - the potential for shattering the self-reflexivity of
82 An historical method of discontinuity makes it impossible to view history as one of sequential events 
which serve as repeatable self-serving regularities. Rather epochs seen as multiplicities and difference is 
seen as a pure event. An emphasis on discontinuity and breaks complements a continuist view, but in 
holding change in suspension transformations are revealed at different levels.
83 Foucault's work in the discursive archives establishes that human subjects and historical events are not 
fixed but discrete identities that are fragmented and changing sites across which the flow of power moves. 
An impossible site of a transitive present space-time is one full of a multi-positonality and techniques of 
power. The archive poses a series of questions that undermine the familiarity of 'our' present, in 
establishing "that we are difference, that our reason is the difference of discourses, our history the history 
of difference, ourselves the difference of masks." M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated 
by Alan Sheridan (Routledge: London, 1995), p 131.
84 D. M. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards A Gay Hagiography, p. 95. This ethical break with the self 
will be looked at in greater detail through the pornographical techne of comic humour. Supra chapter
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the subject.
2.3 Fascination: The Immanence Transgression.
Whilst fascination is a much under-used theoretical tool, it is being 
proposed as the 'gathering point' most appropriate for the pornographical. The 
pornographical fascinates; the corporeality and immorality fascinates; there is 
nothing nice about the pornographical; and it fascinates. The mimetic bodily 
shudders pulsate across the surface of the pornographical and it fascinates. The 
pornographical is being posited as a surface, one that is 'ana-linguistic' (without 
root) but that is given coherence/ identity through the feature (drawing point) of 
fascination, without bringing in a sense of temporality or an 'undecidable'- for 
the pornographical is only graspable at the moment of its multiple other 
crossing; the immanence transgression.
Lacan symbolic register takes hold for the subject, or the desiring lack,
oc
through a 'quilting point', that of the Father, the phallic signifier. For Lacan, 
the quilting point forms a point de caption, which serves to halt the endless play 
of the chains formed between signifiers. The quilting point attaches and fixes a 
chain of signifiers to a signifying knot, rather than to the object itself. However, 
for Lacan this quilting kernel is that of the master (a kind of transcendental still) 
signifier - that of the Name- of- the -Father. He writes:
"The quilting point is the word fear, with all these trans-significant 
connotations. Everything radiates out from and is organised around this 
signifier, similar to these little lines offeree that an upholstery button 
forms on the surface of the material. It's the point of convergence that 
enables everything that happens in this discourse to be situated 
retroactively and prospectively."86
three, pp. 126-175.
85 See J. Lacan, The Psychoses, pp. 
86 J. Lacan, The Psychoses, 
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A postmodern 'read' of Lacan's quilting point would be Nancy's use of 
the term 'clinamen' and Baudrillard's 'simulacra'. J-L. Nancy in his, Being 
Singular Plural, introduces the term clinamen in order to look at how meaning 
increments, or is in excess or increases at the ex-posed and dis-placed origin. 
Nancy uses it discuss the singular plurality of the 'co-presence' of an identity, 
be it communal or just a community of selves. He writes:
"In the atomist model, there are atoms plus the clinamen. But the 
clinamen is not something else, another element outside of the atoms; it is 
not in addition to them; it is the "more" of their exposition." 87
Both Foucault and Baudrillard draw on the term simulacra in order to bring 
movement and coherence to a discursive formation/ nodal point of identity. 
Plato introduces the term of simulacrum in the Republic in order to distinguish 
the false copy from the icon /good copy. The false copy /simulacrum repeats 
only the external appearance of the icon without participating in the idea that 
founds it. The simulacrum is merely a copy of a copy, or an external relation of 
similitude.88
A postmodern use of this term draws on the notion of simulacrum as a 
copy, a 'copy without an original', and as such the simulacrum is both 
paradoxically removed from its origin and at the same time infinitely proximate 
to its point of origin. Durham defines an encounter with the simulacrum as one 
close to memory and fantasy. He writes:
"Through the simulacrum one recalls, or imagines what is virtual or 
unactualized in the very object that one sees." 89
87 J-L. Nancy, Being Singular Plural, translated by R. R. Richardson and Anne E. Byrne. ( Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2000), p. 39.
88 Supra chapter three, pp. 126 - 175, where Lyotard and Augustine are discussed with relation to the 
tensorial sign and the semiotic sign.
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For Baudrillard signs are endlessly circulated and are in actuality more real than 
reality, simulacra are just simulations. Baudrillard points out that the 
contemporary age is part of the 'hyperreal', whereby signs have no connection 
to reality: life mimics art.90 The pornographical, as an assemblage, a surface 
and a singularity, maintains a connection to the bodily object, but this surface is, 
at the same time, connected to neither an essence of the pornographical nor to 
an essence of the object; it is a copy of itself and its discursive and non- 
discursive relationality. The fetish, within this frame can be seen as a copy of a 
copy, a simulation, no longer 'standing-in' castration fear or penis envy, but for 
the pleasure of and out of it's co-existence signification.
Foucault looks at Magritte's art and Klossowski delves into the narrative of 
Diana, and both locate a 'corrosive effect' within the narrative efforts to master 
the spatial and temporal orderings; Magritte's paintings open up the identity 
between words and things, suspending their identities 'between and across its 
repetitions'.91 Klossowski's narration of the search for Diana the hunter's 
identity demonstrates this 'corrosive effect'; in attempting to capture the 
identity of the hunter, Klossowski discovers he himself turns into the hunted 
within the movement of capture; he finds himself transformed. In the 
divergence of the same an endless movement is born - fascination - the 
pornographical is only graspable at the moment of its multiple other crossing, 
'the immanence transgression'.
89 S. Durham, Phantom Communities: The Simulacrum and the Limits of Postmodernism. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 17 - 18.
90 J. Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, translated by Sheila Faria Glaser. (Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 1996.)
91 See M. Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe, translated and edited by James Harkness. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1983).
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Libidinal Technologies of Comic Pleasure.
1. Comic Gesture: Data compression and the pornographical. 
As has been argued up to this point, pornography is no simple product/ 
expression. The meaning of its paradoxical discourse cannot be easily reduced 
to being a mode of power that seeks to oppress and exploit women and children 
through the use of obscene sexual representations. 1 As we have seen, 
pornography cannot be streamlined and neatly packaged into a violent economy 
that utilises abusive images that serve to dehumanise and degrade the human 
body for the pleasure of a voyeuristic 'male gaze'.2 The notion of the desiring 
and abyssal subjectivity/ social agency incorporated within the psychoanalytic
and linguistics epistemologies (e.g. Lacan, Zizek, Irigaray, Kristeva and Butler) 
does not quite expose the complexity of the pornographical and its 'ana- 
aesthetic'.3
In order to continue to redress the imbalance and absence of conceptual 
acuity respecting the world of the pornographical, it is crucial to underscore the 
discrete, heterogeneous tropes/traces that constitute the concept. In this chapter 
we look at primarily the technology of comic humour that all pornographic 
genres incorporate and to further look at the libidinality of such a technology 
and its ability to create that which Susan Sontag has named a 'psychic 
dislocation'.4 Bringing in the comic as a means of data compression that 
packages sexual arousal will not only shed light on a different sense of meaning
1 Supra introduction, pp. 7 - 20.
2 Supra introduction, pp. 7 - 20.
3 Supra chapter two, pp. 81 - 125.
4 S. Sontag, "'The Pornographic Imagination" in Georges Bataille's Story of the Eye. (London: Penguin
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for sexually explicit material, but will also put into question Deleuze and other 
theorists claims that pornography is the expression of the hesistant (pomology) 
and Derrida who attributes the language game itself to the breaking of the 
hymen.5
This chapter proposes to establish the groundwork for the 'ana-aesthetic', 
the a-rootedness of the pornographical aesthetic which will be discussed in 
further detail in chapter four, by three comic routes. Relying on a rather strange 
landscape this chapter will develop the concept of the comic in relationship to 
the pornographical and its role in the data compression of the pornographical 
package/ code. It proposes to this through drawing upon the Heideggerian 
Being (Dasein and techne), the Bataillian notion of witnessing, whereby the 
pornographic is only graspable at the moment of its multiple other crossing; the 
immanence transgression (elaborated here through the use of J-F Lyotard's 
Libidinal Economy), and Freud's use of Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious and Bergson's An Essay on Comic Laughter.6
To put this slightly differently, pornography occupies a strange cultural 
position not only in its occupation with offending aesthetic sensibilities and a 
class-ridden bed of identity woes and other fetishes, but also in its relationship 
to both the body and to technology. It is this relationship that gives 
pornography its paradoxical ana-linguistic structure. One of the characteristics 
that make pornography uniquely definable is its utilisation of comic humour.
Books, 1982), p. 94.
5 G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 288- 294, and J. Derrida, Dissemination, translated and introduced 
by Barbara Johnson. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). This thesis will develop the notion of 
the ethical materiality of pornography further in the following chapter by using Lyotard's notions of an 
'anaesthetic' and a 'differend'. See J-F, Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews".
6 That the pornographic is only graspable at the moment of its multiple other crossing; the immanence 
transgression is outlined and discussed in terms of the pornographical's ana-linguistic nature and the 
gathering or crossing point of fascination. Supra chapter two, pp. 81 - 125.
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Whether intentional or not the professed aim or hope and effect of pornography 
is to sexually excite its audiences.7 Here lies the shame and moral repugnance 
of pornography, and yet this is no simple thing for pornography entails a very 
practical application of data compression.8 The data compression (or the 
compressing of information by the sender in order to transfer it and the 
decompressing and interpretation of it by the receiver) of pornography (an 
economy of meaning/ package/ expression of sexual fantasies) is a complex 
operation that packages sexual arousal and transmits this information across a 
wide variety of technological mediums. Unlike acts of striptease or prostitution, 
pornography has to take into account the technological distance imposed on the 
viewers.
Linda Williams's research into the transition of the genre of pornography 
from stag films into hardcore pornographic films provides an example of data 
compression of the pornographical and the perceived need to create intimacy 
despite the distance created by the technology of film.9 She finds that films in
7 Sontag compares this to 'aim to excite' demonstrated by the literary genre of pornography and its usages 
of sexual obsessions, to that of the literary subject of religious obsessions. Sontag relates this 'aim to 
excite' as a feature of the ability of a wide range of genres, including that of pornography, to compress and 
package information, in the hope that audiences will be fascinated enough to interact with the material and 
create its meaning. I would like to develop this further using Freud's notion of condensation that he 
develops in relation to 'the joke'. She writes that when compared to this subject then "the familiar fact of 
pornography's definite, aggressive impact upon its readers looks somewhat different. Its celebrated 
intention of sexually stimulating readers is really a species of proselytizing. Pornography that is serious 
literature aims to "excite" in the same way that books which render an extreme form of religious 
experience aim to "convert"." S. Sontag, "The Pornographic Imagination" in Georges Bataille's Story of 
the Eye, pp. 94- 95.
8 In writing on the digital age and the merits of digitalization, Negroponte puts forward that two of the 
positive aspects are those of data compression and error correction. He writes: "The relationship between 
bandwidth and computing is subtle. The trade-off between bandwidth and computing is evident today in 
video telephones and more expensive video conferencing systems. Because you compute at both ends of 
the line, you can ship fewer bits back and forth. By spending some money processing the digital video at 
each end, compressing and decompressing it, you use less channel capacity and save money in 
transmission." N. Negroponte, Being Digital (London: Coronet Books, 1995), p. 30.
9 Linda Williams in her analysis of hard-core film pornography defines the impetus of pornography as that 
of "the confession of previously invisible truths of the bodies and pleasures in an unprecedented "frenzy of 
the visible"". L. Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the "Frenzy of the Visible", p. 7, and 
Comolli, "Machines of the visible" in The Cinematic Apparatus, edited by Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen 
Heath. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1980), pp. 122-123. It is from this materialist historian that 
Williams borrows her usage of the phrases "frenzy of the visible" and "machines of the visible". Comolli
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the 1970s explored new ways of creating narrative structures based on sexual 
action with the integration of sound technology. Williams puts forward that 
thirty years after the rest of cinema had utilised sound, the stag films still relied 
upon the power of visual images alone, accompanied with the "exquisite 
embarrassment of silence". 10 Williams documents the mostly inarticulate 
moans of pleasure dominated the aural sound of hardcore films, coupled with 
the mis-matched voice dubbing whereby the moving lips fail to complement the 
sounds being spoken. She notes that the 'oohs' and 'aahs' tended mostly to be 
from female higher pitched voices, punctuated with an odd masculine groan or 
two. Other popular sound effects, that Williams takes account of as relied upon 
in the 'porn' industry vocabulary are those of bedsprings; the smack of a kiss or 
a slap; the slurp of fellatio of cunnilingus; and the woosh of penetrational 
engulfment. She puts forward that dialogue tends to be short consisting mostly 
of cliched phrases such as "fuck me harder" and "I'm going to come". These 
techniques are still used within the video and Internet 'porn' creations, whether 
homemade or studio produced. 11
Williams points out that the use of sound effects for porn films were non-
wrote that the second half of the nineteenth century, which ends in the birth of the cinema, "lives in a sort 
of frenzy of the visible ... of the social multiplication of images: ever wider distribution of illustrated 
papers, waves of prints, caricatures, etc ... of geographical extension of the field of the visible and 
representable ... The whole world becomes visible at the same time it becomes appropriately." See 
Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the "Frenzy of the Visible", p. 285 and pp. 282 - 285. This 
impetus of pornography is considered through other pornographic mediums in William's following work 
Porn Studies. (London: Duke University Press, 2004.)
10 L. Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the "Frenzy of the Visible", p. 122. See also L. O' 
Toole, Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire, pp. 
11 Tang notes that the change of technological medium from film to video impacted on the data 
compression techniques of pornography. The birth of video technology meant that the porn producers no 
longer had to concern themselves with audience demands and anxieties. Anyone could watch and of 
course make pornography from their homes and a one-on-one market was easy to please. Video impacted 
with a non-narrative format far removed from the porn film industries limits of a straight market and a gay 
market. As Isabel Tang writes: "Video pom 'expands the market where you have bisexual porn, 
transsexual porn, lesbian pom, foot-fetish porn' says Jay Lorenz, AVN magazine, which reviews tape by 
genre, also lists Fat/Pregnant, Tickling, Amateur, Catfights, Old Babes, Spanking and even Anal as 
separate categories. In particular the popularity of anal sex is a creation of the video market." I. Tang, 
Pornography: The Secret History of Civilization, 
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synchronous, especially in the sexual numbers sequences. This seems to be 
almost a formal procedure in shooting these scenes.
"The effect of non-synchronous sound is to detract from the spatial 
realism of synchronous sound. Pre-recorded (or post recorded) sound is 
achieved, unlike sound recording done on set, by placing microphones 
close to the body."12
Williams remarks that both hardcore pornography and musical films tend to 
seek an effect of closeness and intimacy, rather than spatial reality.
There is no pre-programmed response for how a pornographic prose, 
image, sound or series of sounds may be received. There are an endless variety 
of viewer responses that may be elicited, as each viewer filters, rearranges and 
converts the cultural signals in a way that makes sense for themselves. The 
'porn' director, Henri Pachard names this the '80/20 rule' whereby the producer 
has to present the 80 per cent in the hope of the product providing pleasure and 
the audience or audiences has to furnish the remaining 20 per cent. As 
Laurence O' Toole points out the efforts needed by the porn consumers can 
quite often be more than 20 per cent. 13
Pornographic products run the risk of offending or upsetting some 
consumers and just not working at all for others. Any pornography is a parcel 
of compressed information that requires the engagement of a viewer or audience 
in order to be decompressed through the potentiality of their sexual fantasies. 
O' Toole dubs this the viewers 'art-work'. As one of the few writers that delves 
into the mysteries of the porn industry by taking it seriously and not simply 
dismissing it out of hand, O' Toole touches upon this ability of pornography to
Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the "Freniy of the Visible", 
Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire, 
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be a small parcel of compressed data that the audience makes big. 14
O' Toole points out the importance of fantasy, not just the context of 
fantasies but the creativity and autonomy in the very act of fantasizing. 15 An act 
of fantasy is both discursively social and solitary in its act and line of flight. A 
sexually explicit piece of prose, image or sound may trigger a viewer to be able 
to fantasize. Roland Barthes, in Camera Lucida, names such a trigger, a 
'punctum' as the accidental punctuation that pricks, bruises and becomes 
poignant to the viewer. 16 It is in this sense that the punctum operates as a 
technology or techne in forming and adding to a moment of an identity, 
meaning and body. 17 A viewer's 'art-work' or 'technologies of self can vary 
according to a whole realm of things, such as his or her momentary mood, 
personal lifestyle, history, values, preferences and energy level.
14 L. O' Toole, Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire, p. 16. Laura Kipnis and Robert Stoller 
whilst not looking at pornography in terms of data compression do comment on the industry's aesthetic 
codes. Both refer to the intricate relationship and shared commonalities between art and pornography, and 
pose both cultural activities as libidinal and perverse, with perversions entailing their own aesthetic codes. 
The major difference between pornography and art appears to that of class status. As a discursive industry, 
the pornographic genres tend to utilise aesthetics in order to send both them and this class distinction of the 
loins up. In 1965 Bob Guccione founded the magazine, Penthouse, featuring photographs of its models as 
impressionist paintings. The photographs were speckled and in colour; the models were shot in poses 
where they were looking away or into a mirror. There was always something between the viewer and the 
model, in looking one penetrated the privacy of the models. It was not until April 1970 that Penthouse 
took the radical step of revealing pubic hair on its centrefold. In doing so it broke the market in becoming 
one of the first 'on-the-counter-shelves' magazines to broach the boundaries of the obscene. See L. Kipnis, 
Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America, p. 83, and, R. Stoller, 
Observing the Erotic Imagination. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 44-69.
15 L. O' Toole, Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire, pp. 331-332.
16 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 26-27. Barthes names the co-presence of "studium" and 
"punctum" as the elements which arouse an interest in photographs or a visual field and in doing so 
establishes a body of information and extends a person's and socio-cultural discursive fields. Barthes 
defines the studium as an "application to a thing" and an "enthusiastic commitment but without special 
acuity". It is by the studium that the viewer, as a political and historical testimony, receives photographs, 
by participating in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings and the actions of the images. However 
it is the co-presence of the punctum that breaks or punctuates the studium. For Barthes the punctum is a 
quirk within the aesthetic play of the photograph, one that can both disturb and attract a person. It is an 
addition, something that whether or it is triggered, is uncoded: it is something that a viewer adds to the 
photograph and something that is already part of it. R. Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 55. Also supra chapter 
two, pp. 126-175.
17 Supra chapter two, pp. 126 - 175. Marcel Mauss was one of the first thinkers to put forward bodily 
techniques as a "technology without an instrument." M. Mauss, "Techniques of the Body", translated by 
Ben Brewster in Economy and Society, 2, 1 (1973), pp. 70- 88. Michel Foucault's work on technologies of 
the self follows in this vein. See M. Foucault, Technologies of the Self; Discipline and Punish and the 
three volumes of A History of Sexuality.
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In remarking on information compression, O' Toole draws upon the work of 
cultural anthropologist Sandy Stone. Stone writes on the cultural implications 
of virtual systems on the conceptual understandings of space, time, proximity 
and agency, and how communication technologies serve to mediate and create 
interactions of social spaces, groups and communities. She considers the 
relationship that the communication technologies have to the bodies and selves 
in three ways: an apparatus for the production of community; an apparatus for 
the production of the body; and as interfaces mediating between bodies and 
selves, whether or not they are within physical proximity of each other. 18
In posing a history of communication technologies as one that reveals how 
social groups search for ways of enacting and stabilizing a sense of presence 
and connection in an increasingly diffuse and distributed global networks and 
fields of power, Stone is curious about the effects of distortion and narrow 
bandwidth on the construction of sexual pleasure, or as she terms it, erotic 
desire, during phone sex. 19 Stone comments on observing the phone sex 
operations of a small community of women in the San Francisco Bay area. She 
found that:
"The phone-sex women were collecting the five senses, the full auditory 
package. In order to convey so much in such small packages, the words 
used by phone sex operators, the sighs, pauses, delays, giggles, amount to 
a highly sophisticated code, a compendium of erotic communication for 
the dialler to receive and decompress by adding themselves, their own 
detailed experiences, fantasies and predilections to the mix. 'The sex 
workers took an extremely complex, highly detailed set of behaviours, 
translated them into a single sense.' And then, 'at the other end of the line 
the recipient... reconstituted ... a fully detailed set of images and 
interactions in multiple sensory mode.' From this combination emerges a 
very elaborate, individual erotic occurrence."
18 A.S. Stone, The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of the Mechanical Age. (MIT Press: 
Massachusetts, 1996), pp. 88 - 89.
19A.S. Stone, The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of the Mechanical Age, pp. 88-95. 
20 L. Toole, Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire, pp. 309 - 310, and Stone, The War of
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Her research demonstrated that the human auditory system has an exceptionally 
wide patience for both distortion and bandwidth limitation in voice 
communication.21
Phone-sex can be taken as part of the pornographical in its application of 
information compression and transfer, through sound, pitch and tone, of a 
fantasy sex package or as Stone terms the 'erotic' code of sexual pleasure.22 
The physical sensations produced in the audiences of the various mediums of 
pornography are no simple or mechanical effect. Susan Sontag in The 
Pornographic Imagination, points out the importance of an emotionally flat 
landscape for the pornographic genres. She writes that:
".. .Pornography is one of the branches of literature - science fiction is
Desire and Technology at the Close of the Mechanical Age, pp. 80 -97.
21 A.S. Stone, The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of the Mechanical Age, 
22 Another example of the data compression package of the pornographic genres is provided by 
Williams' analysis of the transition of stag films into hardcore pornographic films of the 1970s. She 
contends that it is the features, both technical and marked within the performances that allowed the viewer 
to 'get into' the stag films. In seeing more genital action the audience is compensated for the technical 
distance installed between the performers and the audience. Williams notes that another difference or 
rather feature that was noticeably missing from the stag genre of pornographic films, is that of the 'money 
shot'. She finds that the vision of external ejaculation was never present in a stag film with any regularity 
and was unseen in the earlier stag movies - the money shot tends to occur as a narrative trait of the feature- 
length porn movie. Williams puts forward that in the feature length pornographic films the sexual numbers 
had a greater coherence and tended to form complete dramas of arousal, excitement, climax and 
satisfaction; after having been brought into the film, the viewers are provided with the means to withdraw 
satisfied.
In contrast, Williams finds, the stag films endings were abrupt, and came after a barrage of inserted 
close-ups that formed the hardcore sexual sequences. The spectator was meant to be aroused but not 
satisfied. As Williams writes: "(They must)... Seek satisfaction outside the purely visual terms of the film 
- whether in masturbation, in actual sexual relations, or by channelling sexual arousal into communal 
wisecracking or verbal ejaculation of the "homosocial" variety." L. Williams, Hard Core: Power, 
Pleasure and the "Frenzy of the Visible", p. 74. She notes that often stag films in Europe were shown in 
brothels where it served an economic purpose to only arouse the clients, as other means of satisfaction 
were on hand.
Williams draws upon Scott MacDonald and his in his article, "Confessions of a Feminist Porn 
Watcher", in which he wrote of his own experiences in frequenting the arcade booths. He describes these 
as a more modern, colour version of the stag films, whereby the arcades sold magazines, tapes and other 
sexual paraphernalia and often had several solitary booths showing Super 8mm films, spliced together in 
loops and projected onto the wall. MacDonald comments that every half-minute at no particular point, the 
films stopped until more tokens are put into the machine, and viewers began watching the films at random 
points varying on where the last viewer left off. For MacDonald the social experience of these arcades was 
one of 'shared embarrassment' that consisted of avoided eye contact and masturbation in the booth as the 
climax of the visit. L. Williams, Hard Core: Power, Pleasure and the "Frenzy of the Visible", 
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another - aiming at disorientation, at psychic dislocation."23 ".. .Only in 
the absence of directly stated emotions can the reader of pornography find 
room for his own responses. When the event narrated comes already 
festooned with the author's explicitly avowed sentiments, by which the 
reader may be stirred, it then becomes harder to be stirred by the event itself."24
A paramount feature and techne of pornography is that of comic humour, 
as we shall see. From the roots of libertinism, pornography's heritage is one 
that welds the farce and satire of the sexual and the vulnerability of the human 
body to political commentary and entertainment. It is through its usage of 
comic humour that pornography manages to create both an emotional distance 
and at the same time a degree of intimacy with such a difficult and psychically 
offensive terrain. Any chance of sexual arousal in the actors and audiences 
depends upon both the emotional flatness and playfulness that pornography 
manages to generate. Comic humour is entwined within the data compression 
of pornography and is also being suggested as the key to it's unravelling, and 
decompression.
A techne of comic humour enables a viewer to decompress the 
superimposition of space-time that is encapsulated within pornography's data 
compression. Gaston Bachelard argues that verbal and visual times are 
superimposed and it is only in dreams that they are independent of each other.25
23 S. Sontag, "The Pornographic Imagination " in Georges Bataille's Story of the Eye, 
24 S. Sontag, "The Pornographic Imagination" in Georges Bataille's Story of the Eye, pp. 100 - 101. 
Whilst agreeing with Sontag's thoughts on the requirement of comedy and jokes for pornography's 
'artistry', this thesis hopes to take this premise far further and to develop it in greater detail as part iii of 
this chapter hopes to demonstrate.
25 The pornographic works of Shannon Bell and Annie Sprinkle use comic humour in creating visual and 
aural presentations of female ejaculation. S. Bell, Reading, Writing and Re-writing the Prostitute Body. 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), S. Bell, Whore Carnival, and 
http://www.anniesprinkle.org/
See also Lizbeth Goodman, "Comic Subversions: Comedy as Strategy in Feminist Theatre " in The 
Polity Reader in Cultural Theory, edited by Anthony Giddens. (London: Polity Press, 1993), pp. 242 - 
247, and Lizbeth Goodman, "Gender and Humour in Contemporary British Culture " in The British 
Studies Newsletter - Morocco, Issue No. 1, Autumn 1997.
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This is a trait of absurdity that the comic and dream-works share, and can be 
attributed to a part of the pleasure and fantasy of pornography. Freud notes that 
dream logic undergoes a form of compression and transfer, in the dream work 
of the primary processes of condensation and displacement.26 He notes that 
dreams tend to be short and brief in comparison to the wide range of dream 
thoughts, and they have clearly gone through a process of extensive 
condensation during the formation of the dream. He writes:
"It thus seems plausible to suppose that in a dream-work a psychical force 
is operating which on the one hand strips the elements which have a high 
psychical value of their intensity, and on the other hand, by means of their 
overdetermination, creates from elements of low physical value new 
values, which afterwards find their way into the dream-content If that is 
so, transference and displacement of psychical intensities occurs in the 
process of dream-formation, and it is as a result of these that the 
difference of dream-thoughts comes about. The process which we are 
presuming is nothing less than the essential portion of the dream-work; 
and it deserves to be described as 'dream-displacement'. Dream- 
displacement and dream-condensation are the two governing factors to 
whose activity we may in essence ascribe the form assumed by dreams."27
Freud puts forward dream-displacement as the prime method for achieving 
dream-distortion of the unconscious dream-wish. He asserts that during the 
dream-work psychical intensities are displaced from one idea to another 
whereby some images are substituted metonymically along the associative chain 
of significations and images stand in for each other, images and their affects 
become mismatched. Displacement furnishes condensation with the means to 
compress several images into one providing them with an increased multi- 
dimensionality and intensity. Freud gives the condition for dream-thoughts 
finding their way into the dream as that they must evade the censorship of
26 S. Freud, The Interpretation Of Dreams, translated by James Strachey. (London: Penguin Books, 
1991), pp. 381-651.
27 S. Freud, The Interpretation Of Dreams, 
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resistance.
Freud asserts that on the question of absurdity in dreams, dream-thoughts 
are not absurd, rather it is the dream-work that generates absurd dreams and 
dreams featuring absurd elements when faced with the need to represent any 
'criticism, ridicule or derision, that is present in the dream-thoughts.28 He 
states:
"Absurdity in a dream, however, is not to be translated by a simple 'no'; it 
is intended to reproduce the mood of the dream-thoughts, which combines 
derision or laughter with the contradiction. It is only with such an aim in 
view that the dream-work produces anything ridiculous. Here once again 
it is giving a manifest form to a portion of the latent content. "29
This thesis is suggesting that the neologism of dream logic and that of the data 
compression of the pornographical are similar strategies, both seek release from 
emotional tension and the creativity of the absurd in order to effectuate 
identities as something other than a desiring lack, a pure ideology, a 
predetermined essence, a symbolic law or any kind of sexual/social practice 
based on fear of castration or penis envy.30
28 S. Freud, The Interpretation Of Dreams, 
29 S. Freud, The Interpretation Of Dreams, 
Part of the 'ana-aesthetic' of the pornographical seeks to 'send up' and find release from the rigorous 
bodily controls of culture ideals of the body and their entwining class/ moral status. For example a slender 
bodily form demonstrates a well-managed and controlled self, whereas a flabby or fat bodily from is seen 
as brazen disrespect for the self. Kipnis comments: "Fat seems to carry a certain imaginary narrative with 
it, an origins tale of how the fat person got to be that way, the shameful revelation of clandestine (or overt) 
gluttony and overconsumption. But in class terms this has to be seen as something of a displacement: it 
assigns responsibility for overconsumption and gluttony to the social class by far the least culpable of 
overconsuming. Researchers studying the psychology of body image report that fat is associated with a 
range of fears: from loss of control to a reversion to infantile desires, to failure, self-loathing, sloth, and 
passivity. Substitute "welfare class" for "fat" here and you start to see that the phobia of fat and the phobia 
of the poor are heavily cross-coded, and that perhaps the fear of an out-of-control body is not unrelated to 
the fear of out-of-control masses with their voracious demands and insatiable appetites - not just for food, 
but for social resources and entitlement programs." L. Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the 
Politics of Fantasy in America, p. 101. See also L. Gamman and M. Makinen, Female Fetishism: A New 
Look. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1994), pp. 122-170, where they name Bulimia as the fourth fetish. 
Within the pornographical there is room and the ability for women and men of all sizes and shapes, 
and ages to create sexual fantasies, within the industry or with loved ones or friends or all of the 
combinations. Jo Brand in a stand -up performance devised the term 'the kit-kat shuffle' for female 
masturbation. See also Goodman et al, Women's Comedy: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender and 
Humour. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002,), and L. Goodman and J. de Gay, The Routledge Reader in 
Politics and Performance. (London: Routledge, 1999.)
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Bergson attributes both the play of the comic and dreams in granting relief 
from intellectual and emotional tension. Bergson notes how the comic too 
infuses its own effects into the logic of the absurd, in remarking on the definite 
kind of absurdity that the comic tends to infuse. He writes:
".. .In seeking to mold things on an idea of one's own, instead of molding 
one's ideas on things - seeing before us what we are thinking of, instead 
of thinking of what we see. Good sense would have us leave all our 
memories in their proper rank and file; then the appropriate memory will 
every time answer the summons of the situation of the moment and serve 
only to interpret it."31
A comic character will wander astray through an obstinate automatism of 
disposition or of mind, through absentmindedness. Bergson notes that a comic 
scene can be reduced to this simple type of absurdity, whereby a character 
becomes comic in refusing to veer away from his/her own idea, and constantly 
returning to it in spite of incessant interruptions. He puts forward comic 
absurdity as 'of the same nature as that of dreams', as a sane type of madness; 
the comic absurdity of the pornographical - compulsive, obsessional, perverse, 
demonstrating infantile desires for those no longer infantile.
This thesis is proposing that the pornographical, rather than being a 
symbolic network of significations and their entailed deferred (abyssal) 
meaning, forms a surface, a gesture/fragment (of its-non-essential-self) a 
comportment or manner/ stylistics, that is a neologism and ana-linguistic. The 
pornographical surface/ gesture gathers its coherence through points of 
fascination; its surface is one of compressed data, a maddening dream logic, 
obsessive, repetitive and belligerent, transferred, decompressed and compressed 
through a techne of comic humour, as we shall see.
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1.2 Comic Gesture: Comic humour as a techne.
Aristotle's thinking on the matter of the Greek word techne is that it 
expresses what he considered to be the human capacity to act not just from 
instinct and acquired habit but also from understanding.32 Not only do human 
beings know what to do in a specific situation but they also know why they do 
it. Techne can be traditionally translated as meaning an art, craft or skill; 
Aristotle refines this in terms of human rationale as a productive capacity 
informed by an understanding of its intrinsic rationale.33 Aristotle suggests, 
though by no means does he assert that it is essential, that an understanding of 
something's techne can provide a person with immense pleasure. For example 
pleasure can be found in studying painting if one has an understanding of the 
reasons as to why it was the right way to depict the subject. This is analogous 
to the study of animals and nature for Aristotle; technical knowledge can be a 
source of pleasure.34
Heidegger also looked to techne and its relation to truth, not truth as the 
instrumental causa, or as the correctness of an idea, ofveritas, but that of 
aletheia, truth as revealing.35 Technology, asserts Heidegger is no mere means,
31 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
32 Throughout this thesis the German version of the word techne has been used, since it is the Heideggerian 
use of this philosophic term that is being employed. However in discussing Aristole's version of the term 
techne, then the Greek spelling of the word is utilized.
33 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by H. Rackham. (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 
1996), 1140a20f. Aristotle does not deem techne as necessary to producing great poetry or tragedies, 
chance, trial and error often produced as great results as those produced through a use of techne.33 Natural 
gifts or aptitudes for certain endeavours could not be taught. Aristotle in commenting on the art of creating 
bewitching poetry, states that in order to be able to project themselves emotionally into the state of others, 
what poets really required is natural talent and a touch of insanity. Aristotle, Poetics, 55a30-4.
34 Aristotle, Poetics, 645a8-15.
35 Heidegger charts the notion of instrumental truth as causa, or the four causes, back to Aristotle. They 
are: causa materialis, the matter or material out of which something is made; causa formalis, the form or 
shape into which the material enters; causa finalis, the end, for example "the sacrificial rite in relation to 
which the chalice required is determined as to its form and matter"; and causa efficiens, which "brings 
about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith". M. Heidegger, The 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
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it is more importantly a way of revealing. He writes:
"(The word technology)....Stems from the Greek word Technikon means 
that which belongs to techne. We must observe two things with respect to 
the meaning of this word. One is that techne is the name not only for the 
activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and 
the fine arts. Techne belongs to bringing-forth, topoiesis; it is something poietic."36
But techne is a particular kind of something poetic, in being distinguished by 
Aristotle from episteme as being a mode of aletheuein. hi other words 
Heidegger uses the term techne to generate a creative and poetic truth, rather 
than a causal and temporal chain of sequenced happenings. Technology is 
nothing technical here, rather techne is a method that effectuates a "surface', or 
a leap of thought, that relates the subject/ object to the abyss of the event of 
appropriation, providing a kind of substance and comportment in the way in 
which one draws 'that which does not yet lie before us' to oneself, the poetics of 
the enframing, of the event of appropriation.37
Techne, for Heidegger, "reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and 
does not yet lie here before us', as history that is yet to happen, to be yet 
brought forth into the openness of the 'clearing'. This Heideggerian notion of 
techne links it with freedom, a specific kind of freedom that is neither connected 
to the will nor to the causality of human willing. Heidegger states:
"Freedom governs the open in the sense of the cleared and lighted up, i.e., 
of the revealed. ..... But that which frees - the mystery - is concealed and
always concealing itself. All revealing comes out of the open, goes into 
the open, and brings into the open. The freedom of the open consists 
neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in the constraint of mere laws. 
Freedom is that which conceals in a way that opens to light, in whose 
clearing there shimmers that veil that covers what comes to presence of all 
truth and lets the veil appear as what veils. Freedom is the realm of the
36 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
37 See M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference and M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology 
and Other Essays. Supra chapter one, pp. 68 - 80.
139
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
«38destining that at any given time starts a revealing on its way.
The essence of technology and the essence of art are bound together in this 
age's grasp of freedom, of an appropriation of that which reveals the concealing 
of itself.39
The possibility of access to history is grounded in the possibility according 
to which any specific present understands how to be futural. Heidegger 
uncovers the structures of the metaphysical tradition and reads that logic against 
itself. A "leap" out of thought metaphysics becomes possible, whereby this 
leap/ spring towards the event of appropriation, for Heidegger, forms a negative 
dynamic that is simultaneously unveiling - veiling in the active spring of 
thought and the distance of the step back of difference/perdurance.40 Whilst 
Heidegger uses the notion of perdurance to provide the naming for a kind of 
intensity, this is not 'enough' to name the fractal aspect or singularity of the 
body and hi positing an ontology rooted in and on difference, the present is 
rethought as equivalent to a transcendent temporality.41
"Metaphysics does not heed the ontological difference as difference. It 
looks at the ontological elements of that difference. It sees the difference 
between Being and beings, but it is concerned primarily with Being as the 
ground of beings and thus never sees the difference as the difference 
between Overwhelming and Arrival. The difference grants a "Between"
38 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 
39 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, pp. 34 - 35. Heidegger 
establishes the difficulties of representation in arguing that the phenomenon of time is future. He writes: 
"In moving ahead Dasein is its future, in such a way that this being futural it comes back to its past and 
present." M. Heidegger, The Concept of Time, p. 13E. In being futural Dasein is its past; it comes back to 
the 'how'. One manner of its coming back is the call of conscience. Heidegger asserts: "Conscience calls 
Dasein back to its thrownness by calling forth to the possibility of assuming this thrownness." M. 
Heidegger, The Concept of Time, p. 18E. Dasein, in its own anxiety calls itself and it is Dasein that must 
hear its own call and this means want to hear it. This is the hermeneutic circle. Supra chapter one, pp. 68 
-80.
40 Supra chapter one, pp. 68 -80.
41 Heidegger, in later works, uses the medieval word of "Beyng" as a name for the ontological difference 
the difference between Being and being - that dominates any given epoch in the history of Being. M. 
Heidegger, Basic Writings from 'Being and Time' (1927) to 'The Task of Thinking' (1964), 
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in which the Overwhelming of Being and the arrival in beings are held 
toward each other and yet held apart. The Between is perdurance. In the 
perdurance of the difference of Overwhelming (the surprise and 
incalculability of the manner in which Being reaches being) and Arrival 
(presence) reigns a clearing"42
For truth is unfolded in the sheltering that clears, for Heidegger, though it 
is a clearing that whilst it is neither inside nor outside of mankind, in terms of 
being theological or psychoanalytic, but is instead related to perdurance, a kind 
of enduring persistent intensity, and is a Heideggerian presupposition for 
revealing and securing, for anything to be or to happen at all. Or as Heidegger 
phrases it:
"... Within this perdurance there prevails a clearing of what veils and 
closes off- and this its prevalence bestows the being apart, and the being 
toward each other, of overwhelming and arrival."43
Heidegger's event of appropriation forms an assemblage or nexus for the 
gathering of identity, that is formed in the leap towards it and which is given 
resonance in the intense perdurance of oblivion. The battle for truth is situated 
outside of man and is at the same time man. In other words truth is like a 
surface, an expression/ outcome/ attachment of the very thing that, in so being, 
gives the surface its shape (the surface is the shape of the object, or, in this case, 
of'truth').
Pornography's identity is entwined with technological invention and 
impetus, and is as much a part of what wo/mankind is right now. The 
pornographical presents a commentary on contemporary wo/mankind and its 
relationship between technology and the body. Although Heidegger would stop 
short of the pornographical, this thesis is posing this as a movement of dynamic
42 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 17. Supra chapter one, pp. 68 -80.
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that has a techne to it, a techne of comic humour, one that contours a bloody and 
complicit, bodily meaning. It is this techne of comic humour that creates 
substance for the bodily and the surface without lapsing into an essentialist 
logistics or an abyssal logic or lack, in generating a gesture and comportment of 
the surface data compression.
Pornography's techne, or building of comportment, or manner of 
revealing the veil, is one of comic humour.44 A postmodern reading of techne 
draws upon both the Aristotelian and Heideggerian strands of thought. Techne 
names a movement of grasping, a movement that brings something towards 
oneself in a manner or comportment that contours an identity of that specific 
relationship. For Heidegger this would be a movement of appropriation, for the 
postmodern thinkers this is more of an installation of libidinal rhythms, in a 
style that offers a slice or gesture of a fluid objectivity of that particular 
relationship.
In other words a techne or technology reveals the veil of the poesis or arts 
work of relation of identity that is paradoxically a non-relation to a singularity. 
It produces degrees of distance and proximity within this, a presentation of what 
exceeds any possible representation. As Bill Haver states:
"The presentation of the non-relation to singularity, the task of art's work, 
is therefore essentially erotic - indeed, pornographic. Pornography, the
43 M. Heidegger, Identity and Difference, p. 65. Supra chapter one, pp. 68 - 80.
44 Lacoue-Labarthe critiques Heidegger's work and Rectoral Address for its silences and refusal to 
apologize for his continued membership of the German National Socialist Party before and during World 
War II. Even Heidegger's discourse after his withdrawal and settling of accounts with National Socialism 
remains silent over breaking Nazism and even more telling that of the events and systematic murders of the 
Holocaust. Lacoue-Labarthe remained puzzled and saddened at Heidegger's refusal to acknowledge 
'Auschwitz1 as the "caesura of our times." Rather, Lacoue-Labarthe noted how this discourse as with those 
previous and those that followed, revolved around the theme of techne. Although there were some 
theoretical changes, in that techne was no longer connected to energeia, 'being-at-work', but was firmly 
entrenched in a relationship to art in its essence as the 'setting -to-work' ofaletheia. Heidegger had 
shifted from a notion of work to that of the work or oeuvre and "in the very same process, it seems to me, 
in the innermost 'political' recesses of that discourse, National Socialism has been supplanted by what I 
shall call a national-aestheticism." P. Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics, translated by C. 
Turner. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1990.) pp. 46 - 53.
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pornography that genet's writing is, in - but also surpassing it's every 
representation - is a presentation of the essential stupidity of the senses 
and the affects. This is what is called obscenity, the supplement of the 
possibility of interpretation, where cocks are only cocks, cunts are only 
cunts, assholes only assholes, and a cigar is only ever a cigar. What is 
obscene about pornography, and what pornographic in art's work, is the 
fact that it presents the impossible non-relation to singularity, the very 
impossibility of interpretation. Again: through its manifold 
representations pornography presents what needs no interpretation or 
representation; in pornography, the senses are inevitably stupid, what you 
see is what you see. Here, now, there is an unexampled astonishment at 
the fact of not being dead, the fact of existence, the fact of singularity."45
This thesis is proposing that that whilst there is nothing nice about the 
pornographical, there is something that is liberatory about it and something 
creative about the act of sexual fantasy on both a personal and communal level. 
As we shall see, this thesis is suggesting that part of this 'liberatoriness,' and the 
expression of sexual fantasy that the pornographical entails, are bound up with 
the comedic packaging of its data compression.
Heidegger defines techne as knowledge in relation to 'hearing the call' of 
Dasein and with it ones authentic possibilities; he also posits death, wo/man's 
(and Dasein's) finitude as part of this hermeneutic magnet of existence (and of 
time in this heterogeneous sense). In this way Heidegger rethinks the notion of 
negation as excess, by introducing "impurity" as one of original anxiety. 
Original anxiety is the prime disclosive disposition as it reveals our temporal 
finitude in the temporal existence of the nothing. According to Heidegger's 
abyssal logic, joy cannot be seen as a prime disclosive disposition.46 There is 
no subjectivity here. It is the fleeting moment when we are 'individualised' and 
as such face our authentic (and inauthentic) possibilities of Being (of Dasein).
45 B. Haver, "Pornographically man dwells'1 and "Art's work (or fragments for a preface to the genet 
commentaries) " in Issues in Contemporary Culture and Aesthetics: Volume 12, edited by S. Golding / 
johnny de philo, p. 109.
See M. Heidegger, Being and Time, What is Called Thinking?.
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Wo/man is essentially aware of her/his/our finitude and as such s/he/us ventures 
to master her/his/our being in techne. In pushing Dasein into the world it is 
bound in history through the undertaking of techne.47
Critchley in looking to salvage something affirmative about comedy and 
its philosophic relationship to finitude looks at Lacan's ethics of psychoanalysis 
with its references to the role of tragedy and comedy.48 Lacan draws on the 
Heideggerian 'being- towards-death' that triumphs in the dimension of tragedy, 
through the relation of ethical action and desire. He writes:
"Actions are inscribed in the space of tragedy, and it is with relation to 
this space, too, that we are le to take our bearings in the sphere of values. 
Moreover, this is also true of the space of comedy, and when I started to 
talk to you about the formations of the unconscious, it was, as you know, 
the comic that I had in mind.
Let us say by way of the preliminary sounding that the relationship 
between action and the desire which inhabits it is in the space of tragedy 
functions in the direction of a triumph of being-for-death that is 
formulated in Oedipus's ..., a phase in which one finds that..., the 
negation that is identical to the entrance of the signifier. There lies the 
fundamental action of all tragic action.
A preliminary sounding of the space of comedy shows it is less a 
question of a triumph than a futile or derisory play of vision. However 
little time I have thus far devoted to the comic here, you have been able to 
see that there, too, it is a question of the relationship between action and 
desire, and of the former's fundamental failure to catch up with the latter. 
The sphere of comedy is created by the presence at its center of a 
hidden signifier, but that in the Old Comedy is there in person, namely,
47 The paradox here is that the artist must understand the event that first gives things their "look" and to 
men their "outlook" on themselves; just as the preserver (essential for letting the work come into being) 
must have a knowing that is a willing that is "the opening up of human being; out of captivity in beings to 
the openness of Being." M. Heidegger, Basic Writings from 'Being and Time' (1927) to 'The Task of 
Thinking' (1964), p. 192. Art is the repetition of truth, whereby truth opens in a sphere opened by the 
work of art. Dasein is thrown into the freedom of undertaking techne, a creative project that offers a site to 
Being, by the opening of Being in the thrown pull of the nothing. The creative project, for example a work 
of art, traces and sets forth and composes the differentiation between world and earth as limits, the abyssal 
finitude of man marks the work. The work of art later brings Dasein (now-as-preserver) before its own 
limit by the pulling thrust of the work. Art therefore manifests an open foundation as it brings the limits of 
human activity to appear as limits. Does this open foundation either gather the forms of human production 
into a space of the same (unified) or is it the condition of their discontinuity and their essential 
multiplicity? C. Fynsk, Heidegger: Thought and Historicity. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 
p. 130. Heidegger's use of Dasein lends coherence to his assemblage of an event of appropriation and to 
the multiplicity of this relationship of Being and being, without introducing transcendentalism.
48 See S. Critchley, Chapter 10 "Comedy and Finitude: Displacing the Tragic- Heroic Paradigm in 
Philosophy and Psychoanalysis" in Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and 
Contemporary French Thought. (London: Verso, 1999), pp. 217 - 238, and J. Lacan, Chapter XXIV, 
"The Paradoxes of Ethics or Have You Acted in Conformity with Your Desire?" in The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis, 
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the phallus. Who cares if it is subsequently whisked away? One must 
simply remember that the element in comedy that satisfies us, the element 
that makes us laugh, that makes us appreciate it in its full human 
dimension, not excluding the unconscious, is not so much the triumph of 
life as its flight, the fact that life slips away, runs off, escapes all those 
barriers that oppose it, including precisely those that are the most 
essential, those that are constituted by the agency of the signifier.
The phallus is nothing more than a signifier, the signifier of this 
flight. Life goes by, life triumphs, whatever happens. If the comic trips 
up and lands in the soup, the little fellow nevertheless survives.
The pathetic side of this dimension is, you see, exactly the opposite, 
the counterpart of tragedy. They are not incompatible, since tragic- 
comedy exists. That is where the experience of human action resides. 
And it is because we know better than those who went before how to 
recognize the nature of desire, which is at the heart of this experience, that 
a reconsideration of ethics is possible, of a kind that gives this question 
the force of a Last Judgment: Have you acted in conformity with the 
desire that is within you?"49
Critchley argues that Lacan's ethic of psychoanalysis is one that through an 
Aristotelian notion of Catharism (katharsis) the ethical act is not to give way to 
ones desires, but to find a purification of ones desires through a 'being-towards- 
death'. Critchley locates within Lacan's brief mention of the comic that 
comedy demonstrates the inability to 'keep up' with desire, and from this he 
defines comedy as the collapse of heroism into 'anti-heroic mirth'. He writes:
"Comedy is the permanent suspension, postponement or parody of 
catharsis,..... .Comedy is the eruption of materiality into the spiritual
purity of tragic action and desire."50
He places the fallibility of the body as the site of the comic, and asserts that 
comedy exposes a different relation to fmitude through the opening of jokes in 
the comic. Through discussing the comic play of the Marx Brothers, Critchley 
discovers that laughter's complicity conceals an ethical dimension and relation 
to das Ding, which raises 'an identification that annihilates identity'. Critchley
49 J. Lacan, Chapter XXIV, "The Paradoxes of Ethics or Have You Acted in Conformity with Your 
Desire?" in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, pp. 
50 S. Critchley, Chapter 10 "Comedy and Finitude: Displacing the Tragic- Heroic Paradigm in Philosophy 
and Psychoanalysis" in Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary
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concludes that laughter reminds one of one's finitude and has an ethical 
dimension as a 'convulsive', 'contagious' and 'solidaristic' movement. He 
writes:
"... A site resistance to the alleged total administration of society, a node 
of non-identity in the idealizing rage of commodification that returns us 
not to a fully integrated and harmonious Lebenswelt but lights up the 
comic feebleness of our embodiment. Laughter might here be approached 
as a form of resistance, of critique, of the sudden feeling of solidarity that 
follows the eruption of laughter in a bus queue, watching a party political 
broadcast in a pub, or when someone farts in a lift."51
Critchley's emphasis on the fallibility of the body as the site of the comic, and 
its relationship both to pleasure and desire, allows us to approach the 
pornographical in relation a techne of comic humour.
2. Comic Humour: The 'ready- made' surface. (Freud and Bergson).
In his book Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, Sigmund Freud 
defines the pleasure found in jokes, in comic pleasure and in humour.52 He 
defines the pleasure arising from jokes as that of a psychical' economy in 
expenditure upon inhibition'; the pleasure in the comic as that of 'an economy 
in expenditure upon ideation (upon cathexis)'; and the pleasure found in
humour as one of 'an economy upon feeling '. In looking at Freud and Bergson
French Thought, 
51 S. Critchley, Chapter 10,"Comedy and Finitude: Displacing the Tragic- Heroic Paradigm in Philosophy 
and Psychoanalysis " in Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary 
French Thought, 
52 1 will mostly be using the works of Sigmund Freud and Henri Bergson as these two thinkers have written 
on the comic in a manner that distinguishes it from jokes and looks at the technical details as to how comic 
humour operates socially. Not many philosophers or intellectual thinkers have concerned themselves 
much with the topic of humour. Comedy, even in Aristotle's poetics, has most often been unvalued and 
seen in a debased position as something that is part of a way of life for the lo*wer classes, bawdy and crude 
with little aesthetic value. Jacques Lacan, Simon Critchley, Jean Paul (Richter), Theodor Vischer, Kuno 
Fischer and Theodor Lipps all touch upon the subject of the comic. The comic tends to be analysed in 
terms of caricatures and jokes as remarks, and as playful subjective judgments that reveal something that 
has been previously hidden or concealed.
53 Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 302.
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and melding their work on the pleasure of comic humour with Heidegger's 
notion of techne and comportment, then not only is the comic better understand 
in its plurality, but the very notion of data compression is differently cast, giving 
more substance (without an ethical mediation of the universal or linguistic trail) 
to the pornographical.
Freud comments on the specific considerations of the comic of sexuality 
and obscenity through the technique of exposure, for both Freud and Bergson 
the spheres of sexuality and obscenity offer a variety of occasions to yield a 
source of comic pleasure alongside sexual excitement. Freud notes what is 
offered through the sexuality and obscenity is the comic pleasure of 
degradation, in exposing human dependency on bodily pleasure and that of 
unmasking, in disclosing the 'physical demands' behind the assertion of mental 
love.
He asserts that every exposure we are the audience of is equivalent to the 
third person being made comic, in the case of jokes Freud notes their task of 
being able to open, again, access to a lost source of comic pleasure. He 
remarks:
".. .Witnessing an exposure is not a case of the comic for the witness, 
because his own effort in doing so does away with the determining 
condition of comic pleasure: nothing is left but the sexual pleasure of what 
is seen. If the witness gives an account to someone else, the person who 
has been witnessed becomes comic once more, because there is a 
predominant sense that the latter has omitted the expenditure which would 
have been in place for concealing his secret "54
The comic as a techne of pornography allows for any witness to become 
intimately involved with its vice, the emotional release, and the witnessing 
leaves only sexual pleasure. Any participation with the pornographical's
54 S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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discursive economy places one as complicit to the joke, sharing in the comic 
pleasure. In this way the data compression of pornography allows for the comic 
feature to provide a hinge for the pornographical, as we shall see. A techne of 
comic humour allows the audience to enter the textual and diegetic spaces of 
pornography and participate with fascination despite/because of the sexually 
explicit and crude technological pleasures.
Freud discovered that socially the comic behaved differently from that of 
jokes and humour, for humour is content with one person, and the comic with 
two: one who finds what is comic and a second in whom it is found. Freud 
discovers that although informing and involving a third person in the comic 
intensifies the process, nothing new is added to it. This relationship of two that 
the comic requires makes it an ideal voice for pornography in enabling a viewer 
both the possibility of privacy and anonymity and a means to engage and 
connect with the material despite the technological distance.
Another difference that helps Freud to delimit the comic further is that a 
joke is made, whereas the comic is found, usually, or if not it must appear as if 
it is, an unintended discovery in people. He notes it is derived from human 
social relations, in their movements, forms, actions, and character traits, either 
physical ones or sometimes the physical expression of mental character traits. 55 
The comic is non-essential and non-personal, able to be detached from the 
person that seems comic. Rather it is a series of traits or conditions under which 
someone is comic. The comic is found amongst the surface traits of life; the
55 Henri Bergson states: "...Comic does not exist outside the pale of what is strictly human. A landscape 
may be beautiful, charming and sublime, or significant and ugly; it will never be laughable. You may 
laugh at an animal, but only because you have detected in it some human attitude or expression. You may 
laugh at a hat, but what you are making fun of, in this case, is not the piece of felt or straw, but the shape 
that men have given it - the human caprice whose mold it has assumed." H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay 
on the Meaning of the Comic, translated by C. Brereton and F. Rothwell. (Los Angeles: Green Integer 
Books, 1999), p. 9.
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pornographical surface is a readymade source of sexual excitement, bodily 
pleasures, exposures, unmasking and mimicry.
Highly developed techniques make it possible to make someone else comic 
and of course oneself, opening the way for 'an undreamt-of yield of comic 
pleasure'. Freud names these techniques or methods as: "putting them in a 
comic situation, mimicry, disguise, unmasking, caricature, parody, travesty, and 
so on." He asserts that the comic is something spontaneous, even when 
rehearsed. Socially it can serve to humiliate someone, or oneself, and can be 
used for hostile or aggressive purposes, but such underlying intentions are not 
always the case.
Bergson defines the comic as that which obeys the logic of imagination 
rather than that of reason; it is 'something mechanical encrusted onto living'. 
He writes:
"The attitudes, gestures and movements of the human body are laughable
C7
in exact proportion as that body reminds us of a mere machine. "
Bergson points out that an unmasking of a disguise, of a person, of society or of 
nature can be comic in its break with continuity, or as a diversion, for example 
any episode that calls attention to the physical in a person, when it is the moral 
aspects causing concern. Anything that is seen to be inert or stereotyped, or 
"simply readymade, on the surface of living society" can be comic. He asserts:
"Everyone knows how easily the comic spirit exercises its ingenuity on 
social relations of a stereotyped nature, from an ordinary prize distribution 
to the solemn sitting of a court of justice. Any form or formula is a ready- 
made frame into which the comic element may be fitted."58
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
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The spinal column of pornography's discursive economy and industry is made 
of such stuff. The comic proceeds by way of gestures, offering slices of fun, of 
compressed, deeply -rooted yet superficial human bodily matter.
Bergson terms the comic manner as one that offers a gesture of meaning 
rather than the whole concept. To him, any gesture, if it is performed repeatedly 
tends to become established as habit, both imitable and funny in that it has 
become expected. He puts forward: "It is automatism established in life and 
imitating it. It belongs to the comic."59 Rather than conscious actions, comedy 
directs our attention towards gestures; people become imitable when they cease 
to be themselves. Bergson notes that a gesture slips out unawares; unlike action 
it is unintentional and explosive. Gestures are those attitudes and movements 
that are automatic and absentminded. Bergson offers examples of the comic 
readymade as unsociability or social rigidity and inattention to the self. He 
writes: "The chief cause of rigidity is the neglect to look around - and more 
especially within oneself."60
The pornographical is a surface, a gesture of data compression, a-rooted 
and readymade. Sexual and bodily pleasures are automatic, repetitive, 
stereotypical and absentminded, ideal comic ground. A comic series of gestures 
can offer several different types of the same model or readymades, placing 
stereotypes in their multiples, reiterated and recombined, generating new ones. 
To deal with anything more than surface level would risk producing emotion, in 
an audience, in the participants and witnesses, which is incompatible to both 
comedy and the pornographical. Bergson asserts that the comic demands a 
"momentary anesthesia of the heart," for the comic to occur it must not arouse
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
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our intellect or emotions. He defines the art of the comic as one that lulls the 
human sensibility to sleep, providing it with dreams.61 The condensed, 
compressed and displaced neologism of dreams, absurdity and the 
fragmentation of the pornographical and its ana-linguistic comic gestures.
Bergson defines the comic as a dream logic that partakes from the language 
of the unconscious. Comic obsessions, repetitions and compulsions are similar 
those of dreams and their absurdity. Bergson asserts that a journey towards the 
absurd produces on the dreamer the sensation of 'blankness' whereby reason 
and propriety have no meaning. He puts forward comic logic as that of dreams 
as it lacks tension, and allows for the relaxation of reasoning, of intellectual 
tension. In laughing, one relaxes and becomes absent to oneself - the impulse is 
to join in the game, to abandon the strain of thinking and join in the comic 
impertinence. Laughter, Bergson asserts, reveals a revolt on the surface of 
social life. It is through comic pleasure that pornography creates a 'psychic 
dislocation' and enables the participants and witnesses of the pornographical to 
become intimately involved with its pleasurable vice, despite the technical 
distance, and the brash, immoral crudeness of the sexually explicit.
Bergson, as well as Critchley, puts forward an ethical dimension to the 
comic in raising laughter as a social corrective, to the comic rigidity that it 
acknowledges; it is neither kind, nor sympathetic, nor does justice motivate it. 
He comments that it is laughter's function is to 'intimidate by humiliating'.62 
Although, laughter does not always 'hit its target', he argues it can serve as a 
useful barometer in emphasizing and registering the social elements that are
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
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disturbing. The glamour of the pornographic genres lies in their demonstrations 
of the comic methods of exposure and inversion that serve to energetically 
violate most social conventions, figures, cultural aesthetics and sensibilities.63
To Bergson then laughter dwells both in the aesthetic realm and a 
utilitarian province as it pursues an unconscious aim of general cultural 
improvement. For him the comic has aesthetic qualities and coincided 
culturally with new social freedoms from self- preservation, when 'individuals' 
began to regard themselves as works of art. Pornography too is a contemporary 
product of a modern age, occupying a relationship both to the body and to 
technology. On the pornographical surface technology serves as wo/ mankind's 
prosthesis of sexual fantasy - distanced, anonymous, and yet communal in the 
shared eruptive convulsions of shared humour and laughter that the comic 
sexual data generates in its decompression. The pornographical effectuates a 
non-essential barrage of fantasy sex practices and stereotypes, readymade 
formulas, obsessional and repetitious and mimetic.
Bergson proposes different techniques to the comic. He asserts that any 
identification does not need to be complete in order to ensure a comic effect; a 
series of graduated hints, or partial fragments of information can be enough. He 
writes:
"By a certain arrangement of rhythm, rhyme and resonance, it is possible 
to lull the imagination, to rock it to and fro between like and like with a 
regular see-saw motion, and thus prepare it submissively to accept the 
vision suggested."64
Bergson suggests three methods by which a series of graduations can become
63 Supra chapter four, 176-221. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter through 
the notion of an 'ana-aesthetic'.
64 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
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comic: repetition, inversion and reciprocal interference. Repetition, for 
Bergson, is a bit like a spring, there is repression followed by expression, to be 
followed by repression. He writes:
"In a comic repetition of words we generally find two terms: a repressed 
feeling which goes off like a spring, and an idea that delights in repressing 
the feeling anew."65
Part of the data compression of the pornographical operates in such a manner, 
re-igniting it own explosion of neologism and fascination.
Comedies of situation and of character are considered to be classic arts of 
comedy that revolve around the creation of types, models and readymades that 
are endlessly repeated or inversely repeated. With the techniques of repetition 
and inversion a comedy formula or formulae can be re-echoed and re-produced. 
As Bergson notes:
"When a comic scene has been reproduced a number of times, it reaches 
the stage of being a classical type or model. It becomes amusing in itself, 
quite apart from the causes that render it amusing."66
It can become self-referencing and supplemental within a discursive 
arrangement, serving as a 'trigger' trait, image, and word for a condensed and 
compressed package of information.
2.1 The Comic Hinge (and Becoming Unhinged).
Bergson points out that the bulk of the comic proceeds according to a 
reciprocal interference of two series. He writes:
".. .The word "interference" has here the meaning given to it in optics, 
where it indicates the partial superimposition and neutralisation, by each 
other, of two series of light waves."6
65 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
66 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
67 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, pp. 90 and 171.
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Bergson extends this in stating that something can become comic if it is part of 
two independent series of events at the same time, and is capable of being 
interpreted by two or more entirely different meanings simultaneously. This 
sets up an equivocal situation in allowing two different series to develop at the 
same time and to coincide in our imaginations. Pornography's audiences do not 
simply witness and decompress information on male domination and the 
exploitation of a 'male gaze'.
Another method that Bergson suggests is one whereby the comic is 
achieved when an absurd idea is fitted into a well-established phrase form. 
Inversion and reciprocal interference are a playful way of jostling with 
readymade formulae and words, whereas the 'comic in transposition' is much 
more far-reaching. For Bergson, comic invention is obtainable in "transposing 
the natural expression of an idea into another key."68 The beauty of the 
grotesque and bawdiness is celebrated through pornography's comic hinge: 
'bodies piss, shit and fart'.69 The comic puns of the pornographical are hinged 
to the corporeality of bodies.70
Bergson points out that there is a vast ocean of language into which the 
comic is capable of travelling, given the richness of language games, their usage
H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
69 Derrida writes on the notion of the hinge [brisure] as the marking of the impossibility that a sign, as the 
unity of signifier and signified can be effectuated in the fullness of the present and an absolute presence. 
See "Of Grammatology" in/I Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds, edited by Peggy Kamuf. (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 41. Derrida uses the term 'difference' as the hinge between speech 
and writing. The verb, differer, means both to defer and to differ; as such Derrida's notion of 'difference' 
plays between difference based on a deferral from one's self or relation to a deferred origin. There is 
always an original delay, and the original is always a copy, as Derrida argues, the original presentation 
never took place. See J. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory Signs, 
edited and translated with an introduction by David B. Allison. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1973>
70 Harking back to the Libertine and Rabelaisian roots, the discourse of porn celebrates the body and all 
aspects of its corporeality, grotesque and sexualised. Tang raises a delightful example of the cover of a 
TTV compilation tape, Really Gross Anals, on which a porn star exhibits her fascinating ability to turn her
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and grammar. There are the farthest away from each other keys, of for example 
the solemn and the familiar. If these two keys were used together then the 
effect would be one of comic parody. Exaggeration and degradation take place 
in a similar vein, when a moral structure is revealed to immorality, or when 
physicality has the accent over morality. Irony and humour can be defined 
according to keys of transposition, but if the interval between the keys is 
gradually narrowed,
".. .The contrast between the terms obtained will be less and less violent 
and the varieties of comic transposition more and more subtle."71
Freud differs here slightly with Bergson, or rather he adds more substance 
to his points. It is not just the presentation to the anaesthetised senses of two 
contrasting series nor is it simply the oscillation of attention backwards and 
forwards between the two, rather the comparison between two independent 
series must be able to result in a psychical economy in expenditure that is 
capable of being discharged in laughter.72 He writes:
".. .On the one hand the psychical expenditure while we are having a 
certain idea and on the other hand the content of the thing that we are 
having the idea of."73
This psychical comparison is achieved through mimesis. An impulsion to 
imitate is present in the perceptions of movements and through repeated use one 
learns a standard with which to measure these movements in ones 'innervatory 
expenditure.'
"Instead of imitating the movement with my muscles, I have an idea of it
anus inside out. I. Tang, Pornography: The Secret History of Civilization, 
71 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
72 S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, pp. 
73 S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 250. More will be discussed on this with 
regards to mimesis and its relation to the 'ana-aesthetic' of the pornographical, in chapter 4 and the 
conclusion. Supra pp. 176-221.
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through the medium of my memory-traces of expenditures on similar 
movements. Ideation or 'thinking' differs from acting or performing 
above all in the fact that it displaces far smaller cathectic energies and 
holds back the main expenditure from discharge."74
For Freud, the origin of comic pleasure can be found in a comparison based on 
ideational mimetics, of the difference between two expenditures. Or as Freud 
states:
"Comic pleasure and the effect by which it is known - laughter - can only 
come about if this difference is unutilizable and capable of discharge."75
Freud's later piece on humour looks at the ethical role that humour plays, 
in relation to the self and to others, by supporting, consoling and protecting the 
ego from suffering, through the use of 'gallows humour'. He comments:
"The grandeur in it clearly lies in triumph of narcissism, the victorious 
assertion of the ego's invulnerability. The ego refuses to be distressed by 
the provocations of reality, to let itself be compelled to suffer. It insists 
that it cannot be affected by the traumas of the external world; it shows in 
fact that such traumas are no more than occasions for it to gain pleasure. 
.... Humour is not resigned; it is rebellious. It signifies not only the 
triumph of the ego but also of the pleasure principle, which is able here to 
assert itself against the unkindness of the real circumstances."76
Freud thus defines jokes as 'the contribution made to the comic by the 
unconscious' and humour as 'the contribution made to the comic through the 
super-ego'. 77 This is the most positive role that Freud attributes to the usually 
authoritarian and 'guilt - inspiring' super-ego. As with Bergson, Freud too sees 
the creative role that comic pleasure plays in fashioning the self as a 'work of 
art'; it is through fantasy and imaginative play that participants of the
74 S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
75 S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
76 S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents and Other Works, translated by 
James Strachey. (London: Vintage Books, 2001), pp. 162 - 163.
77 S. Freud, The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents and Other Works, 
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pornographical de-compress the 'data compressed sexual meaning'.78
The pornographical is offered as an 'unsayable' negative dynamic, a 
singularity, an assemblage or surface, one that ex-poses and ex-scribes meaning 
through its symbiosis. Through techne this bodily surface is given substance in 
the active movement of the grasping of thought, of the muscular thought that 
moves towards the assemblage, the event of appropriation, the pornographical, 
and in so doing creates a surface gesture of it's substance, it's movement; a 
surface gesture of the ready-made. The ethical gesture of comic humour lies 
here; rather than Kierkegaard's self-elevatory and masterful irony - suited to the 
solitary individual and the T of its representation, the comic neologism of the 
pornographical binds, repeats, proliferates, connects, allowing for a 'rhizomatic' 
surface, as we shall see.79 Deleuze posits humour as the 'co-extensiveness of
Qf\
sense and nonsense'. Rewrites:
"Humour, on the other hand, claims kinship with a minority, with a 
minority-becoming. It is humour which makes a language stammer, 
which imposes on it a minor usage, or which constitutes a complete
O 1
bilingual system within the same language."
2.2 From Comic to Libidinal Technologies: A Comic Witnessing (Lyotard). 
In elucidating the three/four comic routes (gesture of data compression; 
surface gesture of the ready-mades; humour and hinge/ unhinged) one can get a 
sense of the way in which the pornographical is both circumscribing an event 
and at the same time, 'being event'. In putting the pornographical forward as a
78 Supra Bergson in this chapter, p. 27; and O' Toole on de-compression and the role of fantasy in 
constructing the sexual self, pp. 5-7.
79 See R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), S. 
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, and S. Kierkegaard, "The Concept of Irony, -with Continual Reference 
to Socrates " in The Essential Kierkegaard.
80 G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, p. 141; Supra introduction, p. 20, fn 44.
81 G. Deleuze and C. Pamet, Dialogues, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. (London:
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singularity and a discursive economy this section will be drawing upon the work 
of Lyotard amongst others in order to look at how a techne, the surface and the 
skin are libidinal. As shown in chapter two, any event of appropriation always 
exceeds interpretation, producing in its wake an excess, whilst simultaneously 
gathering 'that which is yet to lie to hand', or in a word: the is. Lyotard 
attempts in Libidinal Economy to bring into being the fabric of a libidinal 
philosophy which views society and its political developments in terms of an 
economy of libidinal energies and intensities; he creates a philosophy focused 
upon an ontology of unpredictable happenings and events, rather than the 
structured regularities of dialectical or semiotic totalities.
As shown in the initial, long quote where Lyotard graphically depicts the 
dissection of the libidinal surface, or as he calls it, this "cruel dissection", the 
immense membrane of a discourse and of the human body becomes more than 
the boxed-in three-dimensional body of phenomenology.82 There are no 
divisions here between body and consciousness and between inside or outside. 
There is no outside; the libidinal body forms a surface that twists in such a way 
that it forms a moebius strip joined from end to end. A line traced along one 
side of the strip will end up on the other side without breaking contact with the 
surface.
For Lyotard libidinal intensities and affects are events or refer to events 
that impact on and can create material entities on the fabric of the libidinal band 
or skin, as Lyotard sometimes names it. He writes:
"Intensities are unbound excitations offeree which are characterized by 
their displaceability, their instantaneity and their resistance to the temporal
The Athlone Press, 1987), p. 69. Supra chapter four, pp. 176-221. 
82 Supra introduction, p. 1.
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,,83syntheses of memory.
An affect could be a sound, a colour, a smile, a touch, or anything that has the 
power to move one and to induce feelings and desires. As Woodward 
summarises:
"Affects are structured and interpreted in systems made up of dispositifs, 
libidinal dispositions that compete to exploit the energies of libidinal 
events."84
These set-ups conduct energies into other, perhaps more stable or durable, 
systems and structures. Political institutions often use political manipulation to 
channel fervour to dissent and change society away from violent and disruptive 
eruptions towards more acceptable and calmer paths of action. In such a way 
systems can be said to direct libidinal intensities into more moderate and stable 
activities. Pornography is a regulated allowance of this.
Communities are formed and stabilized through the allowed allotment or 
direction of libidinal energy into spectator sports and leisure activities. Lyotard 
himself channels the cynicism of Libidinal Economy towards these systems that 
are themselves originated and formed through libidinal intensities. These 
systems include theory as well as politics and economics. The most successful 
of these systems tend to become hegemonic in their right or choice of direction 
for exploiting or interpreting libidinal intensities, whilst simultaneously denying 
through their rhetoric or theoretical premises their own libidinal origins. 
Lyotard asserts:
"It is necessary to alter the course of the destiny that pushes thought 
towards the concept, otherwise one will manufacture a libidinal economy
83 1.H. Grant in Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, p. xiii.
84 A. Woodward, University of Queensland, 2006. "Lyotard" in The Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. Available at: http://www.ieD.utm.edu/.
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which will resemble a trivial political economy, that is an ideology with 
pretensions to order, incapable of grasping the duplicity of the said 
economic moments. It is necessary to let the alleged theoretical field be 
swept by the tumult of intensities, even the most difficult to accept 
"theoretically". No one can say that they are up to such a task, everyone 
seeks to flee these intensities and their undesirability in the direction of 
the system and its binary ideal."85
Lyotard reveals the dissimulation that also occurs within any such systems. 
In placing libidinal intensity and the skin it forms as an originary starting point, 
he manages to open up not just the libidinal skin but languages, political, 
economic and theoretical systems. In this way, Lyotard neither creates an 
outside space-time for nor does he champion affects, singularities, intensities 
and libidinal energy over systems, theory, structures, concepts and 
representation. If systems can hide or dissimulate affects then affects can also 
dissimulate systems. It is plausible following this libidinal logic that a stable 
system can be destabilised and disrupted through an intense investment.
A traditional definition of a dispositif would be as a heterogeneous body of 
discourses, propositions, laws and scientific statements. It is the network that 
binds these together, forming a grid of intelligibility that governs the way that 
they interact. Lyotard uses this term in his attempts to affirm the positivity of 
the negative and libidinal deposits, rather than mapping the exclusions and 
disparities produced. He writes:
"It is the production of new libidinal operators that is positive. Thepositif 
is also a positing, an investment, the 'dispositif a disposition to invest, a 
cathexis. As such, the 'dispositif is subject to economic movements and 
displacements, an aspect which the retention of the French term, by 
combining the dis-place with the dis-pose, movement with expenditure 
helps to convey."8
85 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
86 1.H. Grant in J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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Lyotard devises an imaginative libidinal fiction in order to conjure a vivid 
image for his theoretical premises and fictions. This begins on the very first 
page with the dissection of the libidinal body, as previously quoted within this 
chapter, being cut open and spread out to form a flat, band-like surface. This 
libidinal band creates a region on which bursts of libidinal intensity of an event 
or events to take place and run into the dispositifs that channel and form a grid 
of intelligibility for their energy. The image of a libidinal band enables us to 
approach the pornographical surface, bodily and libidinally invested.
This libidinal band, or pornographical surface, forms a material, a skin- 
like material, but not yet an organised body but a figure of dismemberment, 
without a fixed referent, as yet. 87 When in motion this libidinal band circulates, 
in an aleatory fashion, so fast that it glows red with heat. Libidinal energy is not 
yet invested at this point. As the skin rotates, full of drifting affects, it begins to 
slow and cool down, in doing so it forms the disjunctive bar, a movement of 
displaceability on the spot; the time of this disjunctive bar whirling in its 
libidinal journey; a strange witnessing. He notes:
"... Being singular, produces no memory, this segment only ever being 
where it is in an ungraspable time, a tense, and therefore what was 
'previously' journeyed through does not exist: acephalia, time of the 
unconscious."88
As this bar slows it invests in whatever region is available. In becoming 
disjunctive, this bar 'separates the this from the not-this'. This is the 
commencement of the libidinal band transforming into regions of rational and 
representative thought. The bar eventually comes to a standstill and forms a 
stable disjunction. As this disjunctive bar turns on its own axis it produces a
87 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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theatrical volume.89 This specific dispositif on the libidinal skin is the one that 
creates a theatrical space for theory and representation. Lyotard writes:
"The bar becomes a frontier, not to be crossed on pain of confusion, sin 
against the concept, transgression, stupidity, madness, primitive thought. 
The bar becomes a boundary, the boundary of a stage: over there the not- 
this, here the this. End of dissimulation, beginning of value, and of 
ambivalence. For to go from the not-this to the this, it will now be 
necessary to pay: it will cost a great deal to have the not-this over there. 
To pay to enter the over there, to get on stage. To have: the manner of 
being what one is not, prosthesis which supposes negation. And time also 
begins with synthesis of the now, of the no longer, of the already more, 
always to be renewed since the temporal poles are 'from now on ' held in 
exteriority, in relation to each other, at the same time that they are co- 
posed, composed on either side of what separates them. Montage and the 
stage and narrative time."90
This theatrical space, a region or dispositif on the libidinal band that has no 
inside nor outside, has an inside and an outside, a clearly marked disjunction 
between this and the not-this. The comic neologism of the pornographical 
surface, sutures this disjunction, weaving, unthreading with careless humour, 
reiterating the corporeality of the body.
Lyotard's objective is to reveal the fictive nature of the theoretical closure 
of the political economy; to re-describe space, objects and labour in terms that 
are resistant to the closed economy of rule of capital. The key to the way in 
which he accomplishes this is by disclosing the way in which thought is 
restricted to the conceptual through the enclosure within this 'theatre of 
representation'. This theatre consists of three spaces that correspond to, what he 
terms, the backstage, the stage and the auditorium. These three enclosed spaces 
are located in opposition to a fourth open space that constitutes the space of the 
world outside of the theatre.
88 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
89 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, pp. 
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According to this representational system the viewing subject is located 
inside of it and the impact is one of seduction rather than illusion.91 As Lyotard 
remarks:
"I should say seduction rather than illusion because the subject who looks 
into [Brunellesch's] box, if he is not mad, knows very well that he is 
looking at the Baptistry itself. For those who sit in the theatre it is the 
same.... This representation is not trompe 1'ceil and it is not even illusion, 
it is seduction in the proper sense of the term: one is divided from one's 
self, there is scission."92
A techne of comic humour is invaluable for the pornographical discourses and 
industries. It is this libidinal set-up that enables a viewer to become fascinated 
and seduced by the flavours of fantasy that they can bring to pornography; 
fascinated by technologies of self.
Lyotard attempts to illustrate the designation of the space of the political 
as theatrical representation by drawing a parallel with the disposition of the 
Greek polis. The polis is constructed upon a first and outer limit that serves to 
distinguish the city from the outside. The stage is designed as a circle with an 
empty centre. The limit between stage and auditorium is this empty circle, 
which one enters to speak. A third and final limit distinguishes the backstage 
apparatus and determines who can speak and how they may do this. Lyotard 
provides the example:
"Women never speak in the centre and therefore they never say anything. 
Not everyone gets on stage. And then you have the process of 
effacement: wealth, friendship, pressure groups, rhetoric, which are ways 
of getting to speak in the centre, backstage elements, which have to be 
effaced so that the political stage can be constituted."93
90 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
91 See chapter two of this thesis where fascination is raised as the condition of an event, or as that which 
keeps one fastened onto the libidinal skin as it turns. Supra chapter two, pp. 82-125.
92 J-F Lyotard, Dispositifs Pulsionnels. (Paris: Union Generate, 1973), p. 256.
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This analysis of the representational space shows that the democratic right to 
free speech in the centre is distinguished by a number of surrounding limits and 
restraints. There is also a recognition that any attempts to breakdown the limit 
between the stage and backstage does not destroy the theatre of representation 
which is maintained by the continued existence of the outer limit between the 
auditorium and the outside. The unbleached outer limit has the effect of 
creating a barrier which puts aside affects and establishes concepts as 
'extraterritorial'; as Lyotard puts it, it is 'the setting aside of intensities and their 
weakening by the means of their staging."94 The pornographical surface can be 
posed as representing immoral concerns, but in doing so its comic hinge is 
missed.
In order to stage one must establish a representation within the limits of the 
theatre as opposed to the reality of the outside that the theatre must represent. 
However part of this process of staging the representation of reality requires the 
imposition of its rules upon it and so culminates in the reduction of 'reality' to 
that which can be represented, and according to the hegemonic rules in play - 
bring to surface how the notion of representation in Lyotard's work, is 'outside 
of language'. The 'real' becomes the representable and is reduced to an absent 
object of representation. Lyotard refers to this as the placing of the outside on 
the inside.95 As Woodward remarks:
"Lyotard's image of theory as theatre is based on the etymological 
relationship between the two terms; they are both derived from the Greek 
theasthai, meaning to look at, contemplate, or behold. The theorist is like 
a spectator who views the representation of the world (outside the theatre) 
on the stage (inside the theatre)."96
93 J-F. Lyotard, Dispositifs Pulsionnels, 
94 J-F. Lyotard, Dispositifs Pulsionnels, 
95 J-F. Lyotard, Dispositifs Pulsionnels, 
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The theatre of representation creates a de-realisation that makes everything 
within it a product of conceptual representation; in doing so it excludes the 
outside reality that it seeks to represent, and it appears in the theatre as the 
absent original of representation. In resistance to the seduction of the rule of 
representation, Lyotard argues for a figural affirmation of the singularity of the 
event that is irreducible to the theatre of representation. He writes:
"Certainly not a libidinal theatre then, no density, intensities running here 
and there, setting up, escaping, without ever being imprisoned in the 
volume of the stage and auditorium. Theatricality and representation, far 
from being taken as libidinal givens, a fortiori metaphysical, results from 
a certain labour on the labyrinthine and moebian band, a labour which 
prints those particular folds and twists, the effect of which is a box closed 
upon itself, filtering impulses and allowing only those to appear on the 
stage what will come to be known as the exterior, satisfying the conditions 
of interiority. The representative chamber is an energetic dispositif. To 
describe and follow its functioning that's what needs to be done. No need 
to do a critique of metaphysics (or of political economy, which is the same 
thing), since critique presupposes and ceaselessly creates this very 
theatricality; rather be inside and forget it."97
In proposing the pornographical as an 'ana-aesthetic', as we shall see in chapter 
four, its surface is one that is simultaneously aesthetic and non-aesthetic, 
according to the differing permutations of libidinal intensities; this kind of 
singularity or surface yields an ethics without recourse to universalism, but one 
of a rhizomatic or ana-linguistic neologism of comic humour. Lyotard is 
helpful in looking at the 'how' of libidinal intensities and their operation in the 
establishment of communal meanings. His notions of the Great and 
concentratory zeros critique the semiotic and linguistic schools of language, in 
their ability to reduce and erase the presence of skin. The pornographical is
96 A. Woodward, University of Queensland, 2006. "Lyotard" in The Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. Available at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/.
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both the libidinal band and the tensor events it generates, as we shall see.
It is through his image of the libidinal band that Lyotard endeavours to 
highlight that which representation excludes and simultaneously that which it 
affirms from the intense singularities on the band. In conjuring the visual 
images of how this band operates, Lyotard introduces a point of maximum 
intensity in the figure of the tensor, set against a back-drop of a variety of 
apparatus of de-intensification, in the form of the bar, the great and the 
concentratory zeros. As previously discussed it is the bar that provides the 
means of de-intensification of the intensities on the libidinal surface. It is the 
turning and slowing of the bar that gives signification to the intensities. It 
creates exclusion in its conceptual representation to be re-introduced the band 
by twisting in the process of producing a theatrical volume. This de- 
intensification of the band allows the great and the concentratory zeros to come 
into play on the libidinal surface.
These two zeros are two of the many and unlimited dispositifs formed 
instantaneously on the libidinal skin. This occurs with the de-intensification of 
the turning of the bar, when the libidinal surface is folded back in the creation of 
the theatrical volume that creates the division of an inside and an outside. The 
inside is shaped by what is viewed as happening on the outside. This outside of 
the great Zero Lyotard uses as a kind of general term that refers to God[s], the 
phallus, the Platonic world of forms, and other authentic modes of production. 
He writes:
"All these instances ... are effects of the slowing down of the bar, 
referring the intensities running through the band to an elsewhere which 
they appear to lack once they have been confined to the interiority of a 
volume. The great Zero is thus an empty centre which reduces the present 
complexity of what happens instantaneously on the band to a 'chamber of
97 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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presence and absence.'"98
Lyotard makes clear the nihilism inherent in all forms of signification. 
Lyotard defines the two dispositifs of zero as being part of the 'same monster'. 
The two zeros are posed in a relationship to each other, not one based on 
opposition, for they are "unclear and indistinct like the principal pulsions of 
Eros and Thanatos, life and death", they dissimulate each other." Lyotard 
remarks:
".. .The same monster's looting hind-quarters, 'puts the system of 
reproduction at risk' by jealously looting every over-excited intensity in 
order to plug them into the same circuits as established by the first zero, to 
the point of immobilizing the (in)organic body the zero produces, 
intensifying the concentratory process to the point of becoming fatal to the 
stability it serves." 100
Alongside this complex and intense operation of reproducing the same 
Lyotard introduces the simulacrum, the exorbitant and the tensor. The 
simulacrum is the name that Lyotard provides for the exchangeable based on 
equivalence. The ancient thought of Plato is often used as a starting point for 
any discussion of the term simulacrum. For Plato the objective authenticity of 
any truth can be deduced from the distance and nature of the relationship of the 
copy to its original and Ideal Form. In this way Plato distinguishes between a 
good and a bad copy. A good copy or icon is one that inwardly through its 
essence participates the Idea that has founded it and as such can be said to bear 
an essential resemblance to this Ideal. A false copy or simulacrum, however, 
only repeats the external appearance of the icon without essentially participating 
in the Ideal Form that has founded it. A simulacrum is an imitative copy that
98 1.H. Grant in J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, p. xiii. 
99 1.H. Grant in J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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provides only an external relation of similitude.
These crudely sketched Platonic ideas of mimesis, truth and simulacrum 
will be discussed in greater detail throughout the following chapters in this 
thesis, along with the difficulties they raise with regards to what could be 
considered a politically dangerous establishing of a fixed and static 
measurability of truth and identity as essence, based upon an authentic 
relationship that reflects the purity of God in its closeness to the Ideal Forms 
rather than human imperfection. The pornographical surface will be looked at 
tin terms of being a mimetic copy, for which there is no ideal or pure 
first/origin. As Lyotard indicates, here is a theory that provides a fixed and 
universal truth based on a representation of something that is outside of the 
theatrical volume, and therefore absent within.
Lyotard bases his analysis of the simulacrum on Augustine's theological 
theory of language. Rewrites:
"Thus his analysis of Augustine's theory of simulacra establishes the 
generalized equivalence and exchangeability of signs for things due to the 
participation of the latter in a relation of similarity that subsists amongst 
all beings, such unity being guaranteed by (and guaranteeing) God's unity 
with natural things and the mirrorical unity of simulacra insofar as 
language, second-hand (or third-hand for Plato) and representative, is used 
to display these relations. Exchangeability, then, is premised on 
similarity." 101
To digress, though not far, Wittgenstein also raises a similar concern with 
Augustine's theory in his introduction to his book, Philosophical Investigations. 
He begins with a quotation from Augustine's Confessions (I, 8):
"When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved 
towards something I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by 
the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention
100 1.H. Grant in J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, p. xv. 
101 1.H. Grant in J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of 
all peoples: the expression the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of 
other parts of the body, and the tone of the body, and the tone of the voice 
which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or 
avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their 
proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what 
objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these 
signs, I used them to express my own desires." 102
This quotation reveals a specific picture on Augustine's thoughts on the essence 
of human language. Here every word has a meaning that is precise and not 
open to misinterpretation. The meaning is correlated to the word as it stands for 
a particular object. He remarks:
"Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of 
word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I 
believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of 
people's names, and only secondarily of certain actions and properties, 
and of remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself." 103
For both Wittgenstein and Lyotard, Augustine has an over-simplified idea 
of language and its use that whilst it does describe a system of communication, 
not everything that we call language is this system. Wittgenstein provides the 
example of a game:
"It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects 
about on a surface according to certain rules..." - and we replied: You 
seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You can make 
your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games."104
The process of learning and using a language are far more complex than merely 
learning to repeat a word and being able to learn its corresponding object.
102 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1996), p. 2e.
103 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
104 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
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Wittgenstein would define these as processes resembling language. 105 For 
Wittgenstein these processes are what he would name a 'language-game'. 
Wittgenstein would call the process of naming things and repeating words after 
someone else a language-game, along with the using words in learning a song 
such as ring-a-ring-a-roses and a primitive language can be a language-game. 
"I shall call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is 
woven, the 'language-game'."106
Lyotard also draws upon Wittgenstein's notion of language-games and 
uses them to look at incommensurable differences between discourses or 
language -games and the questions of justice that this raises. For example, 
msysogony forms a discourse or language-game with it rules of engagement and 
humour, entwining with other language-games and being-part of the hegemonic 
make-up of these. Both Wittgenstein and Lyotard assert their concerns over 
Augustine's lack of emphasis on the differences between things. Any language 
or language-game is complicated through the use and actions of language and 
its users. For Augustine speech mirrors or represents one soul and can be taken 
literally. It is God who illuminates truth and provides knowledge through the 
soul that is reborn whereas the body, an illusionary simulacrum, as so often is 
the case, is regulated to the lower depths of the physical, and therefore less 
worthy and false, world. This is achieved through what Lyotard names as 
Augustine's 'hierarchy of similitude', which he establishes in his polemic 
against the Roman pagans, The City of God. 101
Lyotard names both Plato's and Augustine's notions of the simulacrum as
105 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
106 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
107 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, pp. 67- 70
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the beginning of the 'ghettoization of art and artists', well before the 
bourgeoisie claimed the right of aesthetic judgement. 108 To Plato, art such as 
poetry, narration and theatre are based on the art of mimesis, by which he means 
imitation. Such arts are for Plato false and therefore simulacrum, as they only 
imitate the appearance of things and not the fullness of their essence or being. 
They are far away in their resemblance to the truth of things, to their Ideal 
Form. Lyotard asserts:
".. .Divine citizenship" in his works. Augustine wishes to rescue and 
maintain the theology of the natural, discursive and philosophical at the 
expense of the mythic, theatrical, gestural, poetic and the civic, political 
theologies. 109
He does this through his theory of the simulacrum, which for Lyotard is a 
theory of 'generalised similitude', in that it forms the basis of semiotics. He 
notes:
".. .Each thing resembles another thing, and given this there must be a 
Resemblance, a Similitude, by participation in which similar things 
similar."110
According to Lyotard Augustine's simulacrum is the word or the son as 
the relationship between the holy trinity. He writes:
".. .The image or simulacrum relationship between two terms has to be 
one not only of similitude, but of engenderment: the son, exactly like the 
father is also what emanates from him. All things are therefore in a 
relation of resemblance if they are not all images of another; and of course 
a hierarchy of things is established which depends on the contents of the 
similitudo (and correctively those of dissimilitude) in their 
interrelations."111
108 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, p. 68. This will be looked at in greater detail in chapter four, supra 
pp. 176-221.
109 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
no J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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And what of dissimilitude Lyotard asks. He asserts that following Augustine's 
logic what would be the most dissimilar, the most de-simulated and bearing the 
least resemblance to the simulacrum, would be the body, the surface where all 
events take place.
Within this hierarchy of generalised similitude, the truth of being is 
replaced or recovered as a sign.
".. .Turns out to be situated outside the sign, and even, since Augustine 
conceives of the sign under the category of the metaphor, above it. This 
being signifies something other than what it is; it signifies that of which it 
is the simulacrum, but, because it is not what it signifies, it also signifies 
the distance which keeps them apart, dissimilitude, the lack of being 
(manque d'etre} which separates them." 112
And even lack slips into this deferral of meaning. Lyotard again charts the 
disappearance of the pulsional and pornographical body in a discourse of denial 
where the present intensities of bodies are almost erased. He writes:
".. .Where the concept of conscious time, ceaselessly referring the event 
from the instance to instance in the to-ing and fro-ing of the future and the 
past, will demand that the entire network of absences be hung on a 
Presence, on a Present omni temporally real, but itself is absent, where 
with this tissue of referrals the semiotic machine is henceforth in position 
ready to close every intensity up in a sign, as a value standing for 
something absent."113
It is this aspect of any such representational theory that Lyotard would term as 
nihilistic in its denial that it is itself libidinal. All representational theories are 
libidinal dispositifs for Lyotard, and signs are inscribed and ex-scribed onto 
skins. It is bodies that are marked or that bear the traces of libidinal intensities. 
Lyotard wishes to open up the road towards libidinal currency by force. A 
sign to Lyotard may well be considered an essential ingredient to any theory of
111 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
112 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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communication, in that a sign replaces something for someone. He writes:
"... A thing is posited as a message, that is, as a medium enriched with a 
sequence of coded elements, and that its addressee, himself in possession 
of the code, is capable, through decoding the message, of retrieving the 
information that the sender meant him to receive."114
The thing is immediately "hollowed out" and in being so becomes a substitute 
and replaces that information for the addressee. 115 Lyotard suggests that this 
can regarded in two different ways: on the one hand the sign replaces what it 
signifies. Lyotard makes reference to the Platonic theory of Ideas in providing 
an example of how "the sign at the same time screens and calls up what it 
announces and conceals". 116
On the other hand if the sign's process of substitution is thought of 
metonymically rather than metaphorically under the name of exchange, then the 
signifier is postponed, and a reiteration of this postponement is set up. He 
writes:
"... Is no longer signification (what is encoded), then, which the sign 
substitutes - the trick is invented: that signification itself is constituted by 
signs alone, that it carries on endlessly, that we never have anything but 
references, that signification is always deferred, meaning is never present 
in flesh and blood."117
hi his endeavours to combat the nihilistic aspects of the semiotic sign, 
Lyotard proposes a reinterpretation of the sign as the tensor. The tensor is a 
duplicitous sign: one of its potentialities is the semiotic sign, which is able to be 
inscribed in existing structures of meaning or networks of significations which
113 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
114 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
115 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
116 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
117 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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are unremitting metonymic referrals. The other potentiality of the tensor 
contains the residual possibilities for other meanings or for the Deleuzian 
actualisation of virtualities. This side of the tensor disrupts and exceeds the 
system, dissimulating and flowing into new systems and structures. 118 The 
tensor is a singularity, a libidinal incommensurability within any ephemeral 
language or language-games: the ready-made comic terrain of the 
pornographical.
Lyotard asserts the importance of the occurrence of dematerialization 
whenever there is a semiotic potentiality of the sign. He states:
"See what you have done: the material is immediately annihilated. 
Where there is a message, there is no material. Adorno said this 
admirably of Schoenberg: the material, he explained, in serialism does 
not count as such, but only as a relation between terms. And in Boulez 
there will be nothing but relations, not only between pitches, but also 
between intensities, timbres, durations. Dematerialization." 119
This dematerialization occurs in simultaneity as the signs inscription or perhaps 
ex-scription into a structural meaning and as a result offers the libido "new 
opportunities for intensification, the fabrication of signs through 
'dematerialisation' providing material for the extension of tensors". 120
'A dance includes suspense, as music includes silence', within reason there 
is passion and with tension there is dissimulation. That structural meanings 
such as the semiotic, referred signs, act, as a cover is both their secret and their
101dissimulation. He remarks:
".. .The opening up of diachronic, which is only a drawing out of the tense
118 See chapter four and the conclusion of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of Deleuze and a mirco- 
ethics of the virtual.
119 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
120 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
121 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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of the compact immobile tensor into an always past and a still to come, an 
even now and a not yet, into the game of de-presence". 122
What then happens to the someone, the subject for whom the message, that has 
replaced the thing and displaced its libidinal energy, is for? This T can be 
amidst the dissimulation and dissimilitude of things, and this T can be a nexus
of interwoven textures and texts, each one pulling the term towards itself. 
Lyotard writes:
"The I is constituted in this relation of the sign as both addressee... and
1 **! A ^^
the decoder and inventor of codes."
But this T can never be in possession of the code, a peculiar witnessing of the 
sexual comic gesture, of the pornographical.
122 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
123 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
124 J-F. Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, 
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CHAPTER FOUR:
Economies of Witnessing: An 'Ana-Aesthetic' Mimetics.
1. The Pornographicars Aesthetics.
This chapter proposes to explore how, and the degree to which, a techne of 
comic humour forms the aesthetics of the pornographical, and forms an integral 
part of the shifting/porous socio-political surface of the pornographical, and its 
relationship to pleasure, that establishes its meaning. The term aesthetics is 
itself historical, complex and intricate, broadly definable as that branch of 
philosophy that deals with the arts on the one hand, and with the nature of 
aesthetic responses and ethical judgements on the other hand. The 
pornographical tends to be categorised as a lower part of cultural expression, 
and as such it fails to be credited with being able to engage its participants in an 
aesthetic relationship or interaction. 1 Given that pornography is far from being 
a coherent or stable cultural category/ discourse to define, what are the 
demarcations that distinguish pornography, pornographic culture and the rest of 
what is to be regarded as culturally valuable, that pornography is refused the 
context of being an expressive cultural and aesthetic form.
During the previous century defining the category of 'art' became less 
reliant on ideas of authorship, originality, uniqueness and Benjamin's concept of 
an aura.2 The erosions of the class-based classification systems in the arts have 
disclosed a rapport between pornography and art. Pornography could be posed
1 See Raymond Williams work on the difficulties and the political problematics of dividing culture into 
categories of 'high' and 'low'. See R. Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. 
(London: Fontana Press, 1988), and R. Williams, Culture and Materialism. (London: Verso Books, 2005).
2 See W. Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction " in Illuminations, edited 
and introduced by Hannah Arendt. (London: Fontana Press, 1992.) For Benjamin a work of art is one that 
is original, marked with a ritualistic value of its place and time. He hesitates but his thoughts lead him in 
the direction that in an age where objects, including art objects can be so readily reproducible, through 
photography and cinema, then it makes little sense to discuss art in terms of having an aura. Benjamin 
begins to rethink the now of time when 'blasted' out of an historical continuum.
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as a site of expression of a cultural, sexual unconscious, exposing the specific 
obsessional repetitions that find their formation within the unconscious - 
unresolved conflicts, traumas, torments and dream neologisms that are 
repeatedly expressed, returned to and repeated afresh throughout the artistic and 
literary, and musical genres. Kipnis argues that both art and perversion share a 
similar point of origin; their respective differences lie in the way that art 
rechannels the same perverse impulsive and energetic elements of sexual 
excitation, into the more socially acceptable and elevated 'package' of aesthetic 
language.3 Kipnis suggests from her research that the degree of sublimation 
involved in an aesthetic response requires 'distance rather than engagement', 
and is dependent on educational capital, which is itself a mechanism for 
enforcing class distinctions.
Aesthetics are important to how 'we' define ourselves discursively as a 
culture and as a myriad of identities. Pornography signifies in its meaning, a 
body of consistent work marked with the familiar traces of repetition and the 
obsession of specific themes, one that utilises aesthetic devices in order to 
expose and 'send up' the realm of aesthetics - taste, delicacy, beauty, manners, 
social and moral conventions - all of which pornography sets itself the task of 
energetically violating. This is a pivotal trademark of the pornographical. 
Historically specific, class bound, radicalised, the realm of aesthetics is cruel to 
those outside of its discourse. Kipnis defines pornography as a 'working-class 
hero' and locates its glamour in its devotion to thwarting and challenging
3 L. Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America, p. 89, L. O' 
Toole, Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire, and B. Haver, "Pornographically man dwells" 
and "Art's -work (or fragments for a preface to the genet commentaries) " in Issues in Contemporary 
Culture and Aesthetics: Volume 12, edited by S. Golding /johnny de philo. (Jan van Eyck Akademie: 
Maastricht, 2001), pp. 8 -13 and 108 -111.
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aesthetic conventions, in an effort to disrupt our precious sensibilities at every 
turn. She writes:
... It produces a body of images that are too blatantly out of the 
unconscious, too unaesthetically written in the language of obsession, 
compulsion, perversion, infantile desires, rage, fear, pain and misogyny."4
It is in this sense that Kipnis dubs pornography an anti-aesthetic, a space of 
political and social significance which highlights some of the cultural sore spots 
in 'elucidating not only the connection between sex and the social, but between 
our desires, our "selves", and the casual everyday brutality of cultural 
conformity.' 5 This usage of the term anti-aesthetic is similar to Hal Foster's 
concept of an "anti-aesthetic" with which he names specific cross-cultural 
practices. He writes:
". . .Cross-disciplinary in nature, that is sensitive to cultural forms 
engaged in a politic (e.g., feminist art) or rooted in a vernacular - that is, to 
forms that deny the idea of a privileged aesthetic realm."6
Foster wished to question the validity of the aesthetic categories in the 
contemporary cultural practices of art. He sought not to reinvent a form of 
modernist nihilism or of affirmative negation that seeks a space beyond 
representation, a time of pure presence, but rather a critique cultural 
representations and social identities. Art, for Foster is never outside of its 
politics.7 Whilst taking on board these two similar concepts of an anti-aesthetic, 
this thesis is putting forward the pornographical as an 'ana-aesthetic', both an 
aesthetic and an anti-aesthetic, a political and ethical surface that is not merely
4 L. Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America, 
5 L. Kipnis, Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America, 
6 H. Foster (ed), The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. (Bay Press: Washington, 1985), p. 
xv.
7 H. Foster (ed), The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, pp. 
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counter-cultural, but is culture itself. The pornographical is being proposed as 
establishing a kind of bodily ethics, generated through its political relationship 
to pleasure; one that does not present an attached universalism or series of deep- 
rooted essentialisms, neither does it privilege temporality, and pose an ethical 
meaning in terms of being 'in suspension' or 'undecidable'. This chapter is 
putting forward the pornographical as a kind of 'rhizomatic' surface that allows 
for a fractal ethical meaning of a 'mimetic shudder', a comic gesture, and a form 
of judgement as a discursive economy to any specific culture.8
1.1. The Emicalitv of Mimetic Pleasure.
The pleasure gained from the mimetic art of the comic differs from that of 
tragedy. Aristotle defines a tragedy as "an imitation ... of events that evoke fear 
and pity."9 This is the aim of any tragic plot: to excite a response of fear and 
pity. In placing the primacy of any successful tragedy, and the audience's 
emotional response to it, with that of the plot, Aristotle details two key variables 
that need to fluctuate within the series of events of the tragic plot. He writes:
"One is the direction of change (from good fortune to bad, or from bad to 
good); the other is the moral status of the person or persons involved in 
the change (virtuous or wicked)."10
In a successful tragedy characters or the plot lines must demonstrate hamartia, 
error. Hamartia to the Greeks was not necessarily an error of moral content 
rather the type of errors made in ignorance or misjudgement, not through a
8 This draws upon Deleuze and Guattari's notion of a' rhizome', a process whereby plants, animals, 
and humans intersect roots of things, and merge with them. See G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, "Introduction: 
Rhizome" in A Thousand Plateaus translated by Brian Massumi. (London: The Athlone Press, 1996), pp. 
3-25.
9 Aristotle, Poetics, translated and introduced by M. Heath. (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 52a2f.
10 M. Heath in Aristotle, Poetics, 
179
Holly Mountain The Porno graphical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
sense of wickedness or evil-doing. This way no sense of outrage or disgust 
arises to interfere with the audience's ability to emote fear and pity. For this to 
be achieved Aristotle recommends a broadly prescribed plot.
An ethical pleasure that arises from a responsive tragedy is one of 
katharsis. Katharsis brings a sense of pleasure from the relief or purification of 
the excess of the emotions of fear and pity. For Aristotle and his Greek 
contemporaries there is an intimate link between emotion and virtue. He 
asserts:
" (Emotions)....Are not irrational impulses. They are grounded in our 
understanding, since an emotional response to a situation presupposes an 
interpretation of it (as fear implies an assessment of the situation as one 
that threatens pain or injury); and since such responses can be more or less 
appropriate to the situation, they are open to ethical evaluation."11
Aristotle asserts that a beneficial and ethical effect of tragic plots is the 
regulation of people's emotions through a katharsis of pity and fear.
Comic pleasure requires a different kind of approach. As Bergson phrases
** 
it, comic pleasure demands a "momentary anesthesia of the heart". Emotional 
indifference is a natural environment for comic pleasure to thrive, for emotional 
states disrupt the possibilities for laughter. Bergson states that the bulk of 
comic scenarios are created through a series of reciprocal interference. Freud 
develops this formula for the comic further by defining comic pleasure as 
arising from a comparison of difference between two expenditures. Now 
katharsis and cathexis are different methods of movement and regulation of the 
psyche or ethical state of being. From Aristotle, katharsis is used with regards
11 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by H. Rackham. (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 
1996), 1106bl8-23.
12 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, pp. 10 -11. Supra chapter three, pp. 
126-175.
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to a purification or cleansing of one's emotional states whereas Freud's use of 
cathexis indicates a process whereby a quantity of psychical, libidinal energy 
becomes attached to, and therefore invested in, an object or to an idea. The 
comic and its accompanying pleasurable feelings are one means of dispersing or 
rather discharging and displacing libidinal cathexis, maintaining movement in 
the psychical, and therefore bodily, mechanisms of identities. However, a 
difficulty lies in ensuring the comic and its release of cathectic energy. Freud 
notes:
"Comic pleasure and the effect by which it is known - laughter - can only 
come about if this difference is unutilizable and capable of discharge. We 
obtain no pleasurable effect but at most a transient sense of pleasure in 
which the characteristic of being comic does not emerge, if the difference 
is put to another use as soon as it is recognised." 13
As Freud points out that there are cases whereby the comic appears out of habit, 
others out of circumstances and even from an observer's point of view. There 
are also times where the comic occurs amidst the most unfavourable of 
conditions. Freud locates two favourable conditions in a toxic mood of 
cheerfulness, in which everything seems comic, and an attunement through the 
expectation of the comic, often through habitual situations. 14 An unfavourable 
condition for comic pleasure to arise is that of a person's preoccupation with a 
mental work of intellectual or imaginative activity. He writes:
".. .Work that pursues serious aims interferes with the capacity of the 
cathexes for discharge - cathexes which the work requires for its 
displacements - so that the only unexpectedly large differences in 
expenditure are able to break through to comic pleasure." 15
13 S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
14 Freud provides an example of comic attunement in attending the theatre. One laughs as one recollects 
having laughed on such an occasion before. As Freud comments it is "in the expectation of laughing that 
he laughs when he sees a comic actor come on to the stage, before the latter can have made any attempt at 
making him laugh. For that reason, too, one admits to feeling ashamed afterwards over what one was able 
to laugh at in the theatre." S. Freud, Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, pp 
181
Holly Mountain The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
However if the mode of preoccupying thought is interrupted then there is a 
chance for a burst of comic pleasure to take place.
Another unfavourable condition for the cathartic discharge of comic 
pleasure is the attention is directed to the comparison from which the comic 
may emerge. Rather like jokes, the comic process must precede in its journey 
quite unobserved. In agreement with Bergson, Freud argues that the 
comparison of expenditures must remain automatic if it is to produce comic 
pleasure. Freud places the comic process as forming part of the preconscious. 
He states:
".. .Such processes, which run their course in the preconscious but lack the 
cathexis of attention with which consciousness is linked, may aptly be 
given the name of 'automatic'."16
The next and perhaps most intense unfavourable condition for the comic 
process, Freud names as the generation of affect, whereby the comic is 
interfered with if the situation from which it may extend effectuates at the same 
time a release of a strong affect. He puts forward that in each particular case the 
affects, disposition and attitude of the individual 'format' the comic in a way 
that it emerges and vanishes according to the standpoint of each particular 
person; an absolute comic exists only in exceptional instances.
The contingency of the comic is greater than of a joke, for the comic is 
found and a joke is made. Although an indifferent attitude is best disposed to 
being overcome with comic pleasure it is possible to laugh in the midst of 
stormy or strained emotions. Freud notes:
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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".. .Where there is a release of affect one can observe a particularly strong 
difference in expenditure bring about the automatism of release." 17
Finally Freud notes that comic pleasure can be generated by any other 
pleasurable accompanying circumstances, and offers pleasure as some sort of 
'contagious effect.' The spheres of sexuality and obscenity offer the most likely 
opportunities for comic pleasure. Freud writes:
"...The amplest occasions for obtaining comic pleasure alongside 
pleasurable sexual excitement; for they can show human beings in their 
dependence on bodily needs (degradation) or they can reveal the physical 
demands lying behind the claim of mental love (unmasking)." 18
In suggesting that the pornographical is a tensor sign, allows for its surface 
to be placed as a 'prehension' or rhizomatic assemblage that is simultaneously 
able to contour its own and other discursive economies. The pornographical is 
able to create an economy of witnessing cultural memories of sexual fantasies, 
fetishes and taboos. The ability to produce comic pleasure is an integral part of 
pornography's 'ana -aesthetics' in that it allows for an exposure of and indeed 
thinly conceals this witnessing and collaboration both at a cultural and at a 
personal level.
As a tensor sign and an economy, pornography is able to provide and point 
to spaces within the representational systems, rather than beyond them. In this 
way a movement both other to itself but paradoxically integral to itself is set on 
its path. This movement that, through a techne of comic humour, releases, or 
rather discharges a psychical expenditure that displaces its libidinal movement 
in copying and exceeding its non-relation -relational nexus. There is no rational 
possession of a pornographic 'code', but a kind of mimetic comportment that
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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comes through the intersubjective dimension that comic pleasure lends to the 
pornographical. Isabelle Stengers suggests that subjectivity is the name of 
mimesis, which happens in an objective world, or in a world that is objective. 19 
Both subjectivity and objectivity occur as an event, the terrain of which is 
virtual. It is the mimetic rhythms and movement of an event that make it real, 
or the process by which it is realised. As shown so far, the mimetic movement is 
and must, as an ethical reauirement, be realised in a bodv, in bodies. This is 
not to suggest that a body is realised, but that "what is realised in the body is 
currently perceived in the soul" (or within the residues of a mimetic bodily
comportment). The reality of the body is the realisation of the 'virtual 
actualisation' of the mimetic movement in the body, as we shall see.
Bodies are important in the world, a requirement to be in the world; a 
requirement for both appearance and essence and, as this thesis is moving away 
from such a paradigm, for the realisation and embodiment of the virtual 
actualisation of the mimetic movements in a body and other bodies. The 
relationships that bodies have in the world to the political are as a discursive 
necessity, ethical. In this way the ethics of pornography are about what a body, 
or bodies, can do through techniques of fantasy sex and fantasy sexual
identities.
"The "constructionist" view of the body - that the body is not an 
anatomical constant but a historical variable, a social construction - ought 
by rights to be serene. If the body consists only in and through its 
representations, across all the discourses in which it is invoked (medical, 
aesthetic, erotic, sartorial, legal, historical), if it truly evaporates into 
representation, becoming weightless, losing its old opacity and density,
19 I. Stengers, Power and Invention: Situating Science, translated by Paul Bains (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), pp. 3-20.
20 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and The Baroque, 
21 G. Deleuze, and F. Guattari,/4 Thousand Plateaus, 
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then in a sense the body should cease to be any kind of problem, for 
anyone. Entirely subsumed into the sphere of cultural work, indeed 
apparently becoming the principal arena of cultural activity, it sheds at last 
its primitive character and is fully assimilated and civilised."22
Pain is the one thing that manages to penetrate these myriads of representations 
that eat away at the actuality, and the constructionist view, of the body.
For Wittgenstein pain is at the limits of my language games, at the limits of 
my world. The body establishes itself as discourse's impassable limit: the 
material density of the body, its psychical drives and pulsions, its convulsions of 
pain and pleasure and the thickness of its enjoyment.23 Bryson summarises this 
in stating that:
"When meaning is identified with cultural convention, when it arises only 
in the interactive space between persons and is no longer to be located in 
anyone's head, paradoxically the body returns with an urgency it never 
before possessed. For pain marks the threshold at which the signifying 
contract and the language games that compose social reality come up 
against some kind of absolute limit: there is no sign i can exchange for my 
pain, it cannot be channelled into words, (only cries), it exists beyond my 
powers to represent it before others. Others, in turn, who know of me 
only through what i can do and be within the world of representation i 
share with them, are unable to know this pain of mine, which belongs to 
me alone and cannot be converted into signifying currency of any kind."24
Part of the pornography's cultural impact is its presentation of bodies, their 
sexualness, polymorphous perversities and libidinal fantasies. As a discursive 
economy the pornographical draws upon the 'lower' cultural tools of the body 
and of comic humour, in 'sending up' and utilising cultural aesthetics and 
representations of the body. This techne is being posed as the generating the 
presence and substance the pornographical surface; one that brings a kind of
22 N. Bryson, "House of Wax" in Cindy Sherman: 1975-1993, text by R. Krauss. (New York: Rizzoli 
Press: 1993), p. 218.
23 N. Bryson, "House of Wax" in Cindy Sherman: 1975-1993, 
24 N. Bryson, "House of Wax" in Cindy Sherman: 1975-1993, 
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non-universalising ethics, and does not privilege temporality or an abyssal 
logics. By turning now to Lyotard's development of a 'differend' and Derrida's 
notion of a 'passe-partout', this kind of ethics and its witnessing will be 
approached in more detail.
1.2. Identity as 'Lost Time': A Witnessing of the Immemorial.
Lyotard approaches these questions by creating what he would term a 
libidinal philosophy that goes beyond a representational theory. Using Sigmund 
Freud's work Lyotard, in his Heidegger and "the jews", looks at the 
possibilities of a disturbance that is unable to be registered by psychic 
mechanisms. Such a possibility would create a taking place of a witnessing that 
cannot be portrayed as either inside nor outside, nor can it be located at any 
particular point on a linear time scale, nor can it be termed as an abyss or an 
absence. Rewrites:
"This excitation need not be "forgotten", repressed according to 
representational procedures, nor through acting out. Its "excess "(of 
quantity, of intensity) exceeds the excess that gives rise (presence, place, 
and time) to the unconscious and the preconscious. It is "in excess" like 
air and earth are in excess for the life of a fish... We are confronted with a 
silence that does not make itself heard as silence."25
A double blow is deposited. Lyotard continues:
"The shock, the unconscious affect, to be like a cloud of energy particles 
that are not subject to serial laws, that are not organized into sets that can 
be thought in terms of words or images, that do not experience any 
attraction at all."26
This double blow comprises a first blow, the first excitation, is not registered as 
it upsets the apparatus with such "force". Lyotard compares it to a whistle that
25 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", translated by A. Michel and M. S. Roberts, p. 12.
26 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
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is inaudible to humans but not to dogs, or like infrared or ultraviolet light.27 The 
force of this excitation cannot be bound or placed within accordance with other 
forces. It is an 'unsayable something', a chance dynamic that may be traumatic 
or quite banal.28 Lyotard writes:
"The deposit left behind by "excessive" excitation, outside of the scene 
and obscene, is not a localizable object in the topology of the soul. This 
deposit is dissipated, widely dispersed like a thermal state of the system, 
which, remaining undetermined, is not workable."29
It must not be subsumed under forms of secondary repression, and be 
understood as something to be excluded according to various figures of 
representation. It is for this reason that Lyotard distinguishes anti-Semitism 
from xenophobia. The latter seeks to place otherness 'outside', an exclusion 
that is a dialectical impossibility. Lyotard asserts:
"(The former).. .Is one of the means of the apparatus of its culture to bind 
and represent as much as possible - to protect against - the originary 
terror, actively to forget it. It is the defensive side of its attack 
mechanisms."30
These manoeuvres attempt to signify "the jews", or the nomadic, 
unrepresentable difference that Lyotard names the differend, as the name of 
control over space and time that constitutes the possibilities of representation, 
and then to forget the cruelty it concomitantly performs. This is the operation 
that makes dialectics possible.
27 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
28 "This event is not 'sensational'. Under the guise of the sensational, it is forgotten." J-F. Lyotard, 
Heidegger and "the jews", p 51. Geoffrey Bennington, in commenting on Lyotard's analysis of the death 
of Pierre Overney during a demonstration outside of a Renault factory, writes: "Overney's death is an 
'event' not because of its causes or effects, but because of its senselessness or inanity: despite the efforts 
of the Renault company's narrative, and even of the demonstration's organizers, Overney's death is an 
event insofar as it refuses to be absorbed into the order of a classical narrative, brought to a book in a 
narrative account, its tension exchanged for other tensions." G. Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 109.
29 G. Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event, 
30 G. Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event, 
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Lyotard defines the differ/end as an absolute difference that cannot be 
reconciled. It is a difference that is neither inside nor outside, one that surpasses 
time and space without being marked within them as a beyond, hi this way it 
remains a non-recuperable difference, a surplus that cannot be reduced to an 
opposition to what it surpasses. With the second blow there takes place an 
affect but without the shock, in comparison to the non- observable affects of the 
first. Lyotard provides the example of purchasing something in a shop when 
suddenly anxiety takes over. He writes:
".. .Anxiety crushes me, I flee, but nothing had really happened. The 
energy dispersed in the affective cloud condenses, gets organized, brings 
on an action, commands a flight without a "real" motive. And it is this 
flight, the feeling that accompanies it, which informs consciousness that 
there is something, without being able to tell what it is. It indicates the 
quod not the quid. The essence of the event: that there is "comes before" 
what there is. This "before" of the quod is also an after of the quid. "3I
The difference is an Otherness in that it problematizes the relation of self 
and other, of identity and difference. Its identity is one that differs from itself. 
Such a singular difference escapes the logic of a universal and a particular, it 
cannot be conceptualised. It differs from a 'virtual' difference which is 
unidentifiable but real; or an 'absolute', or a 'multiple' negation that negates the 
positive/ negative dichotomy, or an excessive 'event' that takes place in 
between past, present or the future of space-time.32 Such an event is forgotten, 
not by being lost in time, but by being 'lost time.' It is forgotten by virtue of 
being left out, but never simply excluded or left behind.
31 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
32 This term is one put forward and used by Sue Golding /johnny de philo. It is a negativity in a negative 
dialectic, one that as a neither / nor exceeds any reduction to an oppositional either / or. It is negation as 
multiplicity since it cannot be seen as producing or simply giving rise to a multiplicity that might be 
separate from it. See S. Golding, "Curiosity" in her The Eight Technologies of Otherness, pp. 10 -27.
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To push this difference into a symbolic logic would be to do violence to its 
nature. For the first blow comes too early for a system that cannot catalogue it, 
the second blow comes too late, and the psychic reaction and representation 
miss their mark. But this peculiar singularity cannot be reduced to a mere 
absence anymore than it can be represented. Lyotard notes:
"It follows that psychoanalysis, the search for lost time, can only be 
interminable, like literature and like true history (i.e., the one that is not 
historicism but anamnesis): the kind of history that does not forget that 
forgetting is not a breakdown of memory but the immemorial always 
'present' but never here-now, always torn apart in the time of 
consciousness, of chronology, between a too early and too late ~ the too 
early of a first blow dealt to the apparatus that it does not feel, and the too 
late of a second blow where something intolerable is felt. A soul struck
"il
without striking a blow.'
This double refusal of incorporation or dismissal is political by definition. 
Lyotard asserts:
"The differend, transcribed as 'tendency', as 'faction' gives rise to 
negotiations, lies, maneuvers, concessions, denunciations ..... If this is 
horrifying, then one 'cannot engage in polities'. One has others do it."34 
Politics for Lyotard is always the strategic approach by which the 
difference which exceeds the mechanisms of procedural justice, 
representation and discursive structures is engaged.35
In critiquing the modernist, systems theory of thinkers such as Luhmann, which 
places the emphasis of legitimation on concepts of performativity and 
efficiency, Lyotard raises the point that rather than achieving greater control and 
amplified performativity through an increase in knowledge, what is actually
33 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
34 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
35 "If politics is conceived of as a genre, Lyotard offers no political 'solution' at all. But if politics (or 
perhaps, though Lyotard does not make this distinction in these terms, 'the political') is taken as a name for 
that heterogeneity and that incommensurability ... then the determination of the political is the problem, 
and the resistance to that determination is the (dis)solution. Lyotard accepts the proposition that 
'everything is political' if the political is described as above, but refuses the apparent corollary (politics is 
everything') insofar as that suggests a genre containing or subordinating all other genres". G. Bennington, 
Lyotard: Writing the Event, 
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augmented through an increase in knowledge is uncertainty. Lyotard focuses 
upon the scientific works of a more postmodern paradigm, such as those of 
Heisenberg and Thorn. These emphasise unpredictability, uncertainty, 
catastrophe, chaos, paralogy and dissensus.
Dissensus challenges the existing rules of the game, or language games, for 
paralogy becomes impossible if recognition is denied and legitimacy withheld 
for new moves in the game. The differend is the name that Lyotard gives to the 
silencing of a player in the language games. It exists when there are no 
available procedures or power with which to present their grievance within or 
through the current discursive domains. Silencing or eliminating a player from 
the game is equivalent to a terrorist act for Lyotard. He illustrates this with the 
example of the revisionist historian's refusal to acknowledge the Nazi gas 
chambers unless a victim of the chambers came forth to offer their valid witness 
testimonials. However according to such logic, to be considered a valid witness
*}£
and victim of the gas chambers, one would have had, to have died in them.
Lyotard's thoughts develop his concerns over the Holocaust and the crypts 
left by Heidegger's abyssal philosophy and silent political views. Any effort to 
represent the mass exterminations and endurances entailed by those in the 
camps, whilst guaranteeing that the horror will not be forgotten, invariably 
domesticate the event. In recounting the dehumanisation of the camps victims 
and their abusive treatment, "it is not as men, women, and children that they are
36 Lyotard puts forward that Faurisson's case is in part possible due to the conflation of the historical genre 
with the cognitive genre. A genre of discourse must be invoked to identify a phrase regime and this 
conflation enabled Faurisson to make a case that what is knowable in history is determined only through 
cognitive phrasing. Just as science as a genre is inescapable from conditions of proof so the rules for 
establishing the reality of the referent determine the "universe of cognitive phrases where truth and falsity 
are at stake". J-F. Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, translated by G. ven den Abeele. 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1983), p. 35. The possibility of subverting the cognitive creates 
a differend that marks the silence of an impossibility of phrasing an injustice.
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exterminated but as the name of what is evil - "jews"- that the Occident has 
given to the unconscious anxiety."37
Similar problems occur when sifting through the actions of the Nazi Party 
themselves. It is not just that there is no reason to see "the jews" as enemies, 
and therefore the insanity of the attempted genocide. They were not treated as 
enemies in the first place: "They have not been declared the enemy. They have 
no claim to the spotlight of confrontation on stage."38 Consequently the 
exterminations must take place off-stage, managed so as to leave no trace.
Any subsequent political reassertion of human rights and toleration, whilst 
to be applauded, presents only a ruse of respect for the alterity of this Otherness. 
Even a revolutionary politics shares this collusion, as the call for the new is the 
slogan of the general economy that governs by implementing the rule of 
forgetting and as such turning the 'spirit exclusively, foreclosing, toward the 
future.' In each case the silent voice of the differend is lost. One must therefore 
not remember the Holocaust directly. Lyotard writes:
"Here, to fight against forgetting means to fight to remember that one 
forgets as soon as one believes, draws conclusions, and holds for certain. 
It means to fight against forgetting the precariousness of what has been 
established, of a re-established past; it is a fight for the sickness whose 
recovery is simulated."39
One can only approach the Holocaust through strategies that betray their 
own attempts at representation. Certain forms of literature present a method of 
this, as does aesthetics. For Lyotard, it is particular types of art, such as Barnett 
Newman, that best accomplish this in bearing witness to the always-returning
37 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
38 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
39 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
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aporia of the sublime. Lyotard asserts that it must be sufficient to remember 
that one remembers. He writes:
".. .It must be sufficient that one remembers that one does not remind 
oneself of it anymore; it must be sufficient to save the interminable and 
the waiting. Ordinary memory accomplishes forgetting, covers up the 
promise. But the promise is not gone, it is always there."40
As Lyotard argues the hope lies in anesthesia to fight against amnesia. The 
pornographical offers a different pathway for an ethical consideration other than 
the 'immemorial' for the body. The pornographical surface, through its techne 
of comic humour, is embodied and mediates the body, creating substantiality 
and a mimetic economy of witnessing.
Derrida's re-conceptualisation of the sublime attempts to deconstruct the 
totality of self-reflexivity of the subject, in looking at the self-reflexivity of the 
subject, of the T of consciousness, and of the loftier branch of aesthetics formed 
by art and literature. In order to analyse the relationship between art and theory, 
the borders must first be fixed and held in place as to what is specific to the 
predeterminations of each. In commenting on Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida 
writes:
".. .To attempt a breakthrough toward the beyond of philosophical 
discourse, you cannot possibly succeed -within language ... except by 
formally and thematically posing the question of the relations between 
belonging and breaking out, the question of closure".41
For Derrida such a question as what is art must be asked through the stipulations 
of its borders and the effects of other forces from other discursive and non- 
discursive formations, outside of these borders. These forces often muddy the
40 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", pp. 
41 J. Derrida, Writing and Difference, translated and introduced by A. Bass. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978), p. 110.
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waters with questions of art's integrity, self-knowledge and self-representations. 
These borders should be continually "questioned, mobilized, and reinscribed if 
art is to have a critical, transformative effect on theory."42 In this way Derrida 
hoped to locate what are the conditions of these borders and frameworks that 
must be exceeded, displaced and undone in order to open up the aesthetic and 
philosophical closure of the heritage of the great and grand philosophies of art.43 
He writes:
"In accepting the art object as a work - that is, as unified, completed, 
integral - theory relegates itself to a specific place outside and determines 
its relation to art as that of an outside to an inside. The question that 
Derrida pursues in his essays on art is how to break out of the enclosure 
determined by this inside/outside opposition - not in order to destroy as 
notions of aesthetic specificity, but to conceive of specificity in some 
other manner; not in order to diminish44 the status of theory, but to make it 
more critical and effective, less dogmatic."
Derrida chooses to focus his critique on the effective closures around the 
boundaries of art by drawing upon the example oftheparergon in Kant's The 
Critique of Judgment, in order to complicate the notion of a frame and the ease 
with which one can take a position or rather with which one is depositioned.
Derrida defines Kant's usage oftheparergon as one that provides a frame 
through a combination of outside and inside in that an outside is drawn inside 
the inside in order to constitute it inside.45 For Derrida there is no ergon 
without \heparergon:
"What constitutes them asparerga is not simply their exteriority or 
surplus nature, it is the internal structural relation that attaches them to the
42 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida. (New York: Methuen Books, 1987), p. 132.
43 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, translated by G. Bennington and I. McLeod. (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 1 -13.
44 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, 
45 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 
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interior lack of the ergon. Without this lack, the ergon would have no 
need of aparergon." 6
The dilemma lies in what belongs to the inside and what to the outside - how 
does one take up a position based on the terms of an exteriority that is necessary 
to the interior integrity of the artwork.
In the Kantian Third Critique, Derrida argues that the question of form 
cannot be divided from that of the frame. The Third Critique is caught within 
this same parergonal logic that it applies to art. For a judgment to be a 
judgment of taste then under the schema for the Kantian analytics, these 
judgments must be formal and distinguished from those of content and matter. 
Derrida asserts:
".. .Formality as the space of aesthetics in general, of a 'formalism' that 
instead of representing a determined system is indistinguishable from the 
history of art and aesthetics itself. And the effect of formality is always 
linked to the possibility of a system of framing that is at the same time 
imposed and erased."47
It becomes a question of differentiating the good frame from the bad one or 
rather knowing when to evoke the frame, when to ignore it and when to refute 
it. As Carroll states, in writing on Derrida:
"A too visible frame detracts from the work and destroys its integrity; a 
frame that is not visible enough produces a lack of differentiation between 
inside and outside, thereby having the same effect. Thus, working the 
frame and making the frame work constitute a critical approach to art that 
originates neither inside nor outside art, that is neither of theory or of art 
alone - for it consists in moving constantly from one to the other."48
For Derrida there are insuperable difficulties in attempting to locate and obtain a 
pure aesthetics or an autonomous one. To achieve this would be only to
46 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 
47 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 
48 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: foucau.lt, Lyotard, Derrida, 
Holly Mountain The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
constitute a limit or a frame. An aesthetic space is one that is never completely 
contained by the frame, one that is always in excess of its frame and thus never 
completely unto itself.
It is through the use of the notion of theparergon that Derrida points to the 
determined nature of the frame in Kant's approach to the aesthetic. He argues 
that this is due to Kant's humanism, for his specific definition or notion of man 
plays an essential role in determining the frame of the aesthetic for Kant. 
Derrida locates a dual relationship between the limiting effects of both Kant's 
humanism and formalism; one implies the other. With the definition of the 
beautiful as a "finality without end" or "purposiveness without purpose", the 
'internal' form of the object is delayed and raised up as the only finality; one 
with no exterior purpose; one that is self-contained and self-sufficient.49 
Derrida summarises this as:
"Finality, an oriented movement, is necessary, for without it there would 
be no beauty, but equally necessary is that the orientor (the end that 
originates) be missing. Without finality, no beauty. But none either if the 
end were to determine this beauty." 50
Derrida summarises beautiful forms as those forms that are finalized in such a 
way that they immediately exhibit their lack of attachment to an end, as the 
'pure cut' that divides them from all other possible ends and purpose is evident 
in their frame. What is most important here is this frame or border that is 
established in finalizing these finality of forms without end, at which 
simultaneously cuts it from its end, and which in doing so keeps us from 
knowing its end and from knowing it.
49 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 
50 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 
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Derrida returns to discuss the frame, this peculiar frame that forms the 
equivalent to Deleuze's concept of a screen; Lyotard's notion of a libidinal skin; 
and Golding's use of surfaces.
"Thus it is the finality-without-end that is said to be beautiful... Thus it is 
the without that counts for beauty: neither finality nor end, neither the 
purpose that it is lacking nor the lack of purpose, but the border in the 
without of the pure cut, the without of the finality-without-end."52
Or as Carroll phrases this the without "out of which the frame is made is both 
the guarantee of the integrity of the inside and the point of passage from the 
inside to out."53
Derrida places Kant's humanism or placing of man as the subject of 
aesthetic judgments as one that doubles in being both absent and present. Man 
is present in occupying a privileged place in nature as the only ideal of beauty 
and 'yet absent as an anthropologically defined unity or end in the judgment of 
pure, free beauty.' Despite the disinterestedness of aesthetic judgments, theories 
of history, society, culture and art reappear with the presence of man in nature 
and as the subject of aesthetic judgments. For man is the only being that Kant 
grants as being able to determine his/her own ends. As Carroll writes:
"Present and absent, these anthropologically determined theories of 
society and culture weigh on the frame that excludes them and reappear 
inside in another form. Exclusion, here, is really a form of displacement; 
the excluded term does not disappear, but, rather takes on a different form 
and place "inside" by being forced "outside"."54
hi locating and shifting away from the limitations of aesthetic judgments and 
their basic component of the frame or par ergon, Derrida turns to the un-
51 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, 
52 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 
53 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, 
54 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, 
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boundedness and excessive nature of the sublime. The question of the sublime 
for Derrida is a question of how to present the unpresentable, or rather the 
almost unpresentable. He writes:
"A concept can be too great, almost too great for presentation. Colossal 
(kolossalisch), therefore, qualifies presentation, the staging or making 
present, or rather making visible of something that is not a thing because 
it is a concept. And the presentation of this concept insomuch as it is not 
presentable; but not simply unpresentable: almost unpresentable.... How is 
it possible to conceive, in the presence of a presentation, the holding- 
oneself-erect-there (Darstellen) of an excess of size that remains only 
almost excessive, on the border of a delimiting trait barely crossed? .... 
The almost -too- much forms the singular originality, with neither border 
nor simple overflow of border [debordement] of the colossal?"55
Derrida reveals how the infinite, the absolute and unboundedness of the sublime 
can only be measured and set off in terms of a border which it exceeds.
The sublime constitutes for Derrida a difference within the aesthetic, or as 
J.L. Nancy states, it is "always a distance within the aesthetic or from the 
aesthetic ... In the sublime, art itself is disturbed, given still another destiny; it 
has its destiny in some sense outside itself'. 56 Carroll comments that the frame 
of the aesthetic can be said to provide a contradictory role in both separating the 
aesthetic from the non-aesthetic and opening it up to what it is not. The 
aesthetic already contains the 'sublime "within in" in the form(lessness) of 
everything that cannot be contained or given form within its frame, starting with 
the frame itself."57
Rather than providing a resolution for the paradoxes within the placement 
and displacement of the frame of art, the sublime can be said to drive art and the 
theory of art outside of the specifically determined aesthetic realm to the non-
55 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 
56 J. L. Nancy, L' Offrande Sublime, pp.76-77.
57 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, 
Holly Mountain The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
determined dimensions of historical, political and ethical thought. The sublime 
can be seen as a radical path of approach to 'working the frame of art and 
opening the aesthetic up to the paraesthetic elements constituting, and at the 
same time, deconstituting its specificity.' 58 Derrida defines the sublime not in 
terms of the absence of a frame but as the movement that passes from one side 
of the frame to the other. He writes:
"The size of the colossal is neither culture nor nature but at the same time 
the one and the other. It is, perhaps, between the presentable and the 
unpresentable, the passage from one to the other as much as the 
irreducibility of one and the other: size, border, the boundaries of the cut, 
what passes and happens, without passing from one to the other."59
Derrida's notion of passage or passe-partout enables him to put forward 
aesthetic questions as critical rather than for the aestheticists, "when the 
question of aesthetic specificity is made a means of passage "outside" rather 
than a blockage "inside"."60 Derrida puts forward a.passe-partout as a:
"...Structure with a moveable base; but although it lets something appear, 
it does not form a frame in the strict sense, rather a frame within a frame. 
Without ceasing [that goes without saying] to space itself out, it plays its 
card or its cardboard between the frame, in what is properly speaking its 
internal edge, and the external edge of what it gives us to see, lets or 
makes appear in its empty enclosure: the picture, the painting, the figure, 
the form, the system of strokes [traits] and of colours."61
The passage of a suspended cut, an event, an instant of superimposed layers, an 
aesthetically full instant, in its spacing and folding; a passage that provides an 
edge, screen, surface or gesture of its surface. It is this passage that is 
pomographical, and that at the same time provides the terrifyingly groundless -
58 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: Foucau.lt, Lyotard, Derrida, 
59 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, pp. 164-165.
60 D. Carroll, Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, 
61 J. Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 
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ground of the discursive identity of pornographical. A violence of the 'laying 
bare' of the surface.
A techne cannot arrive or end at its completion as it allows for anything to 
become present at all. As a means for relaying and producing information that 
can give rise to multiple enframings, the techne of an event is a passe-partout, 
which for pornography is that of comic humour. It is this techne that enables 
the anesthesia of an aesthetically full instant and provision of its gesture.
2. The Ethical Gesture: A History of Mimesis or Rather a Mimetic History.
Mimesis has a complex history one that requires discursive specification at 
each historical shift of its meaning and theoretical use. As Gebauer and Wulf 
point out the concept of mimesis has figured prominently in all scholarly fields 
concerning human thought and action, be it in ideas, speech, writing or reading. 
As they comment:
"... A spectrum of meaning has been unfolded over the course of its 
historical development, including the act of resembling, of presenting the 
self, and expression as well as mimicry, imitatio, representation and 
nonsensuous similarity. The accent may lie on similarity in sensuous 
terms, on a nonsensuous correspondence, or on an intentional construction 
of a correlation. Some writers have emphasized the intermediary 
character of mimesis; they locate it in medial images, which occupy the
/i'5
space between the inner and outer worlds."
Gebauer and Wulf provide a condensation of the most important qualities 
attributed to the concept of mimesis, which have served to establish the breadth 
of the ground for its theoretical use over time. Their list of four points begins 
with that of identification of a person or persons with another or others. As they 
note as a means of identification mimesis establishes a more complex
62 G. Gebauer and C. Wulf, Mimesis: Culture - Art - Society, translated by D. Reneau. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), p. 1.
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relationship of identity; one based on a mental, and imaginative, as well as 
physical connection. As such mimesis can be distinguished from a practice of 
mimicry. This usage of mimesis involves a complementary and sensuous 
adequation in which "people identify themselves by means of their mimetic 
abilities when they see themselves in the Other and perceive a state of mutual 
equality."63
Secondly Gebauer and Wulf comment on the dual components of mimesis. 
It has both active and cognitive aspects and forms a knowledge of practical 
action. Thirdly is the oral history of mimesis and fourthly that of its written 
form. Mimesis was originally developed as a gesture of physical action, rather 
than as a concept in oral cultures. As they point out:
"Even as purely linguistic mimesis, it remains an "indicative speaking". 
The pointing is perceived by the recipient such that he or she is called on 
to see certain things or procedures as something, in this reciprocity lies 
one component of mimesis, one that renders into a spectacle that which is 
indicated or represented."64
This physical side to mimesis is its performative aspect, one that is often 
combined with action-oriented speaking and into the realm of the written form 
of mimesis. As Gebauer and Wulf suggest the performative aspect of mimesis 
as "a presentation of what has been mimetically indicated" tends towards 
condensed symbols and for example rituals and images.
Mimesis can be traced as conceptually bound to freedom; as a means of 
assimilation or even untruth it resists any clear-cut division between the subject 
and object as well as what is and what will be. As an impure concept to rational 
thought mimesis states, as Lacoue- Labarthe defines it, a law of impropriety:
63 G. Gebauer and C. Wulf, Mimesis: Culture - Art - Society, 
64 G. Gebauer and C. Wulf, Mimesis: Culture - Art - Society, 
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"In order to do everything, to imitate everything - in order to (re)present 
or (re)produce everything, in the strongest sense of these terms - one must 
oneself be nothing, have nothing proper to oneself except an "equal 
aptitude" for all sorts of things, roles, characters, functions, and so on. 
The paradox states a law of impropriety, which is also the very law of 
mimesis: only the "man without qualities", the being without properties or 
specificity, the subjectless subject (absent from himself distracted from 
himself, deprived of self) is able to present or produce in general."65
A history of the conflicts surrounding mimesis tends to be charted from the 
philosophical writings of Plato. Pre-Plato mimesis was welded to oral traditions 
and the re-creation of the actions and utterances of both people and animals. 
"Characteristics of other beings were re-created in the form of a "do-as-if', 
woven into music, organized as rhythm, and preformed in public."66 Plato 
points out several facets of mimesis: firstly there is the overwhelming of the 
senses by the recitation, the instance of seduction involved in the practice and 
the effects employed on the audience.
Alongside these more immediate features of mimesis Plato also remarks on 
the emergence of the rhapsodist as a pedagogue and whether claims that what is 
said in these mimetic practices can be judged to be right and true. He finds that 
mimesis demonstrates a tendency towards proliferation and is apt to go astray 
from the path of truth and head into a world of illusion and shallow 
appearances. Consequently mimesis provides simulacrum or false copy and 
provides no objective basis for either an adequation of truth or a pedagogical 
competence.
Whilst ghettoising art and aesthetics as mimetic, and therefore false in their 
immense distance from the divine and eternal Forms, Plato does open up this
65 P. Lacoue - Labarthe, Typography, translated by C. Fynsk and introduced by J. Derrida. (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 259.
66 G. Gebauer and C. Wulf, Mimesis: Culture - Art - Society, translated by D. Reneau, p. 310.
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area of aesthetics and make use of its mimetic processes in his re-creation of the 
Socratic dialogues. Aristotle however transforms such a notion of mimesis into 
a technical concept that plays an organising principle in artworks. He places 
both painting and poetry as forms of mimesis. As Malcolm Heath points out in 
his introduction to The Poetics mimesis with Aristotle tends to be translated as 
either imitation, his preference, or as representation.67
Aristotle's technical concept of mimesis can be found as a building block in 
his philosophical system of thought in terms of the representation of the 
possible and general.68 Now the term representation, as Heath notes, does not 
fully cover the kind of similarity that Aristotle envisioned in his use of mimesis. 
For example, a symbol on a map can be used to represent an airport but for 
Aristotle this would not be a mimesis of an airport, for that would entail a scaled 
outline of its runways and other component parts. It is for this reason that Heath 
chooses to use imitation rather than representation. With imitation a likeness of 
melody and rhythm can be created of character and emotion.69
Imitation can then be used to more aptly encompass Aristotle's range of 
mimetic activities from those artistic endeavours of poetry, painting and music 
alongside other forms of pursuits such as the mimicry of animal noises and 
other sounds, and not forgetting that of children's play-acting.70 The pleasure 
that can be attained from what he regards as a human instinct for mimesis is 
paramount for Aristotle. Heath asserts that for Aristotle human beings are 
naturally:
67 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, pp. 
68 G. Gebauer and C. Wulf, Mimesis: Culture - Art - Society, translated by D. Reneau, p. 310.
69 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, pp. 
70 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, p. xiii and 47a20, and also Aristotle, The Politics, 
translated by T. A. Sinclair. (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 1336a32-34 and 1340al8-23.
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".. .Prone to engage in the creation of likenesses, and to respond to 
likenesses with pleasure, and he explains this instinct by reference to their 
innate desire for knowledge. A likeness is (by definition) a likeness of 
something; to take part in the activity of making and responding to 
likenesses we must recognize the relationship between the likeness and its 
object."71
There are no class or intellectual distinctions here as mimesis is rooted in the 
basic human instincts, and is shared by even the least intellectually sophisticated 
people. To Aristotle, poetry and painting as mimetic arts are pleasurable 
expressions of an elementary human desire for knowledge. He looks in depth in 
The Poetics at poetry's development from techniques of primitive improvisation 
to more complex and sophisticated forms.
A final point to take note of with Aristotle's technical concept of mimesis is 
that an imitation need not be an exact copy of the object imitated, nor need it be 
a likeness of an object which actually exists. Imitation is entwined with 
imaginative play rather than factual documentation of actual events. For 
example in chapter nine The Poetics, Aristotle points out that poems are not 
necessarily historiographical texts and do not need to conform or remain faithful 
to actual occurrences. Rather, poetry is like fiction, for Aristotle, and is able to 
depict what might or would happen, or what is possible in accordance with 
probability or necessity. It is instinctual, imaginative and strategic play.
Aristotle argues that poetry relies on imitation as part of its medium in its 
rhythmical language, with or without melodic accompaniment. "The pleasure 
that human beings take in rhythm and melody makes it natural that their instinct
for imitation should be expressed in verse or song." As a more sophisticated
71 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, translated and introduced by M. Heath, pp.xiii.
72 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, p.iv.
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form of poetry, Aristotle concentrates most of his analysis in The Poetics to that 
of tragedy.74 He defines a tragedy as poetic imitation in the dramatic mode. 
Aristotle places the primacy of a tragic imitation on the plot but also gives 
credence to it's other constituent parts of character and reasoning, or a 
character's moral disposition and interpretations of his or her actions. It's 
medium is that of rhythmical language and it's further constituents are those of 
diction and lyric poetry. 75
Tragedy is a form of imitation that is designed to be acted out on stage, 
where its action can be seen. In this sense a tragedy includes spectacle rather 
than performance for Aristotle, as a tragedy is specifically a poem and not a 
performance. Whether or not a tragedy is performed or whether it is performed 
well or not does not change that it is and can also be defined as a tragedy. 
Consequently although a tragedy is potentially performable, its component
*7<C
aspect is that of spectacle or it's visibility rather than that of performance. 
The route configured by Freud in, Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious, and the notion of ideational mimetics that he establishes as the 
means of communicating or expressing the ideational emotional contents of a 
certain expenditure of energy, will now be looked at in order to provide more 
detail to the mimetic comportment of the pornographical surface and its 
rhizomatic 'ana-aesthetic' ethical pleasures of the comic. This thesis is naming 
'the pornographical' as a site of paradoxes that is formed through specific
73 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, 
74 Aristotle also writes on the nature of the important ingredients of a good epic but he considers this to be 
a less developed form of poetic play. Despite promising to look at comedy in the same light, he never 
really delves into the topic, suggesting to many translators that The Poetics is an unfinished or incomplete 
work. M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, p xviii.
75 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, pp xviii - xix.
76 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, pp 
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conjunctures of the relationship between pleasure and the political. This has 
been suggested as a site that locates, through pornography as an industry, genre, 
discursive economy, mimetic event, and name and in the 'human' bodily 
communication of pornographic 'codes'. Aristotle is important to this matter in 
having laid the foundations for a basis of a different kind of knowledge than that 
of a pure concept or a logo-centric rationality; one that opens an ethical 
evaluation rather than a moral standpoint or categorical imperative.
In basing his sense of knowledge and understanding on mimesis, Aristotle 
observed "imitation is naturally pleasurable to human beings, and explains this 
with reference to the process of recognition which it involves".77 In looking at 
the imitative pleasures and those ofkatharsis that Aristotle pinpoints as 
characteristics of tragedy, he demonstrates a view of human emotions that are 
more than irrational impulses and are intimately linked to virtue. Emotions are 
grounded in and enable 'us1 to develop our understanding and knowledge. 
Aristotle remarks that an emotional response to a situation presupposes an 
interpretation of it and is open ethical evaluation. He writes in The 
Nicomachean Ethics:
"For example, fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity and in general pleasure 
and distress can be experienced in greater or lesser degree, and in both 
cases wrongly. To feel them at the right time, in response to the right 
things, with regard to right people, for the right reason and in the right 
way- that is the mean and the optimum, which is the characteristic of 
virtue."78
Both deficiency and excess of emotion are considered deviant from an ethical 
ideal.
77 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, p. xxxvi.
78 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1106M8-23, p 40.
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Aristotle raises an observation that tragedies "should excite emotions in a 
way that does not do ethical harm to its audiences".79 By this Aristotle is 
referring to the pleasures that katharsis induces by purging excess emotions and 
leaving an audience's emotional state in a more balanced and well-adjusted 
condition. This is not to say that Aristotle considered the pleasurable relief of 
katharsis to be technically fundamental to or characteristic of tragedies, rather 
that an ethical and beneficial effect that any tragedy could and should have on 
some of the members of its audience.
2.1 Ideational Mimetics and Economies in Expenditure.
Freud approaches this topic of his research by looking at the peculiar 
position between jokes and the comic occupied by the naive. He remarks that 
although the naive, in speech, corresponds with jokes in wording, content and 
ushering in a misuse of words, pieces of nonsense or pieces of smut, an oddity is 
produced in that the psychical process in the first person, which produces the 
joke is completely absent. He writes:
"None of the characteristics of the naive exist except in the apprehension 
of the person who hears it - a person coincides with the third person in 
jokes. Moreover the person who produces it does so without any effort. 
The complicated technique, which in jokes is designed to paralyse the 
inhibition arising from rational criticism, is absent in him; he does not 
process this inhibition as yet, so he can produce nonsense and smut 
directly and without compromise."80
In this way the naive can be delimited as a marginal case of jokes, for Freud 
suggested a condition for the effectiveness of a joke relies on both parties being
79 M. Heath, "Introduction" in Aristotle's The Poetics, 
80 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, pp. 
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subject to the same inhibitions and internal resistances.81 Whereas a condition 
for the naive is that one person possesses the inhibitions that the other is 
without. As Freud states, "the apprehension of the naive lies with the person 
provided with inhibitions, and he alone obtains the yield of pleasure which the 
naive brings about."82
The 'internal kinship' of the naive and jokes is that of a core of verbal 
pleasure, pleasure from nonsense and pleasure from the lifting of inhibitions or 
"in the relief of psychical expenditure". However only a portion of the pleasure 
shaped by the naive can be explained in this way. Freud provides an example of 
hearing a naive piece of smut in which the listener is spared from feeling 
indignation through recognising the naivety of the producing person, or through 
observing that the internal inhibition is absent in he/she. Only then can the 
listener laugh. Freud states that we laugh in discharging an economy of 
expenditure that is fashioned from both a lifting of our internal inhibitions and 
through a process of empathy and comparison between the producing person's 
psychical state and our own.
It is this extra element of an empathic and comparative process that Freud 
dubs the spring of comic pleasure. As such he can now summarise his two co- 
appearing definitions of the naive of naive smut and naive jokes as:
"...A species in the comic in so far as its pleasure springs from the 
difference in expenditure which arises in trying to understand someone 
else; and it would approach the joke in being subject to the condition that 
the expenditure economized in the comparison must be an inhibitory 
expenditure." 83
81 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, pp. 204 and 244.
82 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
83 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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It is this quantitative difference in the psychical process and economy of 
expenditure, that if it is not used for some other purpose becomes capable of 
discharge, Freud locates as specifically pleasure arising from the comic.84
Freud argues that the comic evolves from an accidental discovery derived 
from human relations. It is revealed in the movements, forms, actions, and 
character traits of people. When the conditions under which a person seems 
comic are recognisable the comic is capable of being detached from people. He 
writes:
".. .One has it in one's power to make someone else comic opens up the 
way to an un-dreamt-of yield of comic pleasure and is the origin of a 
highly developed technique. One can make oneself comic too."85
Freud illustrates this with examples of comic methods such as placing oneself or 
someone else in a comic situation, mimicry, disguise, unmasking, caricature, 
parody and travesty.
As with Bergson, Freud notes that comic techniques can be used for 
hostile and aggressive purposes. Both thinkers remark on the social nature of 
humiliation that forms an underlying tendency of comic humour. This was 
discussed in greater detail in chapter three of this thesis, libidinal technologies. 
However Freud wishes to delve into the realm of what is spontaneously comic. 
To do this he begins by looking at the comic of movement as a primitive stage 
of performance and method of making an audience laugh. He provides the 
examples of pantomime and the circus clown's act.
84 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 247. Strachey points out that Freud's choice 
of the German word different is a term used in mathematics for a quantitative rather than a qualitative 
difference. Freud himself draws upon the works of Jean-Paul and Bergson here. Jean-Paul introduced a 
notion of psychological contrast gained in comparing someone else's mental processes with one's own as a 
comic lending and Bergson located one formula for inducing comic pleasure as a reciprocal interference of 
series, whereby "a situation is invariably comic when it belongs simultaneously to two altogether 
independent series of events and is capable of being interpreted in two entirely different meanings at the 
same time." H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, 
85 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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As Freud remarks what we are laughing at in these examples is an 
unnecessary expenditure that is too large. A clown's and a child's movements 
are comic in their extravagance, unintended exaggeration and inexpedience. 
Indeed Freud locates the branching of from this comic of movement to that of 
the "comic of bodily shapes and facial features".86 However what is it that 
makes 'us' laugh when we recognise a person's or indeed our own movements as 
exaggerated and inexpedient? It is this extra element of an empathic and 
comparative process that Freud names the spring of comic pleasure. It is this 
quantitative difference in the psychical process and economy of expenditure, 
that arises from comparing on the one hand the psychical expenditure whilst 
"we are having a certain idea and on the other hand the content of the thing that 
we are having the idea of."87 An idea of something large "demands more 
expenditure than the idea of something small" and because of this Freud 
suggests that the comparison is based on an idea of large movements that 
provide a quantitative rather than a qualitative difference.
This comparison of these two things must be measured by a standard, 
which Freud suggests as one of an expenditure of innervation. As he writes:
"I perceive a movement like this of greater or lesser size in someone else, 
the securest way to an understanding (an apperception) of it will be for me 
to carry it out by imitation, and I can then decide from the comparison on 
which of the movements my expenditure was the greater. 
(My emphasis)
Instead of actually imitating the movements through our muscles, Freud points 
out that we tend to use an idea that we already have established of it, or if not
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Holly Mountain The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
then we tend to form an idea of it, using our memory-traces of expenditures of 
similar movements.89
Freud suggests that it is in this way that the main expenditure is held back 
for discharge as "ideation or 'thinking' differs from acting or performing above 
all in the fact that it displaces far smaller cathectic energies and holds back the 
main expenditure from discharge".90 This quantitative factor is given 
expression in the content of the ideas by the means of "a varying expenditure in 
a kind of ideational mimetics". 91 With the comic of movement a specific 
movement is perceived and an "impulsion is given to forming an idea of it by 
means of a certain expenditure of energy."92 Freud continues his elaboration of 
this that in trying to understand and apperceive this movement:
"I make a certain expenditure, and in this portion of the mental process I 
behave exactly as though I were putting myself in the place of the person I 
was observing. But at the same moment, probably, I bear in mind the aim 
of this movement, and by my earlier experience enables me to estimate the 
scale of expenditure required for reaching this aim. In doing so I 
disregard the person whom I am observing and behave as though I myself 
wanted to reach the aim of the movement."93
These possibilities created by my imagination form a comparison between the 
observed movement and my own.
89 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 251. Freud states that it is the memory of 
this innervatory expenditure that remains as a integral part of any of our ideas of this movement and at 
times there will be modes of thinking in which the idea is represented by nothing other than this 
expenditure. In other circumstances he suggests that this element may be replaced by another such as a 
visual or verbal image of the aim of the movement.
90 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 251. The conditions, that Freud raises, 
governing the discharge of this surplus into one of comic pleasure was looked at in chapters three, supra 
pp. 126-175.
91 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 252. Freud seems to be in agreement with 
Aristotle on the organic nature of mimetics and mimesis. He puts forward mimetics as part of the sense 
organs and innervatory features, allowing for the release of pleasure and differing degrees of tension and 
intensity.
92 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
93 Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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When the other person's movement is an exaggerated and extravagant one 
then my increased expenditure is inhibited in the act of being mobilised. It is 
free to be discharged elsewhere. As discussed in the previous two chapters if 
the conditions are favourable, and this is all part of the comic techne, then this 
surplus expenditure can be discharged as comic pleasure. For pleasure in a 
comic movement is generated when "an innervatory expenditure which has 
become an unusable surplus when a comparison is made with a movement of 
one's own."94
Freud takes his theory and investigation further in order to see if other 
cases of the comic can be treated in the same fashion as the comic of 
movement. To recap the comic effect, for Freud, depends on the quantitative 
difference between two cathectic expenditures, one's own and the other person's, 
or singularly through only one's own mental processes or only empathy of those 
with someone else, estimated by 'empathy'. It is the comic that can be produced 
from someone else's intellectual and mental characteristics when the other 
person has spared him or herself expenditure that is considered indispensable.96
Following in this vein of comparison if a person generates too great an 
expenditure on his or her bodily functions and too little on his or her mental 
ones then the comic laughter that ensues expresses a pleasurable sense of 
superiority.97 However if this relationship of expenditure is reversed and the 
other person's physical expenditure is discovered to be less than ours or that his
94 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
95 Whilst looking at other examples of comic pleasure and how it can be achieved, Freud remarks on 
examples of nonsense and stupidity which whist they can sometimes produce a comic effect, this is not 
always the case and often instead of comic what is created is contempt and spiteful hatred. S. Freud, Jokes 
and Their Relation to the Unconscious, pp. 
96 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
97 Freud always reminds us of "the fundamental independence of the comic from the feeling of 
superiority". S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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or her mental expenditure is higher then the well of comic pleasure becomes 
inhibited and we are left with expressing astonishment and admiration.98
When a cathectic comparison is made concerning only the other person and 
not our own self then the pleasurable difference in catechetic expenditure is 
brought about by external influences. An example of this would be the comic of 
situation in which the movements and characteristics of the person involved do 
not play a governing role for "we laugh even if we have to confess that -we 
should have had to do the same in that situation."99
In the comic of situation the other person's mental powers are interrupted 
by the demands of the 'external' world, compromising social conventions, 
necessities and their own bodily needs. Freud provides an example of 
someone's mental processes being interrupted by a pain or an excretory need. 
He writes:
". ...The contrast which, through empathy, offers us the comic difference 
is that between the high degree of interest taken by him before the 
interruption and the minimal one that he has left over for his mental 
activity when the interruption has occurred." 100
The person who offered us this difference becomes comic due to his or her 
inferiority, which springs not from a comparison this time with oneself, for it is 
unlikely that I would have acted differently in such a situation, but with his or 
her earlier self. 101 The other source of comic pleasure arises out of 
transformations in our own cathexes and lies in our relationship with the future;
98 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
99 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
100 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
101 It is worthwhile to note that for Freud comic pleasure from a position of inferiority can only come about 
where there is empathy that is where someone else is concerned. He states: "if we ourselves were in 
similar straits we should be conscious only of distressing feelings. It is probably only by keeping such 
feeling away from ourselves that we are able to enjoy pleasure from the difference arising out of a 
comparison of changing cathexes." S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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with our anticipations and expectant ideas. 102 A quantitatively definite 
expenditure underlies our ideas, one that increases with expectation and 
decreases in the event of disappointment. The comic expenditure on 
expectation, and that of disappointment, is created from an array of components 
including the expenditure of an ideational mimetics; whether what happens is 
perceptually greater or smaller than what is expected. Alongside this is the 
expenditure on tightening my attention; whether what happens is worthy of the 
interest which I had expended the expectation of its occurrence and in other 
cases that of the expenditure of abstraction. 103
This expenditure of an ideational mimetics is mobilised alongside the 
cathectic energy produced through the body's physical preparation in the case of 
expectation. Freud provides the example of a body's movements when someone 
is expecting to catch a ball. He or she puts his or her body into tensions which 
will enable it to meet the impact of the ball; and if when the ball is caught it 
turns out to be too light, then his or her superfluous movements make him or her 
comic to the spectators. 104
Any of these 'naturally' discovered methods can be and are often used to 
serve to make things comic. It is a simpler matter to make oneself comic than to 
make others comic, for example my making oneself clumsy or stupid. The
102 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 259. Immanuel Kant defines laughter as 
"affection arising from a strained expectation being suddenly reduced to nothing." See I. Kant, The 
Critique of Judgement, translated by J. C Meredith. (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1952), Part I, Section I, 54, 
p 199. Freud dismissively mentions Theodor Lipps' reworking of this in basing his thoughts on the origin 
of comic pleasure "quite generally from expectation". See S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious, translated and edited by J. Strachey, p 259 and T. Lipps, Komik and Humour. (Hamburg 
and Leipzig, 1898), 5 Off.
103 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
104 Freud remarks that expenditures of abstraction can be "traced back to that of large and small, since what 
is more interesting, more sublime and even more abstract are only special cases, with particular qualities, 
of what is larger". Again Freud remarks on Theodor Lipps1 work on the derivations of comic pleasure to 
that of a quantitative rather than a qualitative contrast. S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the 
Unconscious, pp. 
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principal method for making other people comic is by placing them in a 
situation whereby they become comic through their human dependence on 
external and social events. 105 The comic situation may be a real one in the sense 
of a practical joke, for example tripping someone up or placing a bucket of 
water on top of an ajar door; or it may be stimulated by speech and play, for 
example an attempt to convince someone of something nonsensical. He writes:
"The aggressiveness, to which making a person comic usually ministers, is 
much assisted by the fact that the comic pleasure is independent of the 
reality of the comic situation, so that everyone is in fact exposed, without 
any defence, to being made comic." 106
Mimicry, caricature, parody and travesty are other techniques of making things 
comic. Mimicry provides "extraordinary pleasure to the hearer" and its arts can 
make almost any object comic. 107 The pornographical draws upon these 
different methods of inducing comic pleasure, and often the stars and 
performers of pornography mimic many a politician or celebrity, or indeed a 
whole well known film, book, story or plot- formula, in order to create the 
intimacy and relaxation of laughter and consequently the emotional distance to 
be 'turned on'.
Caricature, unmasking, parody and travesty are even easier ways to make 
someone, even oneself comic, especially when directed "against people and 
objects which lay claim to authority and respect, which in are in some sense 
sublime" or socially exalted. 108 With a caricature one's speech and mannerisms
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
108 Strachey notes that the English translation for the German word, erhaben, in aesthetics is sublime. 
Where necessary, in the case of people, he has used the word exalted instead. S. Freud, Jokes and Their 
Relation to the Unconscious, 
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are exaggerated and become larger than life, therefore the sublime here "is 
something large in the figurative, physical sense"; "somatically large" and 
represented by an increased expenditure. 109 To this increased expenditure 
corresponds a difference of innervation in one's ideational mimetics brought 
about through a comparison between the ideational states, and able to be 
discharged in comic pleasure and laughter. 110 Freud writes that caricatures 
create degradation by emphasizing in the impression:
".. .Given by the exalted object a single trait which is comic in itself but 
was bound to be overlooked so long as it was perceivable in the general 
picture. By isolating this, a comic effect can be attained which extends 
our memory over the whole object. This is subject to the condition that 
the actual presence of the exalted object does not keep us in a reverential 
attitude." 1 "
Even if a particular comic trait does not in fact exist to be embellished then a 
falsification of a caricature trait does not lessen the comic effect or pleasure 
produced. Alternatively the techniques of parody and travesty operate in a 
manner that creates degradation. He writes:
"...By destroying the unity that exists between people's characters as we 
know them and their speeches and actions, by replacing either the exalted 
figures or their utterances by inferior ones." 112
Whilst operating differently from the method of caricature, all three processes 
share the same mechanism of their production of comic pleasure; as does the 
means of unmasking. However unmasking applies as a method "when someone
109 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
110 Freud provides the examples of the increased expenditure induced when entering into a formal meeting 
or presentation with someone in a socially exalted or dignified position, such as a monarch or prince of 
science. Such an occasion requires that a person place himself or herself under a solemn restraint. A 
similar comparison is achieved in the reverse situation whereby rather than the usual and habitual attitude 
of restraint one is unexpectedly allowed to relax. Both of these allow for a ideational comparison that can 
be discharged by comic laughter. S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, pp.261 - 262.
111 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
112 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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has seized dignity and authority by deception and these have to be taken from 
him in reality." 113
Such procedures for degrading the dignity and social standing of specific 
members of the public, works by "directing attention to the frailties which they 
share with all humanity, but in particular the dependence of their mental 
functions on bodily needs." 114 With unmasking, parody and travesty are 
numerous means of disclosing the "monotonous psychical automatism that lies 
behind the wealth and apparent freedom of psychical functions". 115 Mimicry is 
entwined with that of caricature and often involves techniques of degradation, 
but we also laugh at the "faithfulness of a piece of mimicry", again the 
uncovering of a physical automatism. Here Bergson and Freud are in 
agreement, in that "everything in a living person that makes one thinks of an 
inanimate mechanism has a comic effect." 116
Bergson extends this further by writing that "what is living should never, 
according to our expectation, be repeated exactly the same. When we find such 
a repetition we always suspect some mechanism lying behind the living 
thing". 117 In short Bergson attributes the comic effects of mimicry to both the 
divergence of the living to the inanimate and the degradation involved in this 
comparison. For Freud such a comparison is brought about through an 
expenditure of expectation, this is not only the case for comic mimicry but also
113 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
114 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 263. In this way even people with a lofty 
position of public admiration are pointed out to be only human just like you or me. Marie- Antoinette was 
an early popular figure in pornographic unmaskings as recently was Bill Clinton. Many celebrities have 
found themselves to be the target of a bodily unmasking in many a porn magazine, comic video romp and 
the internet if rife with possible naked celebrity photos and sex tapes that they did not want you to see.
115 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
116 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, pp. 32 -39.
117 H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, p. 35, and S. Freud, Jokes and Their 
Relation to the Unconscious, 
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for those cases that Bergson considers to be of comic rigidity, "of professional 
customs, fixed ideas, and turns of speech repeated on every possible 
occasion." 118
All of these cases provide a comic comparison between "the expenditure 
on expectation and the expenditure actually required for an understanding of 
something that has remained the same, and the larger amount needed for 
expectation would be based on observation of the multiplicity and plasticity of 
living things." 11 As a source of comic pleasure, mimicry arises from a 
comparative expenditure of expectation, rather than one of situation. In 
defining comic pleasure as arising from economies in expenditure of ideation 
(upon cathexis), Freud picks up on Bergson's notion that the comic effects of 
automatism can be traced to the recollected pleasures of children's toys, such as 
a jack-in-the-box. Bergson ponders that perhaps "we too often fail to recognize 
how much of childishness, so to speak, there still is in most of our joyful 
emotions." 120 Remember that for Bergson comedy is a game that imitates life 
and produces something mechanical in something living.
Freud argues that it is not simply recollected pleasure of one's childhood 
that yields the comic variations, inversions and repetitions, but a comparison of 
comic difference and expenditure between a child's behaviour and one's own. 
He writes:
"...The excessive expenditure on movement as well as the small 
intellectual expenditure, the domination of the mental functions by the 
bodily ones, and other features. A child only produces a comic effect on
118 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
119 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, pp. 
120 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, p. 287 and H. Bergson, Laughter: An Essay 
on the Meaning of the Comic, 
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us, when he conducts himself not as a child but as a serious adult, and he 
produces it then in the same way as other people disguise themselves." 121
This, as Freud points out, is not so much gaining "the 'comic' feeling for the lost 
one", but rather the laughter that arises is applicable to "the comparison between 
the adult's ego and the child's ego." 122
There is no uniformity to a comic comparison and its involved expenditure 
and to reiterate, the conditions governing the discharge of a comic expenditure 
and its surplus cathexis are not those of a conscious attitude or any comportment 
that would ensue the release of distressing affects. Whatever isolates a 
psychical act encourages the discharge of comic pleasure and this tends to occur 
only when the cathexis is preconscious. The production of comic pleasure must 
"lack the cathexis of attention to which consciousness is linked" and "may aptly 
be given the name of'automatic'. The process of comparing expenditures must 
remain automatic if it is to produce comic pleasure." 123
In relying on the role of ideational mimetics for the comparative and 
automatic expenditures of comic pleasure, Freud emphasises the importance of 
imagination and day-dreaming, rather than solely either the unconscious or 
conceptual processes. Comic pleasure in this way can be distinguished from its 
counterparts of jokes, which are related to the realm of the unconscious and 
arise from an economy of expenditure upon inhibition, and humour, which 
despite also being automatic and preconscious materialises from an economy in 
expenditure upon feeling, those distressingly emotional expenditures that are so 
perilous to a comic effect.
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, 
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Freud's work on the nature and operations of the ego and its relationship to 
the dimensions of the human psyche, the id and superego, have opened up 
questions around the very possibilities of self-identity and awareness. However 
it is through humour that Freud sketches out a way in which the harshness of the 
superego's role and the ego's relationship to it's ideal can be softened and aided
A
in it's growth. All three expenditures of raising laughter; those of humour, 
jokes and comic pleasure, are discursively formed and as such culturally 
specific according to each particular epoch. Jokes can provide a culture or 
discursive community with an outlet for inhibitions and repressions; whilst 
comic pleasure can offer a mimetic expression of a cultural ideation of cathexis 
and provide the release of sexual energy and a bodily intimacy. 125
With a techne of comic pleasure pornography as a discourse, or 
discursive economy generates a proliferation of a series of its meanings, and the 
entwining relationships of its own history, combined with other discourses of 
the specific time period and their various dimensions, as a code, a pornographic 
cultural code. Such a code generates not just through a physical mimetics but 
that of an ideational mimetics that communicates and expresses the ideational 
and emotional contents of a certain expenditure of energy, that is the expression 
of specific conjunctions of pleasure to the political and the discursive economies 
present, and presenting. The pornographical can never offer the whole reality of 
pleasure, or even capture its own whole physical or pleasurable reality. 
Produced as a technological event of sexual pleasure it can only be fantasy, it 
can never be more that for any pornographer, whether as a viewer, or a
124 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, pp. 
125 S. Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, pp. 239- 302. This differs from Carl lung's 
concept of a universal collective unconscious, containing universal archetypes and fixed symbols, rather 
than the fluidity of repressed wishes, disappointments, traumas and desires. See C. Jung, Symbols of 
Transformation, 1912 and Memories, Dreams, Reflections, 1963.
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producer, or a star (or an actress/actor), or a combination of all of these roles/ 
positions. This technological distance does not deny, but rather requires 
participation from the viewers, and offers them different vantage points and 
strategies of viewing - fast-forward, pause, rewind or converse, edit, copy, 
paste, cut, sample and so on. This is part of pornography's dialogue or 
discursive economy.
Whether intentional or not the professed aim or hope and effect of 
pornography is to sexually excite its audiences. 126 This is no simple thing. 
Pornography entails a very practical application of data compression. It is a 
complex operation that packages sexual arousal and transmits this information 
across a wide variety of technological mediums. To participate in is always to 
create pornography, to dabble in 'porn speak', to insert, mutate and repeat in its 
discursive economy. Pornography can only ever offer a glimpse, a slice of a 
fantasy sex- reality, never the wholeness of the industry. Pornography, as well 
as sexuality, is an invention, an ongoing discursive invention, rather than an 
essence or an eternal fixed truth. It transmits through its coded meaning bodily 
techniques and sexual practice specific to every epoch and culture. 127
126 Sontag compares this to 'aim to excite' demonstrated by the literary genre of pornography and its 
usages of sexual obsessions, to that of the literary subject of religious obsessions. She writes that when 
compared to this subject then "the familiar fact of pornography's definite, aggressive impact upon its 
readers looks somewhat different. Its celebrated intention of sexually stimulating readers is really a 
species of proselytizing. Pornography that is serious literature aims to "excite" in the same way that books 
which render an extreme form of religious experience aim to "convert"." S. Sontag, "The Pornographic 
Imagination " in Georges Bataille's Story of the Eye, pp. 
127 Marcel Mauss was one of the first thinkers to put forward bodily techniques as a "technology without an 
instrument." See M. Mauss, "Techniques of the Body" (1935), translated by Ben Brewster in Economy 
and Society, 2,1 (1973), pp. 70- 88. Michel Foucault's work on technologies of the self follows in this 
vein. See M. Foucault, Technologies of the Self; Discipline and Punish and the three volumes of A 
History of Sexuality.
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Privacies and Practices: 
Virtual Privacy, New Technologies and Democratic Practices.
1. Micro-Ethics of Virtual Indeterminacy: An Importance of Bodies. 
This thesis is offering the specific conjuncture between pleasure and the ethico- 
political, that pornography names, as 'the pornographical'. In this way, 
pornography, as an industry, discourse and genre is manifested, in the particular 
epoch and cultural aspects of it's relationship to pleasure and to the ethico- 
political, whilst the politics of these dynamics, the mannerisms and dynamics of 
a pornographic code, is not subsumed or contained to this one genre, 
subordinating all other genres. 1
'The pornographical' is a site of degrees of paradoxes; a site that locates, 
through pornography as an industry, genre, name and in the 'human' bodily 
communication of pornographic codes, degrees of social taboos; fetishes; 
fantasies; sexual, gender and racial identities; repressions; oppressions; 
prohibitions and proprieties that are central to a sexual and political account of 
the forces meshed in the social and cultural networks that serve to constitute 
reality. G. Deleuze's reworking of Leibniz expresses an event as a fold, one 
that puts forward a dimensionless point as a site of difference. The fold makes 
possible the fusion and interconnectedness of a crossing or meeting point as the 
primary material for an idea of continuous space, but in doing so destroys any 
such spatial smoothness. As Deleuze writes:
"A fold is always folded within a fold, like a cavern in a cavern. The unit 
of matter, the smallest element of the labyrinth, is the fold, not the point 
which is never a part, but a simple extremity of the line."
1 Pornography is not something that just people in the industry produce. Through the impact of 
technology many lovers and acquaintances make pornography in their memories, videos, photos and web 
pages.
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With such a philosophy, there are no points or moments that are enclosed unto 
themselves; they are not reduced to a relationship of equivalence established 
through their difference to other points or forces. Each is nothing other than a 
quantitative difference from related moments, forces or points and any 
continuity is littered with immanent wraps and pleats:
"The irrational number implies the descent of a circular arc on the straight 
line of rational points, and expresses the latter as a false infinity, a simple 
undefinite that includes that includes an infinity of lacunae; that is why 
the continuous is a labyrinth that cannot be represented by a straight line. 
The straight line has to be intermingled with curves."3
The fold is a dispersion that does not extend anywhere. It is a "leap which 
would not amount to throwing oneself elsewhere (as if another world would 
open up) but rather leaping in place. Folding, leaping in place, and thus 
distorting or displacing the ground (the foundation, or its un-founding)."4 
As Deleuze states:
"The arc of a circle resembles a branch of inflection, an element of the 
labyrinth, that from an irrational number, at the meeting of the curved and 
straight lines, produces a point-fold......there will always be an inflection
that makes a fold from variation, and brings the fold or the variation to 
infinity."5
In place of the Euclidean conception, the fold is a repetitive inflection, one that 
is not a return to self but rather one that always relates to difference.
2 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
4 J-L., Nancy, "The Deleuzian Fold in Thought" in P. Patton, Deleuze and the Political. (London: 
Routledge, 2000), pp. 109.
5 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
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The fold is power and force is an act of the fold. The art of pornography is 
one of folding, accomplished through its techne of comic humour. The object 
here is not essentialising, it becomes an event, and it is manneristic.6
"Moving from the branch of inflection, we distinguish a point that is no 
longer what runs along inflection, nor is it the point of inflection itself; it 
is the one in which the lines perpendicular to tangents meet in a state of 
variation. It is not exactly a point but a place, a position, a site, a "linear 
focus", a line emanating from lines. To the degree it represents variation 
or inflection, it can be called point of view."7
There is no pre-given or defined subject here rather the subject becomes what 
comes to be the point of view or rather what remains in the point of view.
Every point of view is a point of view on variation. 
Deleuze moves from inflection to inclusion:
"What is folded is the included, the inherent. It can be stated that what is 
folded is only virtual and currently exists only in an envelope, in 
something that envelops it."9
To move from the virtual to the real the fold must become a site of focus, to 
become extended in the body, the body that occupies the point of view on 
variation. Deleuze states that there must be a body. 10 The body is a 
requirement for a clear zone of expression, for what T clearly express is what 
happens to 'my'body. 11
The question remains is one of how is the virtual actualised or to put it 
another way how are the folds unfolded? Deleuze often presents actualisation
6 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, pp. 18-19.
7 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
8 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, pp. 19 -20.
9 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
10 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
11 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
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in terms of problem and solution. The virtual is an open, problematic structure 
of singularities, which sets the transcendental horizon of its actualisations and 
solutions. Solutions, in turn, never do away with the problematic that gives 
them meaning, and the latter inheres within them as what generates, exceeds 
and subverts them. 12
Sometimes Deleuze portrays actualisation as a dramatization. 13 The actual 
is a simulation, or a copy without an original, or a coming into being whose 
origin is constituted as an effect of its movement. The recipe for actualisation is 
the disjunctive synthesis; the unfolding of folds is itself a macro-fold. If a 
'thing', understood as a formed unity, is constituted through the interrelation of 
heterogeneous forces, then the organisational principle of things is exactly that 
which relates this plurality through an irreducible difference, that of the virtual. 
This confuses any understanding of actuality based upon resemblance, 
correspondence, identity or representation.
Actualisation is, then, a contraction, of microscopic, virtual singularities, 
which is not continuous with the virtual. The virtual inheres within this actual 
dispersion as that which constitutes it and into which it dissolves. The relation 
between virtual and actual is in no way one of negation or opposition. The 
virtual in no way lacks actuality; nor is the actual an incomplete structure
12 See G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, translated by Paul Patton. (London: The Athlone Press, 
1994), pp. 216-221. Deleuze looks at the structural elements of the Marxism of Althusser in particular, in 
commenting on the previous understanding developed by structuralist theories of the time, of virtual 
multiplicities posed in terms of problems, ideas and structures. In this way, both economically and 
linguistically, society can be seen as composed of "purely formal elements defined by the reciprocal 
relations between their component elements. In the case of language, the ultimate signifying units or 
phonemes are defined by their reciprocal relations to other phonemes. It is the structure of these relations, 
prior to their actualisation in a given series of sounds or inscriptions, which defines a given language." P. 
Patton, Deleuze and the Political (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 37.
13 See G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 168-22 land G. Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, pp. 52-
57.
224
Holly Mountain The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
understood in terms of identity: "the unfolded surface is never the opposite of 
the fold, but rather the movement that goes from some to the others." 14
Deleuze provides the example of the embryological egg for the process of 
actualisation and the implied inherent prior ideal and relational structure 
embedded in its genetic structure. 15 The process of actualisation is always a 
means of differentiation for Deleuze. Differentiation is the practice by which 
ideas become actualised in spatio-temporal events and states of affairs; the 
agents of which are spatio-temporal intensities or dynamisms that are internal to 
any given fields of ideational or material intensity. 16 As Patton remarks:
"This account of the relation between virtual structures and spatio- 
temporal events and states of affairs is the means by which Deleuze 
circumvents the philosophy of representations: bodies and states of affairs 
do not resemble the structures or ideal events of which they are the 
expression, in this sense, he argues, 'actualisation or differentiation is 
always a genuine creation"1 . 17
In looking at the works of Henri Bergson, Deleuze emphasises his equal 
treatment of pure memory, duration and the elan vital as virtual realities, which 
implies a method of actualisation or differentiation. He puts forward that the 
"characteristic of virtuality is to exist in such a way that it is actualised by being 
differentiated and is forced to differentiate itself, to create its lines of 
differentiation in order to be actualised." 18
Bergson's notion of memory is drawn upon here, in that pure being to 
Bergson is "a recollection that is pure, virtual and impassive, inactive in itself.
14 G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, 
15 G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
16 P. Patton, Deleuze and the Political, 
17 P. Patton, Deleuze and the Political, p. 38 and also see G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 
18 G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 
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" 19 The creative movement of actualisation or differentiation from the past 
unity of memory to the present multiplicity takes place only in duration.20 With 
Bergson it is duration that differs with itself and matter that repeats itself. Pure 
duration presents an internal multiplicity or difference in kind, one that is a 
virtual and continuous multiplicity. Elan vital is a "case of a virtuality in the 
process of being actualised, a simplicity in the process of differentiating, a 
totality in the process of dividing. Proceeding "by dissociation and division, by 
'dichotomy', is the essence of life."21
Lyotard would dub this the "paradox of the immemorial". As Lyotard 
writes:
"...Past located at this side of the forgotten, much closer to the present 
moment than any past, at the same time that it is incapable of being 
solicited by voluntary and conscious memory - a past Deleuze says that is 
not past but always there."22
As previously discussed in chapter two of this thesis, Bergson and Deleuze base 
the process of differentiation of this paradox of the immemorial, on the 
relationship between the actual and the virtual rather than the couplet of the 
possible and the real.
Deleuze comments that whilst "the real is the image and likeness of the 
possible that it realises, the actual, on the other hand does not resemble the 
virtuality that it embodies."23 The difference between the virtual and the actual
19 G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, p. 71 and also see M. Hardt, An Apprenticeship in Philosophy: Gilles 
Deleuze, 
20 M. Hardt, An Apprenticeship in Philosophy: Gilles Deleuze, pp. 16-17.
21 G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 
22 J-F. Lyotard, Heidegger and "the jews", 
23 G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 
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is what requires the process of differentiation or actualisation is a creation.24 
There are differences between the virtual point of departure and the actual 
outcome and the various lines along which actualisation can take place. 
Without a preformed order or blueprint to dictate its form, the actualisation 
creates an original arrangement or multiplicity of organisation that is always 
indeterminate. "Without the blueprint of order, the creative process of 
organisation is always an art."25
The creative process is formed through a techne, which provides 
something's art and stylistics. In moving away from paradigms of the 
divergence between essence and appearance, into which pornography is always 
placed, this thesis is analysing the pornographical as a name; an event; a 
dynamical movement and a discursive economy. There is no essence to the 
pornographical, nor is there any essence to the viewers; regulators; protesters; 
stars; directors; producers; actors and actresses that participate in and create the 
pornographical surface.
The pornographical gathers its name and identity as an event, as a system 
and an rhizomatic economy that is 'ana-linguistic' through the drawing 
movement and point of fascination. Its sexual meaning is a series of non- 
coincidental events that are gathered through this shifting relationship between 
an outside law and its own, anonymous, indeterminate meaning. In this way the 
pornographical gathers itself, its name, through the effects of the discursive 
systems and in doing so simultaneously re-gathers on itself and asserts its own
An Apprenticeship in Philosophy: Gilles Deleuze, 
An Apprenticeship in Philosophy: Gilles Deleuze, 
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presence. Ethics are produced in this mimetic process and this process itself is 
ethical.
The ethical indeterminacy of the common noun, pornography, is not being 
raised or posited as a metaphor; a symbol; an allegory: or as a substitute and 
'stand-in' for something else. The pornographical is a multi-dimensional name, 
a paradoxical singularity, a discursive economy rather than a void, lack, 
castration, negation, or empty signifier.26 As a singularity that is multiple, 
pornography cannot be reduced to either a lack of or to one fixed starting point; 
it is not pre-figurable. The actuality of the common noun is one of a "virtual"27 
dynamics, hi this sense a virtual reality is not an outside or an 'inbetween', 
rather it is_ a reality, a stimulus. Gilles Deleuze's conceptions of a virtual event 
is being drawn upon here since they allow for an event to be non-recuperable, 
un-localisable and untimely in providing a contour for actual relations of 
difference.
Pornography, as a virtual dynamics, moves in terms of a paradox, a 
rhythmic movement that is paradoxically in excess of itself exactly when it is a 
mimetic copy of this movement, of these moves. Virtual dynamics is the post- 
modern language term for the installation and flux of a mimetic copy. A 
mimetic copy is the residue created in this movement; a virtual actuality; a 
simulacrum; a prehension or a non-sequential series of these elements. It is in 
this sensuous, shifting dynamics that pornography, as an event, functions in
26 Pornography can be seen to be an empty signifier, but I feel that this allows for a misconception of 
pornography, rather this thesis is approaching pornography as both a series of strong signifiers and of 
empty signifiers. E. Laclau, Emancipation® (London: Verso Books, 1996), pp. 36-46.
27 Gilles Deleuze develops his conception of a virtual presence in many of his solo works and in his 
collaborations with Felix Guattari. Primarily three of his works will be drawn upon in demonstrating the 
dynamics of the virtual. G. Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and The Baroque; G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, and 
G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition.
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installing its own legitimisations, in its relationship between itself [as movement 
and as residue] and an outside law [viewers, regulation, political interpretation].
If pornography constitutes the possibilities of representation, it is the 
presenting of its own re-presentations of itself as a virtual actuality. In 
Deleuzian terms the pornographical, as a surface, structures itself as a rhythmic 
movement of dispersion, one that is a passage from a virtual field of forces into 
actual relations of difference. Actualisation is a creative process of dispersion 
irreducible to the virtual itself, so that the virtual remains heterogeneous, hi this 
way the virtual also differs from the possible. The realisation of the possible is 
rather a process of resemblance. Realisation is a coming into existence, and
/"k Q
existence is understood to resemble the possible that it realises.
The virtual operates as an immanent causality; with the telos being 
permanently dispersed, one that is not transcendent and cannot be abstracted 
from its actualisations. It rather inheres within them as something different. 
There is nothing prior to the actualisations of a virtual event, either temporally 
or logically. As a concentration of heterogeneous forces, a virtual event can 
only be subsequently ascribed to the actual relations as that which fix the 
residue of their positions. Hence, within the dynamics a residue can form a 
ground, originality and referenciality according to varying degrees of 
permeability. The ground of an event cannot be called into being prior to what 
it grounds, the durability of which is a question of the impact of these 
concentration offerees and their differing dispersions and repetitions.
A virtual actuality or event remains indeterminate and infinite, after the 
specifities of its occurrence. Its movement of eternal differentiation assures
28 G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, pp. 51-72 and p. 97; and Deleuze, Gilles, The Fold: Leibniz and The 
Baroque, pp. 105-120.
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non-closure of a virtual presence; one that does not correspond to or resemble 
the actuality it underlies. One can move from virtual forces to an actual state of 
affairs, but "if we go back up in the opposite direction, from states of affairs to 
the virtual, the line is not the same because it is not the same virtual."29 The 
process of realisation is guided according of a structure of mimesis as imitation; 
and is consequently judged through frameworks of resemblance and limitation. 
The process of actualisation, breaks and re-invents a structure of mimesis as a 
repeating movement of creative differentiation; one that is not limited by or that 
involves a copying of the ideal in the real. The truth of a name is not reducible 
to an operation of adequation.
A virtual presence does not have an existence or a reality added to it; there 
is no ideal image or form for it to resemble.30 For the virtual to become actual, 
it must create its own terms of actualisation. It is precisely because a virtual 
event operates as an economy that it ends up creating the texture and terms of its 
own actualisation. This occurs in the relationality of a singular event, as a 
concentation of heterogeneous forces, and in the rhythms of its dynamical 
movement of gathering and dispersion. This movement of an event 
simultaneously actualises an exact copy that remains as a residue of its 
relationality and movement, and at the same time exceeds itself; disperses itself 
in an infinite flux as a movement in space-time occurs. For Deleuze, the virtual 
must create its own terms of actualisation, since the actual does not resemble the 
virtuality that it embodies.31
29 G. Deleuze, and F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 156.
30 G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 
31 G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 
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The reality of the body is the realisation of the virtual actualisation 
of the mimetic movement in the body. Bodies are important in the world, a 
requirement to be in the world; a requirement for both appearance and essence 
and, as this thesis is moving away from such a paradigm, for the realisation and 
embodiment of the virtual actualisation of the mimetic movements in a body 
and other bodies. The relationships that bodies have in the world to the political 
are as a discursive necessity, ethical. In this way the ethics of the 
pornographical are about what a body, bodies can do through techniques of 
fantasy sex and fantasy sexual identities.32
So far, this concluding chapter has looked at how a concept of a virtual 
event and its rhythmic mimetic movements are crucial for an understanding of 
the noun pornography as having meaning, a discursive meaning that is installed 
in a non-dialectical, non-essentialist, and non-universalistic manner. This 
different methodological approach of a discursive economy contours and 
textures a constitutive meaning as both real and virtual; produces a surface of 
meaning according to the movement of its economy as an event; a kind of 'a 
priori' which does not bring in universal moralisms and an all encompassing 
universal notion of ethics, but one that also refuses to step outside of the 
political terrain of ethics. This methodological approach elicits a mirco-ethics, 
an array of indeterminate and malleable trajectories of an ethical 'ought' from a 
singular, paradoxical instance, of an event, of a surface.
The discursive economies of pornography name a specific and paradoxical
relationship between pleasure and the ethicio-political. The pornographical is
32 G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 
33 The relationship of the ethicio-political is about founding meaning without presenting an essence.
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a paradoxical industry, discursive economy, and genre; the name and common 
noun pornography is compiled of complex layers of paradoxical meanings that 
are and are installed in the discursive movement of a pornographic code that is 
both virtual and real. Pornography's discourse articulates many different series 
of paradoxes; its discourse is intertwined, through the specific configurations of 
its relationality, with other discourses, for example, those of msysogony; class; 
racisms and homophobia.
'The pornographical' is a site of degrees of paradoxes; a site that locates, 
through pornography as an industry, genre, name and in the 'human' bodily 
communication of pornographic codes, degrees of social taboos; fetishes; 
fantasies; sexual, gender and racial identities; repressions; oppressions; 
prohibitions and proprieties that are central to a sexual and political account of 
the forces meshed in the social and cultural networks that serve to constitute 
reality.
Pornography is being looked at within this thesis in terms of an excessive 
mimetic movement, as a paradoxical event, one that is impossible to capture at 
the moment when it is fully itself. Traditional notions of time as a linear 
progression of cause and effect, of an immanent causality and space as a 
distance between subjects and objects, are insufficient for discussing the 
paradoxical movement that enables two or more objects to occupy the same 
space-time. Whilst a mimetic copy or residue of pornography is localised in a 
particular space and time it is nonetheless also somewhere and sometime else, 
and, yet this other space and time stands at no distance to the localised here and 
now of a mimetic residue, rather it is gathered or folded into it, into them, 
through its being used in the world, through human bodily communication.
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If the excessive mimetic movement of pornography as a virtual event, a 
name of and a paradoxical discourse and industry is best expressed in the form 
of the infinitive verb, 'to pornograph', then in this expression of the name and 
discourse, the referent, the common noun of pornography, that of the event 
captured 'drops out' and is replaced or substituted by the adjective form, a 
substantial instance of self-referenciality, whilst at the same time remaining 
related to the noun, the adjective, 'pornographic', becomes part of the noun's, 
'pornography', self-referenciality, part of the event of the noun. In this way 
meaning is added to the common noun and discursive name of 'pornography' in 
the excessive mimetic movement and mutation of the adjective, 'pornographic'.
What is being alluded to here is that pornography, as a name of an 
industry, a discourse and a movement/rhythms simultaneously produces its 
meaning, and has its meaning produced in terms of strategies of substitution. 
What is substituted in this texturing process, of pornography's discursive 
economy, is layers of overlapping adjectives of self-referenciality. The 
meaning of the event of the name, pornography, is complied through 
dimensional layers of adjectives. It is in this way that a pornographic code is set 
up and depending on the varying degrees of permeability of meanings installed 
by the movement of the virtual event of pornography, how the name, the 
pornographical, and its related pornographic code is multiplied and 'massified'. 
In this way, the paradoxical community of 'the pornographical' is one that both 
exists and does not exist, it is both private and public, (or private in its virtual 
state) in naming a peculiar cultural 'memory space' or psyche of fantasy sexual 
identities.
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It is the libidinal techne of pornography's comic humour that both forms 
and is formed in what Deleuze would call the folding through or folding across 
of an instant. For Derrida this is a passe-partout; for Lyotard a paradox of the 
immemorial or lost time; and for Deleuze a perplication or cross-folding.34 
These introduce a creative distantiation into the midst of things. Such a 
disparation is the distance holding apart a space "that opens in it the chance of a 
"complex" repetition (not restricted to the imitation of a given model, origin, or 
end) or a "free" difference or divergence (not subordinated to fixed analogies or 
categorical identities)."35 Therefore, perplications provide a trace of the 
diagonal lines in a fabric that cut across it so as to fold it again. They can be 
defined as the weaving together of a multiplicity that gives a groundless depth 
of an intensive space in the extensive one that includes or frames it.
Rajchman marks out perplications as:
"... The foldings that expose an extensive multiple complexity in the fabric of 
things rather than a contradictory framed one; they unearth "within "a space the 
complications that take the space "outside" of itself, or its frame, and fold it 
again."36
Deleuze dubs the depth of such groundless complexities virtual. Disparations 
are always virtualities in space for Deleuze; they provide a kind of chance for 
free self-complication. Rajchman suggests the intensity of a disparation as a 
kind of nondynamic energy, in that the virtual-actual couplet cannot be reduced 
to either a dynamis or an energeia, for this would allow for the meaning to be 
trimmed to the unity of a pregiven set of origins and ends. Virtuality occurs in 
the intervals of things as actuality springs from the midst. He writes:
34 G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. and 
35 J. Rajchman, Constructions. (London: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 18.
36 J. Rajchman, Constructions, 
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"Thus the virtual space that a line of actuality exposes in a fabric is not at 
all a possibility or a design to be integrally realized within a fixed frame, 
but rather the movement of a question that opens onto new unchartered 
directions."37
As such Rajchman suggests that perplications, or times and timings that 
hold a space apart are not the re-instantiation of eternal and ideal Forms nor the 
continuation of traditional customs, "but the "untimely" moments that 
redistribute what has gone before while opening up what may yet come".38 I 
would like to proffer that the perplications of pornography as an event, allow 
such untimely moments to redistribute what has gone before while opening up 
what may yet come. Perplications are mimetic and it is the mimetic rhythms 
and movement of an event that make it real, or the process by which it is 
realised.
This thesis is situated across the fields of contemporary political 
philosophy, critical theory and feminist/gender studies. It argues that the notion 
of an 'ana-aesthetic' is required in order to provide a fuller sense of the 
conceptual nuances regarding pornography and its 'peculiar mix' of 
corrosiveness, comedy, cruelty, fascination, fear, and, rather coldly: data 
compression. As is explained at the outset of The Pornographical: An Ethics of 
Mimetic Bodies, the 'ana-aesthetic' becomes both the ground and surface 
economy for this 'unsayable something', this 'peculiar mix' so much a part of 
the everyday common senses of contemporary life and art. Distinct from the 
'anti-aesthetic', the 'ana-aesthetic' utilises a discursive methodology, which 
provides the conceptual tools to highlight the complexities of ethics, aesthetics,
37 J. Rajchman, Constructions,, 
38 J. Rajchman, Constructions, p. 19. This also references to Nietzsche's work Untimely Mediations.
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identity, as well as sexual and sensuous play often over-looked in most 
scholarship on pornography. In sidestepping the usual moral traps found in 
attempts to analyse sexually explicit and often misogynistic pornographies, this 
thesis consequently shows how the 'ana-aesthetic' surface of 'the 
pornographicaP generates a mimetic and bodily ethics. This is its most original 
contribution.
'The pornographical' is discussed in terms of its techne of comic humour, 
as a way of creating substance without lapsing into abyssal logics or lack; and 
the manner in which sexual meaning of fantasy is pleasurable, forming 
compressed data. The comic is suggested as something that is found, a cultural 
'ready-made' gesture, of pleasure, produced through an economic expenditure 
of ideational mimetics (upon cathexis). This thesis suggests that through the 
comic, 'the pornographical' creates mimetic economies of witnessing. The 
Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies, offers 'the pornographical' as an 
'ana-aesthetic', an ethico-political surface that is not merely counter-cultural but 
is culture itself.
236
The Pornographlcal: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B Ashton. London:
Routledge, 1996. 
______. Aesthetic Theory. Translated, edited and introduced by
Robert Hullot-Kentor. London: The Athlone Press, 1999. 
Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords.
Translated by Henry W. Pickford. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998. 
______. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Rolf Tiedman,
and translated by Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2001. 
______ Metaphysics: Concept and Problems. Edited by Rolf
Tiedman, and translated by Edmund Jephcott. Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2000. 
Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life.
Translated by E.F.N. Jephcott. London: Verso, 2002. 
______ Philosophy of Modern Music. Translated by Anne G.
Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster. London: Continuum,
2003. 
______. Prisms. Translated by Samuel and Shierry Weber.
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997. 
______ Problems of a Moral Philosophy. Translated by Rodney
Livingstone. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. 
The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture.
Edited and introduced by J. M. Bernstein. London:
Routledge, 2003. 
The Jargon of Authenticity. Translated by Knut
Tarnowski and Frederic Will. London: Routledge, 2003. 
and Horkheimer, M. Dialectic of Enlightenment^ translated by
John Gumming. London: Verso, 1995. 
Agamben, G. Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of
Experience. Translated by Liz Heron. London: Verso
Books, 1993. 
Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Edited,
translated and introduced by Daniel Heller-Roazen.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
_____. States of Exception. Translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
_____. The Coming Community. Translated by Michael Hardt.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1993. 
_____. The Man Without Content. Translated by Georgia Albert.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
Arato, A. and Gebhardt, E. (eds.). The Essential Frankfurt School Reader.
Introduction by Paul Piccone. New York: Continuum
Books, 2000. 
Arendt, H. On Revolution. London: Penguin Books, 1990.
On Violence. New York: Harvest Books, 1970.
237
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
The Human Condition. Introduced by Margaret Canovan.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
_____. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harvest
Books, 1976. 
_____. The Portable Arendt Edited by Peter Baehr. London:
Penguin Books, 2000. 
Aristotle. Ethics. Translated by J. A. K. Thomson. London: Penguin
Books,1995. 
____. Metaphysics. Translated by H. Lawson-Tancred. London:
Penguin Books, 1998. 
_____  Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham.
Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1996. 
____. Poetics. Translated and introduced by M. Heath London:
Penguin Books, 1996. 
____. The Art of Rhetoric. Translated with notes by H. C.
Lawson - Tancred. London: Penguin Books, 1991. 
____. The Politics. Translated by T. A. Sinclair. London:
Penguin books, 1992. 
Assiter, A. and Carol, A. (eds.). Bad Girls and Dirty Pictures: The Challenge
to Reclaim Feminism. London: Pluto Press, 1993. 
Bachelard, G. The Dialectic of Duration. Translated and annotated by
Mary McAllester Jones, and introduced by Cristina
Chimisso. Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000. 
The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language and the
Cosmos. Translated by Daniel Russell. Boston: Beacon
Press, 1969. 
The Poetics of Space: The Classic Look at How We
Experience Places. Translated by Maria Jolas and
foreword by John R. Stilgoe. Boston: Beacon Press, 1994. 
_____ The Psychoanalysis of Fire. Translated by Alan C. M.
Ross and preface by Northrop Frye. Boston: Beacon Press,
1968. 
Bal, M. Looking In: The Art of Viewing. Introduced by Norman
Bryson. The Netherlands: G+B Arts International, 2001. 
Bakhtin, M. Rabelais and His World. Bloomington: University of
Indiana Press, 1984. 
Barthes, R. A Lover's Discourse: Fragments. Translated by Richard
Howard. London: Penguin Books, 1990.
Camera Lucida. London; Vintage Books, 1993. 
_____. Elements ofSemiology. Translated by Annette Lavers and
Colin Smith. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994. 
_____. Image Music Text. Essays selected and translated by
Stephen Heath. London: Fontana Press, 1977. 
_____. Mythologies. Selected and translated by Annette Lavers.
London: Vintage Books, 1993. 
_____. The Neutral Translated by Rosalind E. Krauss and Denis
Hollier. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005. 
The Responsibility of Forms: Critical Essays on Music,
Art and Representation. Translated by Richard Howard.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
238




The Rustle of Language. Translated by Richard Howard.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.
S/Z. Translated by Richard Miller and preface by Richard
Howard. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995.
Writing Degree Zero. Translated by Annette Lavers and
Colin Smith, and preface by Susan Sontag. New York: Hill
andWang, 1995.
Blue of Noon. Translated by Harry Mathews. London:
Marion Boyers Publishers, 1995.
Eroticism. Translated by Mary Dalwood. London: Marion
Boyers Publishers, 1994.
On Nietzsche. Translated by Bruce Boone and introduced
by Sylvere Lotringer. London: The Athlone Press, 2000.
The Accursed Share: Volume I. Translated by Robert
Hurley. New York: Zone Books, 1991.
The Accursed Share: Volumes II and III. Translated by
Robert Hurley. New York: Zone Books, 1993.
Story of the Eye. Translated by Joachim Neugroschal.
London: Penguin Books, 1982.
The Absence of Myth: Writings on Surrealism.
Translated, edited and introduced by Michael Richardson.
London: Verso, 1994.
The Bataille Reader. Edited by Fred Botting and Scott
Wilson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.
The Impossible. Translated by Robert Hurley. San
Francisco: City Light Books, 1991.
The Tears of Eros. Translated by Peter Connor. San
Francisco: City Lights Books, 1989.
The Theory of Religion. Translated by Robert Hurley.
New York: Zone Books, 1992.
Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939. Edited,
introduced and translated by Allan Stoekl. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1985.
Fatal Strategies. Translated by Philip Beitchman and
W.GJ. Niesluchowski, and edited by Jim Fleming.
London: Pluto Press, 1990.
Forget Foucault. New York: Semiotext(e), 1987.
Fragments: Conversations with Francois L'Yvonnet
Translated by Chris Turner with foreword by Mike Gane.
London: Routledge, 2004.
Revenge of the Crystal: Selected Writings on the Modern
Object and its Destiny, 1968 - 1983. Edited and translated
by Paul Foss and Julian Pefanis. London: Pluto Press, 1990.
The Ecstasy of Communication. Translated by Bernard
and Caroline Schutze. Edited by Sylvere Lotringer. New
York: Semiotext(e), 1988.
Simulacra and Simulation. Translated by Sheila Faria
Glaser. Michigan: University of Michigan, 1996.
Derrida and\the Political London: Routledge, 1996.
239














Reading, Writing and Rewriting the Prostitute Body.
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994. 
Whore Carnival New York: Automedia, 1993. 
Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A study of the Foundations 
of Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986.
Art, Mimesis and the Avant-Garde. London: Routledge, 
1993.
Judging Lyotard. London: Routledge, 1992. 
The Plural Event: Descartes, Hegel, Heidegger. London: 
Routledge, 1993.
The Problems of Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin. 
London: Routledge, 1991.
Illuminations. Edited and introduced by Hannah Arendt, 
and translated by Harry Zohn. London: Fontana Press, 
1992.
Jacques Derrida. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
Interrupting Derrida. London: Routledge, 2000. 
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation. Edited by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart. 
Introduced by F. Rosen. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996. 
Kennedy, R. The Works of Jacques Lacan: An 
Introduction. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 
Ways of Seeing. London: Penguin Books, 1972. 
Duration and Simultaneity: Bergson and the Einsteinian 
Universe. Edited and introduced by Robin Durie. 
Manchester: Clinamen Press, 1999. 
Key Writings. Edited by Keith Ansell Pearson and John 
Mullarkey. London: Continuum, 2002. 
Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic. 
Translated by C. Brereton and F. Rothwell. Los Angeles: 
Green Integer Books, 1999.
Matter and Memory. Translated by N. M. Paul and W. S. 
Palmer. New York: Zone Books, 1991. 
Four Essays on Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1969.
The Power of Ideas. Edited by Henry Hardy. London: 
Pimlico Press, 2001.
Michel Foucault's Force of Flight: Toward and Ethics for 
Thought. New York: Humanity Books, 1990. 
The Final Foucault. Edited by James Bernauer and David 
Rasmussen. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1987. 
Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant, to 
Derrida and Adorno. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997. 
The Infinite Conversation. Translation and foreword by 
Susan Hanson. Minneapolis: university of Minnesota Press, 
1999.
240











Clausewitz, C. v. 
Cohen, T. 
Comolli.
Conway, D. W. 
Coole, D.
Cornell, D.
The Instant of My Death/Demeure: Fiction and
Testimony, by Jacques Derrida. Translated by Elizabeth
Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000.
the one who was standing apart from me. Translated by
Lydia Davis. New York: Station Hill, 1993.
The Blanchot Reader. Edited by Michael Holland.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche.
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.
The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the
Arcades Project. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995.
Thinking Photography. London: MacMillan Press, 1983.
Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex".
London: Routledge, 1993.
Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. London:
Routledge, 1997.
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Power of Identity.
London: Routledge, 1990.
The Psychic Life of Power. Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1997.
Paraesthetics: Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida. New York:
Methuen, 1987.
Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001.
Philosophy of Art: A Contemporary Introduction.
London: Routledge, 1999.
The Sadeian Woman and the Ideology of Pornography.
New York: Pantheon Books, 1978.
Consequences of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
A Kant Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995.
The Chomsky Reader. Edited by James Peck. London:
Serpent's Tail, 1995.
Understanding Power: The Indispensible Chomsky.
Edited by Peter R. Mitchell and John Schoeffel. London:
Vintage Books, 2003.
On War. Translated by J. J. Graham and F. N. Maude.
Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1997.
Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
"Machines of the visible" in The Cinematic Apparatus.
Edited by Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen Heath. New
York: St. Martins Press, 1980.
Nietzsche and the Political London: Routledge, 1997.
Negativity and Politics: Dionysus and dialectics from Kant
to poststructuralism. London: Routledge, 2000.
Feminism and Pornography. Oxford: Oxford university
Press, 2000.
The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and
Sexual Harassment London: Routledge, 1995.
241





De Beauvoir, S. 
Debord, G. 
De Certeau, M.
De Landa, M. 
Deleuze, G.
The Philosophy of the Limit. London: Routledge, 1992.
Ethics, Politics and Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida,
Levinas and Contemporary French Thought London:
Verso, 1999.
The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1991.
Digital Aesthetics. London: Sage Publications, 1998.
After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the Pale of
History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
The Blood of Others. Translated by Yvonne Moyse and
Roger Senhouse. London: Penguin Books, 1964.
The Society of the Spectacle. Translated by Donald
Nicholson-Smith. New York: Zone Books, 1995.
Heterologies: Discourse on the Other. Translated by Brain
Massumi and foreword by Wlad Godzich. Minneapolis:
university of Minnesota Press, 2000.
A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History. New York:
Swerve Editions, 2000.
Bergsonism. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, 1997.
Cinema 1: The Movement Image. Translated by Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: The Athlone
Press, 1997.
Cinema 2: The Time Image. Translated by Hugh
Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. London: The Athlone Press,
1992.
Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953 -1974. Translated
by Michael Taormina and edited by David Lapoujade. Los
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004.
Empiricism and Subjectivity: An Essay on Hume's Theory
of Human Nature. Translated and introduced by
Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991.
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Translated by
Martin Joughin. New York: Zone Books, 1992.
Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation. Translated by
Daniel W. Smith. London: Continuum, 2003.
Foucault Translated and edited by Scan Hand. London:
The Athlone Press, 1988.
Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties.
Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam.
London: The Athlone Press, 1995.
Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty. New York: Zone
Books, 1991.
Negotiations: 1972 -1990.Translated by Martin Joughin.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.
Nietzsche and Philosophy. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson.
London: The Athlone Press, 1996.
242




Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life. Translated by Anna
Boyman and introduced by John Rajchman. New York:
Zone Books, 2001.
Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Translated by Robert
Hurley. San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988.
The Fold: Leibniz and The Baroque. Translated and
introduced by Tom Conley. London: The Athlone Press,
1993.
The Logic of Sense. Edited by Constantin V. Boundas and
translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. London:
The Athlone Press, 1990.
Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Preface by
Michel Foucault. Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark
Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1983.
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.
Translation and foreword by Brian Massumi. London: The
Athlone Press, 1996.
Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature. Translated by Dana
Polan and foreword by Reda Bensmai'a. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
Nomadology: The War Machine. Translated by Brian
Massumi. New York: Semiotext(e), 1986.
On The Line. Translated by John Johnston. New York:
Semiotext(e), 1983.
Dialogues. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam. London: The Athlone Press, 1987.
Dialogues II. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara
Habberjam. London: Continuum, 2002.
Acts of Literature. Edited by Derek Attridge. London:
Routledge, 1992.
A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds. Edited by Peggy
Kamuf. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
Aporias. Translated by Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1993.
Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Translated by
Eric Prenowitz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1995.
A Taste for the Secret Translated by Giacomo Donis, and
edited by Giacomo Donis and David Webb. Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2001.
Difference and Repetition. Translated by Paul Patton.
London: The Athlone Press, 1994.
Dissemination. Translated and introduced by Barbara
Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Edmund Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction.
Translated, prefaced and afterword by John P. Leavey, Jr.
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
Given Time: Counterfeit Money. Translated by Peggy
Kamuf. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
Limited Inc. Edited by Gerald Graff. Illinois:
Northwestern University Press, 1997. 
_____. Margins of Philosophy. Translated by Alan Bass.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982. 
_____  
Memoiresfor Paul de Man. Translated by Cecile Lindsay,
Jonathan Culler, Eduardo Cadava and Peggy Kamuf. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 
. Memoirs of the Blind: The Self-Portrait and Other Ruins.
Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. 
_____  
Of Grammatology. Translated and introduced by Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press,
1976. 
_____
Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Translated by
Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
_____. On the Name. Edited by Thomas Dutoit and translated by
David Wood, John P. Leavy, Jr., and lan McLeod.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jiirgen
Habermas and Jacques Derrida. Edited by Giovanna
Borradori. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
_____
Politics of Friendship. Translated by George Collins.
London: Verso Books, 1997. 
_____
Points. . .Interviews 1974 - 1994. Edited by Elisabeth
Weber and translated by Peggy Kamuf and others.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. 
_____. Positions. Translated and annotated by Alan Bass. New
York: Continuum, 2002. 
Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of
Mourning and the New International. Translated by
Peggy Kamuf, and introduced by Bernd Magnus and
Stephen Cullenberg. London: Routledge, 1994. 
Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's
Theory Signs. Edited and translated with an introduction
by David B. Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1973. 
_____. Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles. Translated by Barbara Harlow.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979. 
_____. The Gift of Death. Translated by David Wills. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
_____. The Truth in Painting. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington
and lan McLeod. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1987. 
_____. "Desistance" in Lacoue-Labarthe, P. Typography:
Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics. Translated by Christopher
Fynsk. California: Stanford University Press, 1998. 
De Duve, T. Kant After Duchamp. Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1998. 
De Sade. Juliette. Translated by Austryn Wainhouse. New York:
244











Justine, Philosophy in the Bedroom and Other Writings.
Translated by Richard Seaver and Austryn Wainhouse. 
London: Arrow Books, 1991.
The 120 Days of Sodom and Other Writing. Translated by 
Richard Seaver and Austryn Wainhouse. London: Arrow 
Books, 1990.
Modern French Philosophy. Translated by L. Scott-Fox 
and J.M. Harding. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996.
Phantom Communities: The Simulacrum and the limits of 
the Postmodern. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998.
Men Possessing Women. London: The Women's Press, 
1992.
Interpretation and Overinterpretation. Edited by Stefan 
Collini. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
Desire and Love: Photoworks. . London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1999.
Inside Information: Imaging the Human Body. . 
London: Thames and Hudson, 1996. 
The Body: Photoworks of the Human Form. London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1996.
Maynard, P. (eds.). Aesthetics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997.
Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and 
Postmodernism in the Contemporary West. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990. 
Prosthetic Gods. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2006. 
The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. 
Washington: Bay Press, 1985.
The Return of the Real Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 
1996.
Abnormal Translated by Graham Burchell,2003. and 
edited by Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni. 
London: Verso,
Death and the Labyrinth: The World of Raymond 
Roussel Translated by Charles Ruas. London: The 
Athlone Press, 1987.
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 
Translated by Alan Sheridan. London: Penguin Books, 
1991.
Fearless Speech. Edited by Joseph Pearson. Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2001.
Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961 -1984. Edited 
by Sylvere Lotringer, and translated by Lysa Hochroth and 
John Johnston. New York: Semiotext(e), 1996. 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays 
and Interviews. Edited and introduced by Donald F.
245
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
Bouchard. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry
Simon. New York: Cornell University Press, 1996.
Madness and Civilization: A History of insanity in the Age
of Reason. Translated by Richard Howard. London:
Routledge, 1995.
Maurice Blanchot: Thought From Outside/Michel
Foucault as I Imagine Him, by M. Blanchot Translated
by Jeffrey Mehlman and Brian Massumi. New York: Zone
Books, 1990.
Michel Foucault: Aesthetics, Method and Epistemology.
Edited by James D. Faubion, and Translated by Robert
Hurley and others. New York: The New Press, 1998.
Michel Foucault: Ethics. Edited by Paul Rabinow, and
translated by Robert Hurley and others. London: Penguin
Press, 1997.
Michel Foucault- Politics- Philosophy- Culture:
Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984. Translated by
Alan Sheridan et al, and edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman.
London: Routledge, 1990.
Michel Foucault: Power. Edited by James d. Faubion, and
translated by Robert Hurley and others. London: Penguin
Press, 2001.
Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings 1972 -1977. Edited by Colin Gordon, and
Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham
and Kate Soper. Essex: Longman, 1980.
Society Must Be Defended. Translated by David Macey,
and edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana.
London: Penguin Books, 2003.
Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel
Foucault. Edited by Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and
Patrick H. Hutton. Massachusetts: University of
Massachusetts press, 1988.
The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A. M.
Sheridan Smith. London: Routledge, 1995.
The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical
Perception. Translated by Alan S. Sheridan. London:
Routledge, 2000.
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Edited
by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller.
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, VoL 1.
Translated Robert Hurley. London: Penguin Books, 1990.
The History of Sexuality: The Use of Pleasure, VoL 2.
Translated Robert Hurley. London : Penguin Books, 1990.
The History of Sexuality: The Care of the Self, VoL 3.
Translated Robert Hurley. London: Penguin Books, 1990.
The Foucault Reader. Edited by Paul Rabinow. London:
Penguin Books, 1991.
246




Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio
Trombadori. Translated by R. James Goldstein and James
Cascaito. New York: Semiotext(e), 1991. 
______. The Politics of Truth. Edited by Sylvere Lotringer and
Lysa Hochroth. New York: Semiotext(e), 1997. 
  The Order of Things: An Archaeology on the Human
Sciences. London: Routledge, 1994. 
______  This is not a Pipe. Translated and edited by James
Harkness. London: University of California Press, 1983. 
and Binswanger, L. Dreams and Existence. Edited by Keith Hoeller, and
translated by Forrest Williams. New Jersey: Humanities
Press, 1993.
Photogenic Painting. Edited by Sarah Wilson, translated
by Daffydd Roberts and introduced by Adrian Rifkin.
London: Black Dog Publishing, 1999.
Screen Violence. London: Bloomsbury Publications, 1996.
Art and Literature. Translated by James Strachey. London:
Penguin Books, 1990.
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology and
Other Works. Translated by James Strachey. London:
Vintage Books, 2001.
Case Histories II. Translated by James Strachey. London:
Penguin Books, 1991.
Civilization and Its Discontents. Translated by David
McLintock. London: Penguin Books, 2002.
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Translated by
James Strachey. London: Penguin Books, 1991.
Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. Translated
by James Strachey. London: Penguin Books, 1991.
Moses and Monotheism, An Outline of Psycho-analysis
and Other Works. Translated by James Strachey. London:
Vintage Books, 2001.
On Metapsychology. Translated by James Strachey.
London: Penguin Books, 1991.
On Sexuality. Translated by James Strachey. London:
Penguin, 1991.
Origins of Religion. Translated by James Strachey.
London: Penguin Books, 1990.
The Freud Reader. Edited by Peter Gay. New York:
Vintage Books, 1995.
The Future of an Illusion, Civilization and its Discontents
and Other Works. Translated by James Strachey. London:
Vintage Books, 2001.
The Interpretation Of Dreams. Translated by James
Strachey. London: Penguin Books, 1991.
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Translated by
James Strachey. London: Penguin Books, 1991.
Heidegger: Thought and Historicity. Expanded edition.
New York: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Fynsk, C.
247
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies













Infant Figures: The Death of the 'Infans' and Other 
Scenes of Origin. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000.
Language and Relation...that there is language.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. 
Makinen,M. Female Fetishism: A New Look. 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1994.
Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida.
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995.
The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of
Reflection. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1993. 
Wulf, C. Mimesis: Culture-Art-Society. Translated by
Don Reneau. Berkeley: University of California
Press,1995.
The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double
Consciousness. London: Verso Books, 1996.
There Ain 't No Black in the Union Jack. London:
Routledge, 1995.
The Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1996.
Conceptual Art. London: Phaidon Press, 1998.
Games of Truth: a blood Poetic in 7 Part Harmony.
London: University of Greenwich, 2003.
Gramsci's Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post- 
Liberal Democracy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1992.
Honour. London: Taylor Francis, 1999..
"Sexual Manners" in Ethics of Enactment. Public, Vol. 8,
Toronto: 1993.
"Solar Clitoris" in Bataille. Parallax, Mar - Apr 1997.
Women's Comedy: Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Gender
and Humour. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.
"Comic Subversions: Comedy as Strategy in Feminist
Theatre " in The Polity Reader in Cultural Theory, 
by Anthony Giddens. London: Polity Press, 1993.
"Gender and Humour in Contemporary British Culture" in
Issue No. 1,
Autumn, 1997.
The Routledge Reader in Politics and Performance.
London: Routledge, 1999.
Philosophy of the Arts: An Introduction to Aesthetics.
London: Routledge, 1997.
Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited and
translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith.
London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998.
Postmodern War: The New Politics of Conflict London:
Routledge, 1997.
The Cyborg Handbook. London: Routledge, 1995.
Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
248
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
Greene, B.





Hegel, G. W. F.
Heidegger, M.
The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions,
and the Quest for the Ultimate Theory. London: Vintage
Books, 1999.
Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1995.
Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of
Nature. London: Free Association Books, 1991.
Modest_Witness@ Second Millennium: Feminism and
Technoscience. London: Routledge, 1997.
Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy.
London: UCL Press, 1993.
The Body of This Death: Historicity and Sociality in the
Time of AIDS. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996.
"Pornographically man dwells ...... towards an
irresponsible reading of Heidegger " in Issues in
Contemporary Culture and Aesthetics, VoL 12, edited by
S. Golding/johnny de philo. Maastricht: Jan Van Eyck
Akademie, August 2001.
A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black
Holes. Introduction by Carl Sagan. London: Bantam
Books, 1997.
Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics. Translated by
Bernard Bosanquet, and edited, and introduced with
commentary by Michael Inwood. London: Penguin Books,
1993.
The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A. V. Miller
with a foreword by J. N. Findlay. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977.
The Hegel Reader. Edited by Stephen Houlgate. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
Basic Concepts. Translated by Gary E. Aylesworth.
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993.
Basic Writings. Edited by David Farrell Krell. London:
Routledge, 1996.
Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997.
The Concept of Time. Translated by William McNeill.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Parvis
Emad and Kenneth Maly. Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 1994.
Identity and Difference. Translated by J. Stambaugh.
New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969.
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Translated by
Richard Taft. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.
Nietzsche: Volumes One and Two. Translated by David
Farrell Krell. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.
Nietzsche: Volumes Three and Four. Translated by David
Farrell Krell. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991.
249





The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.
Translated and introduced by William Lovitt. New York:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1977.
The Principle of Reason. Translated by Reginald Lilly.
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996.
What is Called Thinking? Translated by J. Glenn Gray.
New York: Harper TorchBooks, 1968.
The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality. 
University Press, 1993.
Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to
Habermas. London: Hutchinson Publishing Group, 1980.
Blanchot: Extreme Contemporary. London: Routledge,
1997.
Leviathan. Edited by C.B. Macpherson. London: Penguin
Books, 1979. 
Hollis, M. and Lukes, S. (eds.). Rationality and Relativism. Massachusetts:
The MIT Press, 1997.
Horkheimer, M. Eclipse of Reason. New York: Continuum Books, 1974. 
Hunt, L. Eroticism and the Body Politic. Baltimore: The John
Hopkins University Press, 1992. 
The Family Romance of the French Revolution.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992. 
The Invention of Pornography: Obscenity and the
Origins of Modernity, 1500-1800. New York: Zone Books,
1996.
A Hegel Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
Between East and West: From Singularity to Community.
Translated by S. Pluhacek. New Delhi, India: New Age
Books, 2005. 
_____
Speculum of the Other Woman. Translated by Gillian C.
Gill. New York: Cornell University Press, 1987. 
_____. The Irigaray Reader. Edited by Margaret Whitford.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991. 
_____. The Sex Which is Not One. Translated by Catherine Porter
with Carolyn Burke. New York: Cornell University Press,
1988. 
Jay, M. the Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt
School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923 -1950.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. 
Kant, I. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Lewis White
Beck. New Jersey: Prentice Hall Publications, 1993. 
_____. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp
Smith. London: MacMillan Press, 1929. 
Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.
Translated by T. K. Abbott. New York: Prometheus Books,
1988. 
_____. Kant: Selections. Edited and introduced by Lewis White
















Kraut, R. (ed.). 
Kristeva, J.
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime.
Translated John T. Goldthwait. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1960.
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. The Paul Cams
translation. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
1977.
The Critique of Judgement Translated with analytical
indexes by James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1952.
The Metaphysics of Morals. Edited and translated by Mary
Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Female Perversions. New York: Doubleday Books, 1991.
Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
The Secret Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Either/Or: A Fragment of Life. Translated by A. Hannay.
London: Penguin Books, 1992.
Fear and Trembling. Translated and introduced by
Alastair Hannay. London: Penguin Books, 1985.
The Essential Kierkegaard. Edited by H.V. Hong and E.H.
Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Repetition. Translated by H.V. Hong and E.H. Hong.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
The Sickness Unto Death. Translated by A. Hannay.
London: Penguin Books, 1989.
Bound and Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of
Fantasy in America. North Carolina: Duke University
Press, 1999.
Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle. Translated by Daniel W.
Smith. London: The Athlone Press, 1997.
The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and
After. Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1986.
Fuzzy thinking: The New Science of Fuzzy Thinking.
London: Flamingo Books, 1994.
The Physics of Star Trek. Foreword by Stephen Hawking.
London: Flamingo books, 1995.
Formless: A User's Guide. New York: Zone Books, 1997.
The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist
Myths. Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996.
The Optical Unconscious. Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
1996.
The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Translated by
Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press,
1982.
251
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
Lacan, J.
Laclau, E
Revolution in Poetic Language. New York: Columbia
University Press, 1984.
The Kristeva Reader. Edited by Toril Moi. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1992.
"A Question of Subjectivity- An Interview " in
Postmodernism. Edited by R. Rice and P. Waugh.
London: Edward Arnold, 1989.
Ecrits: A Selection. Translated by Bruce Fink. New York:
W. & W. Norton and Company, 2002.
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis: The Seminar of Jacques
Lacan, Book VII. Translated Dennis Porter and edited by
Jacques - Alain Miller. London: Routledge, 1999.
The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis.
Translated by Alan Sheridan and edited by Jacques - Alain
Miller. London: Vintage Books, 1998.
The Psychoses: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III.
Translated by Russell Grigg and edited by Jacques - Alain
Miller. London: Routledge, 2000.
"Seminar on the Purloined Letter ". Translated by J.
Melhman, in J. Muller and W. Richardson, (eds), The
Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida and Psychoanalytic
Reading. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1988.
Emancipation^). London: Verso Books, 1996.
New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. London:
Verso Books, 1990.
The Making of Political Identities. London: Verso Books,
1994.
Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a radical
Democratic Politics. London: Verso books, 1999. 
Lacoue-Labarthe, P. Heidegger, Art and Politics. Translated by C. Turner.
Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1990. 
_____ Musica Ficta (Figures of Wagner). Translated by Felicia
McCarren. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. 
Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics. Translated by
Christopher Fynsk. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1998. 
and Nancy, J-L. Retreating the Political Edited by Simon Sparks. London:
Routledge, 1997. 
Levinas, E. Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo.
Translated by Richard A. Cohen. Pittsburgh: Duquesne
University Press, 1985.
Two Treatises of Government Edited by Peter Laslett.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Dispositifs Pulsionnels. Union Generale: Paris, 1973.
Driftworks. Edited by Roger McKeon. New York:
Semiotext(e), 1984.
Heidegger and uthe]ews n. Translated by Andreas Michel
and Mark S. Roberts, and introduced by David Carroll.





The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime. Translated by
Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford University press, 
1994.
Libidinal Economy. Translated by lain H. Grant. London:
The Athlone Press, 1993. 
  Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988. 
______. Phenomenology. Translated by Brian Beakley and
foreword by Gayle L. Ormiston. New York: State
University of New York Press, 1991. 
______  Political Writings. Translated by Bill Readings and Kevin
Paul Geiman, and foreword by Bill Readings. London:
University of London Press, 1993. 
______. postmodern fables. Translated by Georges Van Den
Abbeele. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997. 
______. signed, Malraux. Translated by Robert Harvey.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 
Soundproof Room: Malraux's Anti-Aesthetics. Translated
by Robert Harvey. Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2001. 
The Assassination of Experience by Painting - Jacques
Monory. Translated by Rachel Bowlby and edited by Sarah
Wilson. London: Black Dog Publishing, 1998. 
______ The Confession of Augustine. Translated by Richard
Beardsworth. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 
______ The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Translated by Georges
Van Den Abbeele. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996. 
The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Translated by
Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1993. 
______. The LyotardReader. Edited by Andrew Benjamin.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992. 
The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.
Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi,
foreword by Fredric Jameson. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1997. 
The Postmodern Explained to Children: Correspondence
1982 -1985. Translations edited by Julian Pefanis and
Morgan Thomas. London: Turnaround Books, 1992. 
______ Toward the Postmodern. Edited by Robert Harvey and
Mark S. Roberts. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1995. 
and Thebaud, J-L. Just Gaming. Translated by Wlad Godzich, afterword by
Samuel Weber and translated by Brian Massumi.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. 
MacDonald, S. "Confessions of a Feminist Porn Watcher" in Film
Quarterly 36, no 3. 1983. 
MacKinnon, C. Only Words. Harvard University Press: Massachusetts,
1996.
253














"Not a Moral Issue " in Feminism and Pornography.
Edited by Drucilla Cornell. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000,
The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and
Dialectic. Translated by Lisabeth During and preface by
Jacques Derrida. London: Routledge, 2005.
An Essay on Liberation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1991.
Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into
Freud. London: Ark Paperbacks, 1987.
Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Utopia.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.
One - Dimensional Man. Introduced by Douglas Kellner.
London: Routledge, 1991.
Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social
Theory. New York: Humanity Books, 1999.
The Aesthetic Dimension: Toward a Critique of Marxist
Aesthetics. Boston: Beacon Press, 1978.
Getting into the Artist's Head" in Helen Chadwick. Edited
by Mark Sladen. Ostfildern, Germany: Barbican Art
Gallery/ Harje Cantz Publishers, 2004.
Karl Marx: Selected Writings. Edited by David McLellan.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
"Techniques of the Body". Translated by Ben Brewster in
Economy and Society, 2, 1, 1973.
Imperial Leather: Racet Gender and Sexuality in the
Colonial Conquest. London: Routledge, 1995.
Basic Writings. Edited by Thomas Baldwin. London:
Routledge, 2004.
Phenomenology of Perception. Translated from the French
by Colin Smith. London: Routledge, 2000.
On Liberty and Other Essays. Edited and introduced by
John Gray. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius. London:
Vintage Books, 1991.
"Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape" in Take
Back the Night: Women on Pornography. Edited by
Laura Lederer. London: Bantham Books, 1982.
Being Singular Plural Translated by Robert D.
Richardson and Anne E. O'Byrne. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2000.
Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative. Translated by
Jason Smith and Steven Miller. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2002.
The Birth to Presence. Translated by Brian Holmes and
others. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.
The Muses. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1996.
Being Digital London: Coronet Books, 1995.
A Nietzsche Reader. Selected and translated by R. J.
Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books, 1977.
254
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
O' Toole, L. 
Patton, P.





Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated and edited with
commentaries by Walter Kaufinann. New York: The
Modern Library, 1992.
Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the
Future. Translated with commentary by Walter Kaufmann.
London: Vintage Books, 1989.
Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality.
Translated by R. J. Hollingdale and introduced by Michael
Tanner. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1995.
Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits.
Translated by R. J Hollingdale and introduced by Richard
Schacht. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1996.
My Sister and I. Translated by Dr. Oscar Levy. Los
Angeles: Amok Books, 1990.
The Birth of Tragedy/ The Case of Wagner. Translated
with commentary by Walter Kaufmann. New York:
Vintage Books, 1967.
The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and An
Appendix in Song. Translated with commentary by Walter
Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.
The Will to Power. Edited by Walter Kaufmann, and
translated by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New
York: Vintage Books, 1968.
Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Translated and introduced by R.
J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books, 1969.
Twilight of the Idols/ The Anti-Christ. Translated and
introduced, with commentary by R. J. Hollingdale.
London: Penguin Books, 1979.
Untimely Mediations. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale and
introduced by J.P. Stern. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996.
Pornocopia: Porn, Sex, Technology and Desire. London:
Serpent's Tail, 1998.
Deleuze:A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
1997.
Deleuze and the Political. London: Routledge, 2000.
The Attack of the Blob: Hannah Arendt's Concept of the
Social. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.
Republic. Translated by Robin Waterfleld. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994.
The Last Days of Socrates. Translated by Hugh
Tredennick and Harold Tarrant. London: Penguin Books,
2003.
Symposium. Translated and introduced by Alexander
Nehamas and Paul Woodruff.
Heidegger: An Introduction. London: UCL Press, 1999.
The Open Society and Its Enemies: Volume onet The
Spell of Plato. London: Routledge, 2003.
Constructions. Foreword by Paul Virilio. Massachusetts:
The MIT Press, 1998.
255
The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies





Michel Foucault: The Freedom of Philosophy. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1985.
The Deleuze Connections. Massachusetts: The MIT Press,
2000.
Foucault's Discipline: The Politics of Subjectivity.
Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.
Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics. London:
Routledge, 1992.
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Hegel: Contra Sociology. London: The Athlone Press,
1995.
Love's Work. London: Vintage Books, 1997.
Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1994.
Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996.
Discourse on the Origin of Inequality. Translated by D. A.
Cress, and introduced by James Miller. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
On the Social Contract Translated by Donald A. Cress,
and introduced by Peter Gay. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1987.
"Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality" in Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female
Sexuality, edited by Carol S. Vance. London: Pandora
Press, 1992.
Poetics of Cinema. Translated by Brian Holmes. France:
Dis Voir Editions.
Against Pornography: The Evidence of Harm. California:
Russell Publications, 1993.
Spacings - of Reason and Imagination: In the texts of
Kant, Fichte, HegeL Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1987. 
Schrift, A.D.(ed.). The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity.
London: Routledge, 1997. 
Segal, L. and Mclntosh, M. (eds.). Sex Exposed: Sexuality and the
Pornography Debate. New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1993. 
Shaviro, S. The Cinematic Body. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2000. 
Shelton, A. (ed.) Fetishism: Visualising Power and Desire. London: Lund
Humphries Publishers, 1995. 
Sigel, L International Exposure: Perspectives on Modern
European Pornography, 1800 - 2000. London: Rutgers
University Press, 2005 






The Pornographical: An Ethics of Mimetic Bodies
Singer, P. Rethinking Life and Death: The Collapse of Our
Traditional Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1994.
Sontag, S. Etcetera. London: Vintage Books, 1996. 
______  On Photography. London: Penguin Books, 1977. 
______  Styles of Radical Will London: Vintage Books, 2001. 
    
  . "The Pornographic Imagination" in Georges Bataille's
Story of the Eye. London: Penguin Books, 1982. 
Sorel, G. Reflections on Violence. Translated by T. E. Hulme and J.
Roth, and introduced by Edward A. Shils. New York:
Dover Publications, 2004. 
Sprinkle, A. Annie Sprinkle: Post Porn Modernist. New York: Torch
Books, 1991.
Stavrakakis, Y. Lacan and the Political London: Routledge, 1999. 
Stengers, I. Power and Invention: Situating Science. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1997. 
Stiglitz, J. Globalization and Its Discontents. London: Penguin
Books, 2002. 
Stirk, P.M.R. and Weigall, D. (eds.). An Introduction to Political Ideas.
London: Pinter Publishers, 1995. 
Stoller, R. Observing the Erotic Imagination. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985. 
Stone, A.S. The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of the
Mechanical Age. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996 
Stroll, A. Surfaces. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press,
1988. 
Strossen, N. Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight
for Women's Rights. London: Abacus Books, 1996. 
Tang, I. Pornography: The Secret History of Civilization.
London: Macmillan Publishers, 1999.
Taylor, C. Hegel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
Tilly, C. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge:
Cambridge University press, 2003. 
Ulmer, G. L. Applied Grammatology: Post(e)-Pedagogy from Jacques
Derrida to Joseph Beuys. Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1992. 
Vance, C.S. (ed.). Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality.
London: Pandora Press, 1992. 
Vico, G. New Science. Translated by David Marsh and introduced
by Anthony Grafton. London: Penguin Books, 2001. 
Virilio, P. Open Sky. Translated by Julie Rose. London: Verso
Books, 1997. 
Speed and Politics: An Essay on Dromology. Translated
by Mark Polizzotti. New York: Semiotext(e), 1986. 
_____. The Lost Dimension. Translated by Daniel Moshenberg.
New York: Semiotext(e), 1991. 
War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception. Translated
by Patrick Camiller. London: Verso Books, 1989. 
Weeks, J. Invented Moralities: Sexual Values in an Age of
Uncertainty. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995.
257









Genealogies of Difference. Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 2002.
Lyotard and the Political London: Routledge, 2000.
Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the " Frenzy of the
Visible". London: Pandora Press, 1991.
Porn Studies. London: Duke University Press, 2004.
"Pornographies on/scene or Diff'rent strokes for different
folks " in Sex Exposed: Sexuality and the Pornography
Debate, edited by Lynne Segal and Mary Mclntosh. New
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1993.
Culture and Materialism. London: Verso, 2005.
Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. London:
Fontana Press, 1988.
Technologies of Seeing: Photography, Cinematography
and Television. London: British Film Institute Publishing,
1996.
Culture and Value.: A Selection of Posthumous Remains.
Edited by Georg Henrik von Wright in collaboration with
Heikki Nyman, and transited by Peter Winch. Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
On Certainty. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von
Wright, and translated by Denis Paul and G.E.M.
Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
Philosophical Grammar. Edited by Rush Rhees and
translated by Anthony Kenny. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1990.
Philosphical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M.
Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
Remarks on Colour. Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe, and
translated by Linda L. McAlister and Margarete Schattle.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998.
The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the
'PhilosophicalInvestigations'. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 1998.
The Wittgenstein Reader. Edited by Anthony Kenny.
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995.
A World Without Time: The Forgotten Legacy ofGodel
and Einstein. New York: Basic Books, 2005.
The Zizek Reader. Edited by Elizabeth and Edmond
Wright. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
258

